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ABSTRACT

Decision Making in Networked Systems
Mohammad Hadi Afrasiabi
Roch Guérin

Living in a networked world, human agents are increasingly connected as advances in
technology facilitates the flow of information between and the availability of services to
them. Through this research, we look at interacting agents in networked environments,
and explore how their decisions are influenced by other people’s decisions. In this context,
an individual’s decision may be regarding a concrete action, e.g., adoption of a product
or service that is offered, or simply shape her opinion about a subject. Accordingly, we
investigate two classes of such problems. The first problem is the dynamics of service
adoption in networked environments, where one user’s adoption decision, influences the
adoption decision of other users by affecting (positively or negatively) the benefits that
they derive from the service. We consider this problem in the context of “User-Provided
Connectivity”, or UPC. The service offers an alternative to traditional infrastructure-based
communication services by allowing users to share their “home base” connectivity with other
users, thereby increasing their access to connectivity. We investigate when such services are
viable, and propose a number of pricing policies of different complexities. The pricing
policies exhibit differences in their ability to maximize the total welfare created by the
service, and distributing the welfare between different stakeholders. The second problem
is the spread of opinions in a networked environment, where one agent’s opinion about an
issue, influences and is influenced by that of other agents to whom she is connected. We
are particularly interested in the role that people’s adherence to specific groups or parties
may play in how final opinions are formed. We approach this problem using a model of
interactions inspired by the Ising spin-glass model from classical Physics. We consider two
related but distinct settings, and show that when party memberships directly influence
user interactions, even slightest statistical partisan biases result in partisan final outcomes:
where everyone in a party shares the same opinion, opposite to that of the other party. On
the other hand, if party membership plays an indirect role in biasing agent interactions,
then there is room for intra-party heterogeneity of opinions.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Individuals1 living in the networked modern world interact with each other in a variety of
ways. They consume and share information, goods and services, whereby influencing each
other’s decisions and behaviors [33]. These interactions complicate the decision-making
patterns in networked settings, and there has been growing interest in understanding and
predicting such patterns [28,35,36], which require consideration of how individuals perceive
and react to external influences, or “externalities”.
The concept of externalities (also called “network effect”) has been traditionally used
for modeling the adoption of goods and services in networked settings [27]. A product
with positive externalities, for example, is one that becomes more appealing as more people
use it. In this research, we study2 various problems in networked settings where individuals
face complex positive and negative externalities, and investigate how the tug of war between
different types of externalities shapes individuals’ decisions and behaviors in those settings.
In this context, an individual’s decision may be regarding a concrete action, e.g., adoption
of a new product or service that is offered, or simply shape her opinion regarding a subject.
In both cases, the person’s decision includes a component that is contributed by others.
Accordingly, we investigate two classes of such problems.
1

We may use the terms “individual”, “person” and “agent” interchangeably to refer to an entity in a
networked setting, as may be represented by a “node” in the network’s graph.
2
This dissertation is based on work with Roch Guérin and Santosh Venkatesh, parts of which has
appeared in [1–6].

1

The first problem is the dynamics of service adoption in networked environments, where
one user’s adoption decision influences the adoption decisions of other users by affecting
(positively or negatively) the benefits that they derive from the service. We consider this
problem in the context of “User-Provided Connectivity, or UPC, which we introduce in
Section 1.1 with full investigation given in Chapter 3.
The second problem is the spread of opinions in networked environments, where one
agent’s opinion about an issue, influences and is influenced by that of other agents to whom
she is connected. We are particularly interested in the role that people’s adherence to
specific groups or parties may play in how final opinions are formed. We introduce this
problem in Section 1.2, with full investigation provided in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 2 we review the related work in this area.

1.1

Adoption of service in user-provided connectivity

Network services often exhibit positive and negative externalities that affect users’ adoption
decisions. One such service is “user-provided connectivity” or UPC. The service offers an
alternative to traditional infrastructure-based communication services by allowing users to
share their “home base” connectivity (see [64] for an example) with other users, thereby
increasing their access to connectivity.
More users mean more connectivity alternatives, i.e., a positive externality, but also
greater odds of having to share one’s own connectivity, i.e., a negative externality. The tug
of war between positive and negative externalities together with the fact that they often
depend not just on how many but also which users adopt, make it difficult to predict the
service’s eventual success. We explore this issue, and investigate not only when and why
such services may be viable, but also explore how pricing can be used to effectively and
practically realize them.
Towards this goal, we develop a simple model that helps understand how the different
factors interact and affect the adoption of a UPC service and the total welfare (sum of users’
utility and provider’s profit) it creates, and how that welfare can be efficiently distributed
2

between users and the service provider. To maintain analytical tractability, the model makes
a series of simplifying assumptions, many of which may arguably not hold in practice.
However, the analysis affords insight that, as we demonstrate, remains valid even under
more general settings. Specifically, our main contributions consist of
• Formulating and solving a simple model that captures key features of a UPC type of
service;
• Characterizing when and how the service’s total welfare, or value, is maximized;
• Identifying practical pricing policies that realize a different trade-off between optimizing welfare and distributing it between stakeholders.
• Numerically validating the robustness of the findings, when relaxing the simplifying
assumptions on which the model relies.

1.2

Opinion formation in biased networks

Social interactions commonly take place in a networked setting where an individual’s opinion
is influenced by the opinions of others. We allow this influence to be positive or negative,
biased by partisan affiliations of connected individuals. Such signed influences are akin to
the positive and negative externalities described earlier for the adoption of a UPC service.
Our work explores the role of partisan influence in the emergence of consensus opinions in
social network settings.
We study a network of nodes where each node holds an opinion — a binary state that
may update over time under the influence of a node’s neighbors. Nodes have biased affinities,
which logically partition the network into distinct parties. Nodes in the same party tend
to have a positive influence on each other, but the extent to which this holds varies across
nodes and depends on the chosen affinity model.
We consider two variations on an Ising spin-glass network model (from classical physics)
that investigate opinion formation in such biased affinity systems. These models differ in
how they determine the pairwise influence between nodes.

3

The first of these in what we term the random influence model randomly selects the
influence two nodes exert on each other based on their respective party affiliation. The
second, a profile-based model, relies on a profile, a κ-bit vector of ±1 entries based on the
node’s known positions regarding each of κ independent topics. In this model the similarity
of the profiles of two nodes determines whether they have a positive or negative influence
on each other’s opinions.
We investigate the formation of opinions under both models and characterize their fixed
points (equilibria). We show that while these systems always converge to a fixed point,
they differ in their number and types of fixed points. Under a direct party impact as in
the random influence model, opinions nearly always converge to a partisan outcome with
parties settling on unanimous, antagonistic positions. In the profile-based model, the shift
from a direct to an indirect role in how party affiliation impacts decisions translates into
significant differences in the type of outcomes that can arise. In particular, party unanimity
is not the norm anymore.
While we initially assume that all nodes are connected (full graph) and also that all
nodes are members of one of two parties, with nodes from the same party more likely to
exhibit a positive affinity bias, we later relax these assumption. Specifically, we introduce
two set of modifications to our models. We first study the effect of a third group of nodes,
e.g., independent nodes who have unbiased affinities towards other nodes, irrespective of
party affiliations. We then consider the impact of additional structure, in the form of an
Erdős-Rényi graph (as opposed to a full graph), that determines which nodes interact with
each other.

4

Chapter 2

Related works
The types of problems described in Chapter 1, that exhibit interconnected agents and
mutual interactions, belong to a broader set of questions that naturally emerge in networked
settings and have become prevalent in many different areas, e.g., economics, social science,
biology, engineering and political science. The growing importance of, and interest in, such
questions is behind the emergence of “Network Science” as a new independent field [27, 33,
50, 76].
The breadth of topics that network science spans also means that multi-disciplinary
approaches are typically needed when tackling problems [37, 47, 68]. This is well illustrated
in our work, which relies on techniques from marketing research and statistical physics to
tackle the problems of service adoption and opinion formation in the presence of party biases
that it is concerned with. Similarly, researchers from seemingly disparate backgrounds have
contributed to the field of network science. In the past decade, a number of books have
aggregated the various studies in this field [33,51,54,72,90]. Such books provide a thorough
review of the different techniques for study of network systems, as well as their implications
and predictions.
In the next two sections we provide a more specific review of the literature as related to
the particular problems that we study, namely, where the “externalities” play a prominent
role in the system.

5

2.1

Adoption of products and services

The service adoption process that we introduce in Chapter 3 involves settings that are
studied under the umbrella of systems theory and/or game theory in various fields, from
engineering [8, 13, 46, 83] to economics [9]. In the language of the latter, our work considers
a forward looking monopolistic service provider who tries to optimally price a service and
offers it to a set of heterogeneous myopic users, who in turn play a best-response dynamics
game until the system potentially reaches a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Best-response dynamics [41] in game theory refers to scenarios where agents repeatedly
improve their choice until a Nash equilibrium is reached. Such a procedure provides a
plausible path to realizing a Nash equilibrium of the system, whence the agents are said
to “learn the equilibrium” [78]. Learning in game theory is also considered in [40], and is
closely related to the subjects of potential games [14,69] and evolutionary game theory [87].
Another related area in game theory consists of the works on the concept of “price of
anarchy” [59], which is similar in flavor to our discussion in Section 3.7.3 on sub-optimal
welfare realization.
In studying systems with heterogeneous users and in the presence of externalities, it
is common [7, 21, 25, 81] to assume some knowledge of the state of the system, e.g., users’
characteristics, or ”types”, for the other users and the provider. For instance, [25] assumes
that the monopolist has complete knowledge of the graph structure and therefore is able to
measure the individual network characteristics of each user. Similarly, [7] assumes that the
seller knows the probability distribution for the users’ valuation of the good, and that the
knowledge of the state of the system can propagate to users. In our analytical models too,
we assume that while the provider does not have knowledge of the individual user types,
it knows their probability distribution1 . We also assume that users know the state of the
system, as the level of adoption and the type of current adopters can be inferred by a user
by observing the available service coverage and the roaming traffic that goes through one’s
1

Such information can be obtained, for example, using techniques from marketing research as discussed
in [45].

6

home base. As such, our models represent a game with “incomplete information”, since
while the distribution of users’ utility function is known, individual users’ utilities are not.
Also, users have “perfect information”, in that they know the moves previously made by
all other players.
An important property of the adoption models that we introduce is that they exhibit
both positive and negative externalities. There is a vast literature investigating the effect of
externalities, often called network effects [34,62,63], but the majority of these works focus on
either positive or negative externalities separately. For example, [24] investigates the impact
of positive externalities on the product adoption decisions of individuals. The effect of
positive externalities on the competition between technologies is considered in [39,55,56] and
extended to include converters and switching costs in several other works, e.g., [30,38,53,82].
Conversely, the impact of negative externalities, e.g., from congestion, has been extensively
investigated in the context of pricing for both communication networks [43, 57, 66, 75, 85]
and transportation systems [16, 23, 58, 73].
The topic of optimal pricing for systems with both positive and negative externalities is
less studied and seems to have been first addressed in [29] that sought to optimize a combination of provider’s profit and consumers’ surplus. Different pricing strategies were considered, including flat pricing and pricing strategies that account for the product “amount”
consumed by a user, i.e., akin to the usage-based pricing model of Section 3.5. Other works
have been primarily conducted in the context of the theory of clubs first formally introduced
in [22] (see [10, 77, 80] for more recent discussions). A club has a membership that shares
a common good or facility, e.g., a swimming pool, so that increases in membership have
a positive effect (externality) by lowering the cost share of the common good, e.g., lower
maintenance costs of the shared swimming pool. At the same time, a larger membership also
has a negative, congestion-like effect, e.g., a more crowded swimming pool. In general, the
co-existence of positive and negative externalities implies an optimal membership size (see
also [52] for a recent interesting investigation that contrasts the outcomes of self-forming
and managed memberships).

7

Club-like behaviors also manifest themselves in file-sharing peer-to-peer (p2p) systems.
In a file-sharing p2p system, more peers increase the total resources available to store
content. However, unless enough peers are willing to share their resources, more peers can
also translate into a higher load on those peers willing to serve files to others, and/or a
longer time for locating a desired file. This has then triggered the investigation of incentive
mechanisms to ensure that enough peers share their resources, e.g., BitTorrent “tit-for-tat”
mechanism [31] or [32] that also explores a possible application to a wireless access system
similar in principle to the one we consider in Chapter 3.
Our model differs from these earlier works in important ways. First and foremost, it introduces a model for individual adoption decisions of a service, which allows for heterogeneity in the users’ valuation of the service. In particular, certain users (roaming users) have a
strong disincentive to adoption when coverage/penetration is low, while others (sedentary
users) are mostly insensitive to this factor. Conversely, this heterogeneity is also present in
the negative externality associated with an increase in service adoption. Its magnitude is
a function of not just the number of adopters, but their identity as well, i.e., roaming or
sedentary users. The presence of heterogeneity in how users value the service and how they
affect its value is a key aspect of a UPC–like service; one that influences its value and how
to price it to realize this value.

2.2

Formation and spread of opinions

Tools from statistical physics have been adapted for use in economics, models of neural
computation, as well as to offer models of social interactions in network settings [15, 20,
71, 74]. In the latter setting, the phenomenon of community structure in social networks
and graphs has seen some attention in the literature. Community structure refers to the
presence of modular groups in networks where individual members inside a community are
highly connected but connections between members of different communities are sparse or
non-existent. In particular, members of any one community exert little or no influence on
members of other communities.
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Works in this area include [44], which uses centrality indices in graphs to detect community structure, [18] which identifies mechanisms to generate networks with community
structure, and [60] which studies the formation of opinions in these settings.
These works reflect the tendency of individuals in a society to assemble in smaller groups
that are not necessarily connected. They do not, however, capture partisan interactions
between parts of a society, where individuals from different groups co-mingle and interact
in a manner shaped by their respective party or group, in the process exerting positive and
negative influences on each other.
Various models of positive and negative interactions in a spin glass framework have also
been considered in the literature [15, 19]. In these settings agents are considered to be statistically exchangeable with no a priori biases in the strengths of their random interactions
with other agents. These models lead to the characteristic disorder-induced phase transitions of spin glass models but do not in themselves make provision for partisan behaviour
in opinion formation.
A variety of other models of opinion formation in sociological settings have been considered in the literature. These include the energy-driven Ising spin glass model, the voter
model, the Szanjd model, and the bounded-confidence model [17, 26, 65, 67, 79, 86]. These
models all feature agents influencing each other’s opinions in a number of different ways.
While the posited mechanisms vary, agent interactions in these models are a priori unbiased
and their influence on each other is only through the prism of their opinions; there is no
party or group structure influencing interactions. As we shall see in Chapter 4, fundamentally different behaviours arise when interactions are influenced, however slightly, by an
over-arching party structure.
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Chapter 3

User-Provided Connectivity
3.1

Introduction

There is no denying that we are a networked society, and many networked goods or services
exhibit strong externalities, i.e., a change — positive or negative — in the value of one unit
of good, as more people use those goods. For example, Metcalfe’s law [27, p.71] captures
the positive effect on a network value of having more users, while the increased congestion
that arises from the added traffic contributes a negative externality. Externalities, and
more generally the benefits derived from goods or services, vary across users, i.e., exhibit
heterogeneity. This makes predicting the impact of externalities difficult, especially when
positive and negative forces interact. A basic question of interest is then to determine
(ahead of time) if and how offerings of goods or services that exhibit positive and negative
externalities will succeed or fail.
The original motivation for this work was answering this question for a specific service,
namely, user provided connectivity or UPC. The goal of UPC is to address the rising thirst
for ubiquitous data connectivity fueled by the fast growing number of capable and versatile
mobile devices. This growth has taxed the communication infrastructure of wireless carriers
to the point where it is threatening their continued success [91]. Addressing this issue
calls for either upgrading the infrastructure; a costly proposition, or exploring alternatives
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for “off-loading” some of the traffic. WiFi off-load solutions (e.g., as embodied in the
Hotspot2.0 initiative of the WiFi Alliance and the Next Generation Hotspot (NGH) of
the Wireless Broadband Alliance) offer a possible option, of which FON1 demonstrated a
possible realization. FON users purchase an access router (FONERA) that they use for
their own local broadband access, but with the agreement that a (small) fraction of their
access bandwidth can be made available to other FON users. In exchange, they receive the
same privilege2 when roaming, i.e., can connect through the access points of other FON
users.
Under a UPC scheme, connectivity grows “organically” as more users join the network
and improve its coverage, and the challenge is to determine if it can reach sufficient critical
mass to be viable. Consider for example a FON-like service starting with no users. This
makes the service unattractive to users that value ubiquitous connectivity highly, e.g., users
that roam frequently, because the limited coverage offers little connectivity beyond that of a
user’s “home base”. On the other hand, sedentary users are mostly insensitive to the initial
minimal coverage, and if the price is low enough can derive positive utility from the service;
hence join. If enough such (sedentary) users join, coverage may increase past a point where
it becomes attractive to roaming users who will start joining. This would then ensure rapid
growth of the service, were it not for a negative dimension to that growth.
Specifically, as more roaming users join, they compete for connectivity and may encounter increasingly congested access points. Conversely, sedentary users end-up having to
share their home access more frequently. This may be sufficient to convince them to drop
the service (unlike roaming users, they do not see much added value from the better coverage). The resulting reduction in coverage would in turn affect roaming users, who could
then also start leaving. Hence, after an initial period of growth, the service may experience
a decline.
The extent to which such behaviors arise depends on many factors, and in particular
1

http://www.fon.com. See also AnyFi (www.anyfinetworks.com) or previously KeyWifi, and also more
recently Comcast [64] for similarly inspired services.
2
Alternatively, they can also be offered some form of compensation.
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the trade-off between service cost and users’ sensitivity to the positive and negative aspects
of a growing user-base. Making the service “free” would clearly maximize adoption, but
unless other revenue sources are available, e.g., ads, is unlikely to allow it to be viable.
Increasing the service price could affect (lower) adoption, but may improve its viability.
More generally, service pricing offers a “control knob” that can be used to realize a variety
of objectives, e.g., maximizing overall value or welfare, or maximizing provider’s profit, etc.
This control knob can be complex and involve offering the service at a different price to
each user, i.e., discriminatory pricing [11], or very basic, e.g., fixed pricing, and there is
typically a trade-off between how well objectives can be met and the complexity of the
control (pricing) used to meet them.
In this chapter we develop a simple model that helps understand how these factors
interact and affect the adoption of a UPC service and the welfare (sum of users’ utility
and provider’s profit) it creates, and how that welfare can be efficiently distributed between
users and the service provider. To maintain analytical tractability, the model makes a series
of simplifying assumptions, many of which may arguably not hold in practice. However,
the analysis affords insight that, as we demonstrate, remains valid even under more general
settings. Specifically, this chapter’s main contributions consist of
• Formulating and solving a simple model that captures key features of a UPC type of
service;
• Characterizing when and how the service’s total welfare, or value, is maximized;
• Identifying practical pricing policies that realize a different trade-off between optimizing welfare and distributing it between stakeholders.
• Numerically validating the robustness of the findings, when relaxing the simplifying
assumptions on which the model relies.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model we
rely on to capture the properties of a UPC service. Section 3.3 explores when and how
the service value (total welfare) is maximized. Section 3.4 introduces the role of pricing in
realizing different goals for the service, with subsequent sections dedicated to specific pricing
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policies, i.e., usage-based (Section 3.5), hybrid (Section 3.6), and fixed-price (Section 3.7).
Section 3.9 discusses generalizations and robustness of the findings. A summary of the
chapter’s findings is provided in Section 3.10.

3.2

Model Formulation

This section introduces a model that captures key aspects of adoption of a UPC-like service
by users. We first present the general form of the model in Section 3.2.1. We then introduce a series of simplifying assumptions in Section 3.2.2 to obtain a simpler model that is
analytically tractable. Verifying that the findings afforded by this simplified model remain
valid in more general situations calls for a two-prong approach: (1) An explicit solution is
developed that offers a qualitative understanding of and insight into what drives the success
(or failure) of UPC systems; (2) The robustness of those findings is then numerically tested
under configurations that emulate more general settings, i.e., where the model’s simplifying
assumptions are relaxed and errors are present in the estimation of its parameters.

3.2.1

General form

Given the expected organic growth of a UPC service, the interplay between the coverage
it realizes and its ability to attract more users is of primary interest. The service coverage
κ depends on the level x of adoption in the target user population, and determines the
odds that users can obtain connectivity through the service while roaming. Users are
heterogeneous in their propensity to roam, as captured through a variable θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. A
user’s exact θ value is private information, but its distribution (over the user population)
is known. A low θ indicates a sedentary user while a high θ corresponds to a user that
frequently roams. Hence, θ determines a user’s sensitivity to service coverage.
As commonly done [24], a user’s service adoption decision is based on the utility she
derives from the service; she decides to adopt if that utility is positive. A user’s utility is
denoted as U (Θ, θ), where θ is the roaming propensity of the user herself, and Θ identifies
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the current set of adopters. The general form of U (Θ, θ) is given in Eq. (3.1).

U (Θ, θ) = F (θ, κ) + G(θ, m) − p(Θ, θ) ,

(3.1)

where m is the volume of roaming traffic generated3 by the current set of adopters Θ.
F (θ, κ) reflects the overall utility of connectivity, either at home or roaming, while
G(θ, m) accounts for the negative impact of roaming traffic. Finally, p(Θ, θ) is the price
charged to the user θ when the adopters’ set is Θ.
Note that the price p(Θ, θ) is a control parameter that affects service adoption, i.e., it
can be endogenized to achieve specific objectives. In this chapter, we explore the use of
pricing to maximize total welfare and/or profit. Other parameters are exogenous and can
be estimated, e.g., using techniques from marketing research as discussed in [45], but not
controlled.
Building on Eq. (3.1), users adopt the service only if their utility is positive, and are
myopic when evaluating the utility they expect to derive from the service, i.e., they do not
anticipate the impact of their own decision on other users’ adoption decisions. However,
adoption levels affect coverage, and as coverage changes, so does an individual user’s utility
and, therefore, her adoption decision.
The level of adoption x is given by
Z
x = |Θ| ,

f (θ) dθ,
θ∈Θ

where f (θ) is a density function and reflects the distribution of roaming characteristics over
the user population.
In the next section, we specialize the different terms in the utility function of Eq. (3.1).
3

Each user is assumed to generate one unit of traffic, whether at home or roaming.
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3.2.2

Assumptions and the simplified model

For analytical tractability, we make several assumptions regarding the form and range of
the parameters of Eq. (3.1) (Section 3.9 explores the impact of relaxing these assumptions).
First, a user’s propensity to roam, as measured by θ, is taken to be uniformly distributed
in [0, 1], i.e.,
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.

f (θ) = 1,

This implies that given a set of adopters Θ, the adoption level, x is
Z
x=

dθ .

(3.2)

θ∈Θ

Conversely, assuming that every user contributes one unit of traffic, the volume of roaming
traffic m generated by current adopters is given by
Z
m=

θ dθ .

(3.3)

θ∈Θ

Next, we assume that the distributions of users over the service area and their roaming
patterns are uniform. A uniform distribution of users implies that the adoption level x also
measures the availability of connectivity to roaming users, hence κ = x. Similarly, uniform
roaming patterns mean that roaming users (and traffic) are evenly distributed across users’
home bases, i.e., all see the same connectivity while roaming. Therefore, we can write the
function F (θ, κ) as
F (θ, κ) = (1 − θ) γ + θ rx .

(3.4)

The parameter γ ≥ 0 measures the utility of basic home connectivity, while r ≥ 0 reflects
the utility of roaming connectivity.4 The latter needs to be weighed by the ”odds” that
such connectivity is available, which are proportional to the current service coverage κ = x.
Hence, rx is the (true) utility of roaming connectivity, when the level of coverage is κ = x.
4

The range of the values of roaming connectivity is taken to be r ≥ γ, i.e., the value of roaming
connectivity is at least as high as that of home connectivity.
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The additional factors 1 − θ and θ in Eq. (3.4) capture the impact of a user’s roaming
characteristic in how it uses, and therefore values, home and roaming connectivity. Specifically, a user with roaming characteristic θ splits its connectivity time in the proportions θ
and 1 − θ between roaming and home connectivity, respectively.
Further, the impact of roaming traffic is assumed proportional to its volume m, which
based on the assumption of uniform roaming patterns, is equally distributed across adopters’
home bases. Specifically, the (negative) utility associated with roaming traffic consuming
resources in the home base of users is proportional to −cm , c ≥ 0. Roaming traffic affects
equally the users whose home base it uses, and the roaming users seeking connectivity
through it. Hence, all users experience the same impact of the form −θcm − (1 − θ)cm =
−cm, so that G(θ, m) is5
G(m) = −c m .
Under these assumptions, a user’s utility is of the form

U (Θ, θ) = γ − c m + θ (r x − γ) − p(Θ, θ) .

(3.5)

In the next section, we characterize the total welfare that can be created by a UPC
service as a function of the service parameters (exogenous and endogenous).

3.3

Total Welfare

In this section, we characterize the total welfare (value) a UPC service can create for
its adopters and provider. Adopters’ welfare is through the utility they derive from the
service, while the provider’s welfare is from what it charges adopters for the service. Using
the model introduced in the previous section, we derive analytical conditions under which
the total welfare is maximized. As argued earlier, the benefit of such analytical solutions
is in providing insight into when and why the service may be valuable (worth deploying).
5

The range of the coefficient of roaming traffic, c, is taken to be 0 ≤ c < r, i.e., it is lower than the max
roaming utility.
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The validity of that insight is tested under more general conditions in Section 3.9.
To compute the maximum welfare, we first obtain the optimal set of adopters Θ∗ (x) for
any given adoption level x, and then solve for the optimal x.

3.3.1

Optimal Adoption Set for Given Adoption Level

For a given adoption level x, we seek the set of adopters Θ, |Θ| = x, that maximizes welfare.
Provider’s welfare (or profit) WP can be written as
Z
(p(Θ, θ) − e) dθ ,

WP (Θ) =

(3.6)

θ∈Θ

where p(Θ, θ) is the price charged to a user with roaming characteristic θ given a set Θ of
existing adopters, and e is the per customer cost of providing the service, e.g., as incurred
from billing, customer service, or equipment cost subsidies6 . Conversely users’ welfare is
given by
Z
WU (Θ) =

U (Θ, θ) dθ .

(3.7)

θ∈Θ

The service welfare, V (Θ), is the sum of these two quantities.
V (Θ) = WU (Θ) + WP (Θ)


Z
=
U (Θ, θ) + p(Θ, θ) − e dθ.

(3.8)

θ∈Θ

For notational purposes, we denote the integrand in Eq. (3.8) by v(Θ, θ),

v(Θ, θ) , U (Θ, θ) + p(Θ, θ) − e ,

which can be interpreted as the individual value adopter θ contributes to the service. Using
6

Note that this cost is ultimately born by the users, as it affects the price the provider charges for the
service.
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Eq. (3.5) we can rewrite Eq. (3.8) as


γ + θ (rx − γ) − cm − e dθ.

Z
V (Θ) =

(3.9)

θ∈Θ

Characterizing optimal welfare for a given adoption level x, therefore calls for identifying
the set Θ∗ (x) of adopters of cardinality x, |Θ∗ | = x, which maximizes Eq. (3.9). This is the
subject of the next lemma, which is proved in Appendix A.9 in a more general form.
Lemma 1. For any adoption level x, maximum welfare is always obtained with a set of
adopters Θ∗ (x) that exhibit contiguous roaming characteristics. Specifically, Θ∗ (x) is of the
form
∗

Θ (x) =




Θ∗1 (x) = [0, x)


Θ∗ (x) = [1 − x, 1]
2

3.3.2

if x <

γ
r−c ,

if x ≥

γ
r−c .

(3.10)

Optimal Adoption Level

From Lemma 1, we obtain the optimal welfare V ∗ (x) , V (Θ∗ (x)) given any adoption level
x. Following the partition of Eq. (3.10) into two cases x ∈ [0,

γ
r−c )

γ
and x ∈ [ r−c
, 1], we

consider separately the cases of V (Θ∗1 (x)) and V (Θ∗2 (x)).
Using Eq. (3.10) in Eq. (3.3) gives for x ∈ [0,
m(Θ∗1 (x))

γ
r−c ),

x

Z
=

θdθ =
θ=0

x2
,
2

and therefore by and Eq. (3.9)
V (Θ∗1 (x)) =

r−c 3 γ 2
x − x + (γ − e)x.
2
2

γ
Similarly, for x ∈ [ r−c
, 1], the roaming traffic corresponding to Θ∗2 (x) is

m(Θ∗2 (x))

Z

1

=

θdθ =
θ=1−x
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1
2x − x2 ,
2

and therefore by Eq. (3.9)
V (Θ∗2 (x)) = −

r−c 3
γ
x + ( + r − c)x2 − ex.
2
2

Combining the above expressions, the optimal service value V ∗ (x) , V (Θ∗ (x)) for a given
adoption level x is given by

∗

V (x) =



γ 2
3

 r−c
2 x − 2 x + (γ − e)x

if x <

γ
r−c



− r−c x3 + ( γ + r − c)x2 − ex
2
2

if x ≥

γ
r−c ,

where Θ∗ (x) and x are related by Eq. (3.10).
Given V ∗ (x), we can then solve for the value x∗ that maximizes V ∗ (x). The computations are mechanical in nature and are given in Appendix A.2, with Fig. 3.1 illustrating x∗
as a function of γ and e (for r − c = 1).
The solution can be partitioned into two different regimes based on the value of γ. When
γ ≤ r − c (corresponding to γ ≤ 1 in Fig. 3.1), optimal adoption is either x∗ = 1 or x∗ = 0,
depending on the service cost e. If the service cost is low (e <

γ+r−c
2 ),

then maximum

welfare occurs for x∗ = 1, and it is
V ∗ (x = 1) =

Conversely, if the service cost is high (e ≥

γ+r−c
− e.
2
γ+r−c
2 ),

(3.11)

then it overshadows any benefit or

utility the service produces and it is impossible to create positive welfare. In this case, the
“optimal” adoption is x∗ = 0.
In contrast, when γ > r − c (corresponding to γ > 1 in Fig. 3.1), intermediate values
0 < x∗ < 1 are possible (the gradient-shaded region of Fig. 3.1). This is because as γ
increases, sedentary users start to derive more utility and progressively become the dominant
value contributors. Therefore a set of (mostly) sedentary adopters can make a large positive
welfare contribution. Furthermore, because this value is negatively affected by roaming
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traffic, the optimal adoption level discourages frequently roaming users. Note that r − c
gives a tentative measure of the “net” importance of roaming (roaming utility factor less
roaming traffic factor), and as such the condition γ > r − c describes a system where home
connectivity has a higher value than the overall (“net”) effect of roaming connectivity. Such
a system may arguably not be a prime candidate for UPC services.
In summary, the main finding that emerges from the results of this section is that when
a UPC service can generate significant positive value, that value is typically maximized at
full adoption (or close to full adoption7 ) Section 3.9 numerically tests the validity of this
finding when the model’s assumptions are relaxed.
While this section explored the relationship between service adoption and total welfare,
and identified adoption sets that maximize total welfare, the next section focuses on how to
realize such outcomes. As we shall see, this greatly depends on the flexibility of the pricing
policy used.

3.4

Role of Pricing

The analysis of Section 3.3 characterizes maximum service welfare, but does not offer a
constructive method to realize it. As shown in Eq. (3.5), adoption and, therefore, welfare,
depend on p(Θ, θ). Hence, maximizing welfare calls for identifying a suitable pricing policy.
Moreover, the price p(Θ, θ) is also the parameter that determines how welfare is divided
between users and the provider. For example, if p(Θ, θ) = e, then the provider is only
compensated for its expenses e (its profit is WP (Θ) = 0) and the entire welfare is realized
as user’s utility, WU (Θ) = V (Θ). Conversely, if p(Θ, θ) = v(Θ, θ) + e, then U (Θ, θ) = 0,
i.e., users derive zero utility (strictly speaking, prices would be set to ensure an infinitesimal
but positive utility) and all of the welfare is realized as provider’s profit, WP (Θ) = V (Θ).
Other pricing schemes are possible that distribute welfare between users and the provider.
7

Specifically in more general cases where coverage “saturates” with adoption, the maximum total welfare
may predictably be realized at slightly below full adoption. The reason is reaching full adoption in that case
would add more roaming traffic without meaningfully improving coverage. Details are given in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 3.1: Regions of optimal adoption for maximum system value. Parameters are r = 1.6
and c = 0.6 (and therefore r − c = 1). The gradient-shaded area corresponds to 0 < x∗ < 1,
whereas the solid black and white areas correspond to x∗ = 1 and x∗ = 0, respectively.

(a) θ0 = 0

(b) θ0 = 0.4

(c) θ0 = 1

Figure 3.2: System value contributed by user θ0 as a function of x. Parameters are γ =
0.8, e = 0, c = 0.6, b = 0, r = 1.6.
For example, a price of the form
p(Θ, θ) = v(Θ, θ) + e − δ
(3.12)
= (1 − θ)γ + θrx − cm − δ ,
which is an instance of a discriminatory pricing policy, leaves every user with a positive
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(a) x = 0.2

(b) x = 0.5

(c) x = 1

Figure 3.3: System value contribution across users, at different adoption levels. Parameters
are γ = 0.8, e = 0, c = 0.6, b = 0, r = 1.6.
utility U (Θ, θ) = δ > 0, hence realizing the optimal adoption level8 x = 1. Therefore,
the optimal welfare V ∗ (1) of Eq. (3.11) is realized and by using U ([0, 1], θ) in Eq. (3.7) it
follows that the users’ overall welfare is

WU ([0, 1]) = δ .

This means that without affecting adoption, we can pick any δ > 0 to freely vary WU ([0, 1])
in the range (0, V ∗ (1)], and accordingly by Eq. (3.8),
WP ([0, 1]) = V ∗ (1) − WU ([0, 1]).

(3.13)

In short, this policy realizes two important goals
• Optimal welfare, and
• Flexible welfare distribution.
Such a discriminatory pricing policy is, however, difficult to implement in practice as it
requires knowledge of individual user characteristics (θ) that may not be readily available9 ,
8

When optimal adoption is not at x = 1, optimal welfare can still be realized by setting a high price for
users who should not adopt.
9
Even if the provider has full knowledge of individual user characteristics θ, it may not be acceptable to
charge users differently.
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and also results in a price that varies with the adoption level x. This heterogeneity across
both users and adoption levels is illustrated in Figs. 3.2 and 3.3, that plot v(Θ, θ) as a
function of θ and x.
In the following sections, we introduce pricing policies that offer a different trade-off
between realizing maximum welfare, distributing it arbitrarily, and practicality.

3.5

Usage-based Pricing Policy

As mentioned above, a discriminatory pricing policy can both maximize total welfare and
distribute it arbitrarily between users and the provider. It is, however, difficult to implement
in practice. This section proposes a usage-based pricing scheme that mimics the behavior
of the discriminatory policy, but makes it feasible in practice. Under a usage-based pricing
scheme, users are charged based on how often they connect at home and while roaming. We
present next the structure of usage-based pricing, how it is able to capture key aspects of
discriminatory pricing, and also the insight that the analysis of the pricing policy affords.

3.5.1

Pricing Structure

In a UPC service, usage has two components, home usage denoted by zh , and roaming usage
denoted by zr . A usage-based pricing policy may assign different prices to these two usage
types. Assuming that ph and pr are unit prices for home and roaming usage, respectively,
a user is charged
pz (zh , zr ) = zh · ph + zr · pr − a,

(3.14)

where a corresponds to fixed usage allowance that may be given to each user, e.g., akin to
the free minutes commonly included in cellular phone plans.
Eq. (3.14) states what a user pays for the service as a function of her usage. Next,
we express this cost in terms of the user and service model of Section 3.2. This calls for
characterizing how roaming characteristics θ and the service coverage x affect a user’s home
and roaming usages.
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By definition, θ denotes a user’s propensity to roam, i.e., how often she is roaming
versus at home. However, because a roaming user successfully connects only where there is
coverage, her “typical” roaming usage is only z r (x, θ) = θx. Conversely, her typical home
usage is simply z h (θ) = 1 − θ (home connectivity is always available). Replacing zh and
zr in Eq. (3.14) by the typical roaming and home usages z r (x, θ) and z h (θ) of a user with
roaming characteristics θ, we obtain the following expression for what she will typically be
charged for using a UPC service with a coverage level of x

pz (x, θ) = ph (1 − θ) + pr θx − a.

(3.15)

Eq. (3.15) has three parameters ph , pr and a that affect service adoption, i.e., which users
derive positive utility. Given our goal of emulating the discriminatory pricing policy of
Eq. (3.12) and by comparing it to Eq. (3.15), we choose ph = γ and pr = r, which yields
the following usage-based pricing scheme

pz (x, θ) = γ(1 − θ) + rθx − a.

(3.16)

We note that the only difference between Eq. (3.16) and the discriminatory pricing of
Eq. (3.12) is in the terms a versus cm − δ, where the former is constant while the latter
depends on the level of roaming traffic m. As we shall see next, this difference is minor, and
the usage-based pricing policy of Eq. (3.16) is capable of realizing both maximum welfare
and flexibility in how welfare is distributed across users and the provider.

3.5.2

Maximal Service Adoption

Using Eq. (3.16) in Eq. (3.5) gives the following expression for the utility derived by user θ
from adopting the service
U (Θ, θ) = a − cm.
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(3.17)

We next use Eq. (3.17) to identify the adoption equilibria under usage-based pricing. We
say a set of adopters Θ comprises an equilibrium when
U (Θ, θ) > 0,

if θ ∈ Θ,

U (Θ, θ) ≤ 0,

if θ 6∈ Θ.

and

Then,
Proposition 1. Under the usage-based pricing policy of Eq. (3.16), full adoption, x = 1,
is the unique equilibrium if a > c/2, and is not an equilibrium if a ≤ c/2.
Proof. Recall that c ≥ 0, and note that at any adoption level x (corresponding to an
adopters’ set Θ such that |Θ| = x), the roaming traffic m satisfies m ≤ 1/2. Hence,
cm ≤ c/2 and Eq. (3.17) yields that U (Θ, θ) ≥ a − c/2. Consequently U (Θ, θ) > 0 if
a − c/2 > 0. This is true for all values of θ and Θ, i.e., all users have positive utility at
all adoption levels. Therefore no other equilibrium can exist, since that would mean for
b =
b the utility is negative, which is contradictory. This proves
some Θ
6 [0, 1], and for θ 6∈ Θ
sufficiency.
On the other hand, if a ≤ c/2, then by Eq. (3.17) we have U (Θ, θ) ≤ c/2 − cm. But
at full adoption m = 1/2 and therefore U ([0, 1], θ) ≤ 0, which means [0, 1] cannot be an
equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Proposition 1 implies that the usage-based pricing policy maximizes total welfare by
realizing full adoption10 , provided the provider sets the usage allowance a higher than the
threshold c/2. The threshold’s value c/2 is clearly specific to the assumptions on which
the model is predicated. However, as we will see in Section 3.9, such a threshold condition
is present under more general conditions. In particular, as long as the usage allowance a
is larger than a threshold a0 , full adoption is the unique equilibrium, while if a ≤ a0 , full
adoption is then not an equilibrium.
We explore next the policy’s ability to distribute welfare between users and the provider.
10

Assuming that the parameters are such that total welfare is maximized at x = 1.
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3.5.3

Welfare Distribution

From Eq. (3.17), the utility of user θ at full adoption is
c
U ([0, 1], θ) = a − ·
2
Combining this expression with Eq. (3.7) gives the overall user welfare

WU ([0, 1]) = a −

c
,
2

with provider’s profit given accordingly by Eq. (3.13).
This means that we can pick any a > c/2 without affecting adoption, and therefore
freely vary both WU ([0, 1]) and WP ([0, 1]) in the full range [0, V ∗ (1)).
Although, as mentioned earlier, the usage-based policy does not perfectly emulate the
discriminatory policy of Eq. (3.12), it coincides with it at full adoption through the change
of variables δ , a − c/2. Hence, a usage-based pricing policy offers a practical solution to
realize optimality and flexibility (in distributing welfare).
Those benefits notwithstanding, implementing usage-based pricing calls for monitoring
(logging) usage, which incurs a cost. In addition, some users may prefer the predictability
of fixed pricing (independent of usage), even in cases where it may be less advantageous
for them [61], i.e., result in a lower utility. This is particularly so in the case of homeconnectivity, for which fixed pricing is often the norm. For instance, Time Warner recently
announced [84] that its customers would always retain the option of a flat-rate monthly
pricing for broadband Internet access, with usage-based plans being optional.
For those reasons, we consider next a hybrid pricing policy that combines fixed and
usage-based pricing, and evaluate the trade-offs it imposes.
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3.6

Hybrid Usage-based Pricing Policy

Consider a pricing policy that combines a fixed price for home connectivity, and a usagebased price for connectivity while roaming.

3.6.1

Pricing Structure

Using notation similar to Section 3.5.1, let zr denote the roaming usage of a user. The total
hybrid usage-based price that a user is charged is then

py (zr ) = ph + zr · pr ,

(3.18)

where the price of home usage is fixed (independent of usage) at ph and identical for all
users11 , and as before pr is the unit usage price while roaming.
The only user-dependent term in Eq. (3.18) is, therefore, her roaming usage. Recalling
the discussion of Section 3.5.1, the typical roaming usage z r (x, θ) of a user with roaming
profile θ when the service coverage is x is equal to θx. Hence, the typical cost to a user
with profile θ for the service is given by

py (x, θ) = ph + pr θx,

(3.19)

Next, we investigate if and how ph and pr can be set to again emulate the discriminatory
policy of Eq. (3.12), or more importantly achieve the same outcomes, namely, maximum
welfare and flexibility in allowing distribution of welfare across users and the provider. As
per the discussion of Section 3.4, the former calls for selecting ph and pr so as to ensure full
adoption, i.e., x = 1.
11

Note that the usage allowance a is now included in ph .

27

3.6.2

Maximal Service Adoption

Given the price structure of Eq. (3.19), the utility of a user can be obtained from Eq. (3.5)
as
U (Θ, θ) = γ − cm − ph + θ(rx − γ − xpr ).
By applying the change of variables
c
− ph
2

δh = γ −

and δr = r − γ − pr ,

U (Θ, θ) can be rewritten as

U (Θ, θ) =

c
− cm + δh + θ(x(δr + γ) − γ).
2

(3.20)

Note that δh corresponds to the net residual utility for home connectivity at full adoption,
and conversely δr is the corresponding quantity for roaming connectivity.
The next Lemma provides conditions under which full adoption is an equilibrium.
Lemma 2. Under the hybrid pricing of Eq. (3.19), full adoption, x = 1, is an equilibrium
if and only if δh > 0 and δr > −δh .
Proof. At full adoption we have Θ = [0, 1], x = 1 and m = 1/2. Therefore the utility of
Eq. (3.20) becomes
U ([0, 1], θ) = δh + θδr .
For Θ = [0, 1] to be an equilibrium, all users must have positive utility. This implies

δh + θδr > 0 ,

∀θ ∈ [0, 1].

Since this is a linear function of θ, the inequality holds if and only if it is satisfied for both
θ = 0 and θ = 1, i.e., δh > 0 and δh + δr > 0.
The conditions of Lemma 2 state that full adoption, x = 1, is possible only if the fixed
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Figure 3.4: Utility of a user with θ = 1 as a function of coverage under hybrid pricing for
γ = 1, c = 0.7, δh = 0.05 and δr = 0.01.
price ph for home connectivity is not too high, i.e., δh > 0 ⇒ ph < γ − 2c , and the roaming
usage-based price pr is no higher than the net roaming value at full adoption, r − 2c , minus
the price ph already charged for home connectivity, i.e., δr > −δh ⇒ pr < r −

c
2

− ph .

Unlike the conditions of Proposition 1 that ensured positive utility for all users at all
levels of coverage, Lemma 2 does not include such guarantees. In particular, and as illustrated in Fig. 3.4 for the θ = 1 user, the utility of a user can vary from negative to positive
as coverage increases, with a cross-over value of x ≈ 0.85 in the case of Fig. 3.4. The θ = 1
user, therefore, adopts only once coverage exceeds 0.85. Hence, her adoption depends on
the adoption of enough other users (x > 0.85). In general, and as hinted at in Fig. 3.3, users
with low θ values have higher utility at low coverage, and are therefore the ones joining
the service when it is first offered. As they do, the service becomes more valuable for users
with higher θ values, whose utility may then become positive allowing them to adopt. This
progression can, however, stall before full adoption is reached, i.e., adoption may stop at a
level x < 1. This can arise even under the conditions of Lemma 2, as Lemma 2 does not
guarantee the uniqueness of the x = 1 equilibrium.
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As shown in Appendix A.3, when the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, x = 1 is the unique
equilibrium if and only if γ satisfies

γ < c + 2δh + 2

p
(c/2 + δh )(δr + δh ).

(3.21)

This then ensures that adoption increases monotonically until reaching full adoption. The
condition of Eq. (3.21) can be combined with Lemma 2 to obtain the equivalent of Proposition 1 for the hybrid pricing policy.
Proposition 2. Under the hybrid pricing of Eq. (3.19), full adoption, x=1, is the unique
equilibrium if and only if
• When γ < c :

δh > 0 and δr > −δh

• When γ ≥ c :

δh > 0 and δr > −δh and

δh >

γ2
− c/2.
4(γ + δr − c/2)

(3.22)

Proof. As a result of the two conditions δh > 0 and δr > −δh and because c ≥ 0 it follows
p
that 2δh + 2 (c/2 + δh )(δr + δh ) in Eq. (3.21) is always positive. Therefore Eq. (3.21)
always holds if γ < c, without further constraints on the values of δh and δr .
On the other hand, when γ ≥ c, δh and/or δr need to be large enough to ensure that
Eq. (3.21) is satisfied. Specifically, algebraic manipulation of Eq. (3.21) in this case yields
Eq. (3.22).
Proposition 2 states that when x = 1 is an equilibrium under hybrid pricing, it can
coexist with other equilibria when the value of home connectivity utility is high enough,
i.e., γ ≥ c and the condition of Eq. (3.22) is not satisfied. Focusing on cases when x = 1
maximizes total welfare, e.g., e is low enough, this means that it is possible for the provider
to set prices ph and pr (and consequently δh and δr ) for which full adoption is feasible, i.e.,
the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied, without ever being able to reach this target. This
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Figure 3.5: Final adoption level for the hybrid pricing policy, and identification of the
boundaries demarcating the regions associated with the conditions of Proposition 2. The
straight line corresponds to γ = c = 0.8, and the curved line captures the condition of
Eq. (3.22). The system’s parameters are c = 0.8, δr = 0, with γ and δh values varying.
occurs when the provider’s choice of prices allows the emergence of a second equilibrium
x
e < 1, where adoption stops upon reaching it.
As Proposition 2 indicates though, it is possible to avoid such outcomes by properly
selecting prices (parameters δh and δr ) to comply with Eq. (3.22). This is illustrated in
Fig. 3.5, which plots the system’s final adoption as γ and δh vary for the case c = 0.8
(initial adoption is set to x = 0, and for simplicity we assume δr = 0 and focus on the
impact of varying δh ). The figure confirms (straight boundary line at γ = c = 0.8 in the
figure) that when γ < c = 0.8, any value of δh > 0 results in full adoption. It also shows
that when γ ≥ c = 0.8, the system only converges to full adoption when δh further satisfies
the condition of Eq. (3.22) (corresponding to δh values that lie to the right of the curved
boundary line in the figure).
The conditions of Proposition 2 are clearly specific to the assumptions on which the
model is predicated. However, we will see in Section 3.9 that the very same behavior
arises under more general settings; specifically, a second, sub-optimal equilibrium (e
x < 1)
can arise whenever the value of home connectivity exceeds a certain threshold, and in the
process prevent the system from reaching its intended target of full adoption. In addition,
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overcoming this issue can again be accomplished by adjusting prices, albeit to different
values than those of Proposition 2.
We note that the aspect of adjusting (lowering) prices to ensure full adoption begs the
question of what would motivate the provider to do so. We explore this issue next in the
broader context of the hybrid pricing policy’s ability to distribute welfare between users
and the provider. We first explore the pricing policy’s ability to support arbitrary welfare
distribution at full adoption, including maximizing the provider’s profit, and then focus on
the extent to which the conditions of Proposition 2 constrain this ability, and what options
are available to overcome those limitations.

3.6.3

Welfare Distribution

As before, we focus on scenarios for which total welfare is maximized at full adoption, i.e.,
combinations that, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1, correspond to a low enough cost e relative to
the other system’s parameters γ, c, and r. We explore first whether, once at full adoption
(and maximum total welfare), the hybrid pricing policy allows an arbitrary distribution of
welfare (as the usage-based policy did), from maximum user welfare to maximum provider
profit.
Lemma 2 identifies the constraints that pricing must satisfy to ensure that full adoption
is an equilibrium, i.e., δh > 0 and δr > −δh . Combining Eq. (3.20) and Eq. (3.7) gives the
following expression for the users’ welfare WU ([0, 1]) at full adoption

WU ([0, 1]) = δh +

δr
,
2

(3.23)

with according to Eq. (3.13) and Eq. (3.11), the provider’s profit given by

WP ([0, 1]) =



γ+r−c
δr
− e − δh +
.
2
2

(3.24)

Realizing maximum user welfare calls for choosing prices such that WP ([0, 1]) = 0, which
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according to Eq. (3.24) implies

δh +

δr
γ+r−c
=
− e.
2
2

This can be readily accomplished by choosing values of δh and δr that also satisfy Lemma 2,
e.g., δh =  > 0, and δr = γ + r − c − 2e − 2 > −, where  is arbitrarily small. Conversely,
maximizing the provider’s profit calls for setting prices that extract (nearly) all the value
users realize from the system, i.e., set both δh and δr equal to arbitrarily small positive
values (this again satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2, namely, δh > 0 and δr > −δh ).
Intermediate distributions of welfare are also feasible simply by adjusting the values of
δh and δr . Consider for example a scenario where a regulator wants all users to see the
same utility value α > 0. From Eq. (3.20) the utility of a user with roaming parameter θ is
given by
U ([0, 1], θ) = δh + θδr = α .
Eliminating the dependency on θ to ensure that all users see the same utility requires δr = 0,
which then implies δh = α > 0 that again satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2. Hence, we
see that once at full adoption (and assuming full adoption maximizes welfare), the hybrid
pricing policy, like the usage-based policy, is capable of achieving any arbitrary distribution
of welfare between users and the provider. However as made explicit in Proposition 2,
reaching full adoption can, as reflected in Eq. (3.22), impose additional conditions on pricing,
which may preclude some welfare distribution configurations. In particular, maximizing the
provider’s profit, which as just discussed calls for setting both δh and δr to arbitrarily small
positive values, readily conflicts with the conditions of Eq. (3.22).
A possible approach suggested by the discussion of Section 3.6.2, is for the provider to
offer an introductory pricing that satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2; thereby enabling
full adoption to be reached. The motivation for the provider to do so is that once full (or
nearly full12 ) adoption has been reached, it can then switch to a pricing scheme that allows
12

See Appendix A.3 for details on how early the service provider can end the introductory pricing phase.
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it to extract a higher profit.
In the next section, we introduce a third family of pricing policies that seeks to eliminate
all dependency on monitoring a user’s usage; therefore simplifying implementation and
possibly facilitating user acceptance.

3.7

Fixed Price Policy

This section considers a pricing policy based on a fixed price that covers both home and
roaming connectivity.
As mentioned earlier, the use of a fixed price is not uncommon for home connectivity,
but it is arguably less so for wireless roaming access which is the other component of the
service we consider. Nevertheless, a number of wireless carriers do offer fixed-price wireless
services [89]. Hence it is of interest to investigate the impact such a pricing policy might
have on their ability to maximize profit and on the welfare the system realizes.

3.7.1

Pricing Structure

Pricing is independent of usage and based on a single parameter p,

p(Θ, θ) = p, ∀ Θ, θ.

(3.25)

We investigate if and how p can be set to realize maximum welfare and flexibility in distributing it across stakeholders. As per the discussion of Section 3.4, the former (typically)
calls for selecting p so as to ensure full adoption, i.e., x = 1.

3.7.2

Maximum Service Adoption

Given Eq. (3.5) and the price structure of Eq. (3.25), the utility of user θ is

U (Θ, θ) = γ − p − c m + θ (r x − γ) .
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(3.26)

Cases

[0, γ/r)

[γ/r, 1]

1

—

—

2

•

—

2’



—

3

—

•

3’

—



4

•, ◦

—

5

—

•, ◦

6

•, ◦

•

7

•

•, ◦

8

•, ◦

•, ◦

Table 3.1: Equilibria combinations under fixed pricing
The following Lemma then gives the condition under which full adoption is an equilibrium.
The proof is in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 3. Under the fixed price policy of Eq. (3.25), full adoption is an equilibrium if and
only if p < γ − c/2.
Note that as was the case with Lemma 2, the condition of Lemma 3 does not imply
uniqueness of the x = 1 equilibrium. In fact, as shown in Appendix A.4, under fixed pricing
there may be as many as four equilibria, spanning combinations of stable, unstable, periodic,
or chaotic equilibria. Table 3.1 summarizes possible combinations, with (•) denoting stable
equilibria, (◦) unstable equilibria, () equilibria associated with an “orbit” that can be
either convergent, periodic, or chaotic, and (—) the absence of equilibria.
Ensuring that x = 1 is the unique (stable) equilibrium, and therefore that the service
always reaches full adoption, calls for additional constraints on p beyond those of Lemma 3.
These constraints are formalized in the next Proposition, which mirrors the conditions of
Proposition 1 for usage-based pricing. The proof is again in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 3. Under the fixed price policy of Eq. (3.25), full adoption, x = 1, is the
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unique equilibrium if and only if
γ2
p < min γ − c/2, γ −
4r − 2c



.

The conditions of Proposition 3 ensure that total welfare is maximized under a fixed
price policy. Next, we see if and how these conditions limit the policy’s ability to distribute
welfare between users and the provider.

3.7.3

Welfare Distribution

From Eq. (3.26), the utility of user θ at full adoption is

U ([0, 1], θ) = (1 − θ)γ + θr − p − c/2 ,

which when combined with Eq. (3.7), gives the following expression for user welfare

WU ([0, 1]) =

γ+r−c
− p,
2

with Eq. (3.13) correspondingly giving the provider’s profit as

WP ([0, 1]) = p − e .

As before, flexibility in distributing welfare calls for being able to vary WU ([0, 1]) across the
full range (0, V ∗ (1)], where V ∗ (1) =

γ+r−c
2

− e. Clearly, this cannot be achieved without

violating the conditions of Proposition 3, e.g., WU ([0, 1]) = 0 calls for p =

γ+r−c
2

≥ γ − c/2

(recall that r ≥ γ). Therefore the service is not capable of realizing full adoption and
maximizing the provider’s profit (see Appendix A.4 for a full discussion).
Under hybrid pricing, we suggested the use of introductory prices to first realize full
adoption, and then perform the desired welfare allocation. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient under fixed pricing, as certain welfare allocations are incompatible with not just
Proposition 3, but also Lemma 3. In particular and as mentioned above, WU ([0, 1]) ≈ 0
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calls for a price p ≥ γ − c/2 that violates the conditions of both the Lemma and the Proposition. Hence, after an introductory price expires, it forces a drop in adoption below x = 1
and prevents welfare maximization.
In other words, the simplicity of the fixed price policy comes at a cost in terms of
its ability to simultaneously maximize and distribute welfare. The concern is that this
limitation may result in sub-optimal welfare realizations (and lower service coverage), as
the provider may be tempted to set prices to maximize profit.

Figure 3.6: Relative profit drop from profit maximization to welfare maximization (fixedprice policy γ = 1, r = 2 and e = 0.3).
Fig. 3.6 helps assess the extent to which this may be a risk. It plots as a function of c
and for a combination of parameters γ = 1, r = 2, and e = 0.3, the relative difference in
profit between a profit maximizing choice of p and one that yields the best possible profit
while also maximizing welfare, i.e., maintaining x = 1. The figure indicates that as long as
c remains relatively small (compared to γ and r), the incentive to deviate from a welfare
maximizing price is small. As a matter of fact, when c is very small maximizing profit and
welfare coincide even though welfare cannot be entirely realized as profit (this is an intrinsic
limitation of the fixed-price policy). As the negative impact of roaming traffic, c, grows
larger, it however becomes increasingly tempting (profitable) for the provider to deviate
37

from a welfare maximizing strategy and set a price that keeps adoption low. Arguably
though, such scenarios where users are highly sensitive to the (negative) impact of roaming
traffic are inherently not conducive to the large-scale deployment of a UPC like service.
The analysis of this section and its illustration in Fig. 3.6, are clearly dependent on the
specific assumptions of the model. However, as demonstrated in Section 3.9, the findings
hold even under more general conditions.
In summary, although the fixed price policy exhibits clear limitations in its ability to
jointly maximize welfare and profit, its simplicity still makes it an attractive candidate, at
least in scenarios where users are relatively insensitive to the negative aspects of a UPC
service (small c values). In addition and as discussed in Appendix A.4, setting the price to
maximize profit can be “risky,” as the optimal price is such that small errors in parameter
estimation can produce a dramatic collapse in adoption and consequently profit13 . This
should make the safer welfare maximization policy more appealing to the service provider.

3.8

Subsidies and pricing by user choice

As we saw, while a UPC service can generate significant value, fully realizing it calls for
relatively complex pricing. In this section we show that successful outcomes under any
pricing policy often require the ability to subsidize a subset of users, which could in turn
render pricing even more complex. We then propose the Price choice policy, that seeks to
realize another effective compromise between pricing complexity and the policy’s ability to
maximize system value and extract profit. We illustrate the benefits of the proposed policy
by demonstrating when and how it outperforms previously proposed policies.

3.8.1

The Need for Subsidies

We showed in Section 3.3 that under the adoption model of Eq. (3.5), the total system
value is generally14 maximized at full adoption, i.e., when all users adopt the service. An
13
14

In other words, the underlying optimization is inherently fragile.
That is, when the per-user service implementation cost, e, is not too high.
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important goal for a pricing policy is, therefore, achieving full adoption, while also enabling
the service provider to recoup most of the service value as profit. As we shall see now, this
may require subsidizing a subset of users to achieve full adoption, and therefore maximum
service value.
Before we proceed, it will be helpful to rewrite Eq. (3.5) as

U (Θ, θ) = Ui (Θ, θ) − p(Θ, θ) ,

(3.27)

where
Ui (Θ, θ) = γ (1 − θ) + θ r x − c m.
is the value or intrinsic utility the user derives from the service.
Eq. (3.27) readily shows that full adoption, i.e., Θ = [0, 1], implies15 p([0, 1], θ) <
Ui ([0, 1], θ), ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]. An immediate consequence of this observation is that subsidies
are needed, i.e., p([0, 1], θ) < 0, whenever Ui ([0, 1], θ) ≤ 0 for some θ value. The next
proposition characterizes when this arises and the users to which it applies.
Proposition 4. Users requiring subsidies at full adoption have roaming characteristics that
satisfy
θ < θ∗ ,

cm∗ − γ
,
r−γ

(3.28)

where m∗ is the volume of roaming traffic m at full adoption.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Eq. (3.5) with x = 1 (full adoption) and m = m∗ (note
that r − γ > 0).
We note that from Eq. (3.28), the set of users requiring subsidies, ΘS = [0, θ∗ ], is empty
only if θ∗ < 0 ⇔ c m∗ < γ. This is intuitive since c m∗ < γ implies that the impact of
roaming traffic at full adoption is less than the utility of basic home connectivity. However,
when this condition is not satisfied, subsidies are required to offset the impact of roaming
15
Note that this is a necessary condition for full adoption, and may not be sufficient. In particular, it
does not guarantee that the system reaches full adoption, which depends on adoption dynamics.
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traffic for users that derive little or no benefits from the service’s roaming feature, i.e., users
with low θ values.
We also note that the distribution of θ can affect the number of users requiring subsidies,
|ΘS |, in subtle ways. In particular, increasing (decreasing) the roaming propensity of some
users, e.g., by creating a mode near θ = 1 (θ = 0), will on one hand decrease (increase) the
number of users below θ∗ , but on the other hand increase (decrease) the roaming traffic16
m∗ and in the process increase (decrease) θ∗ .

3.8.2

Complexities of Service Pricing

We saw earlier that a pricing policy determines the service cost, p(Θ, θ), for each user. The
pricing policy is a control knob a service provider can use to affect users’ adoption decisions
and control profit. A sophisticated pricing policy may allow the provider to both maximize
overall service value and recoup more of that value as profit (e.g., usage-based pricing policy
of Section 3.5). Such a sophisticated policy is, however, likely to be complex, which may
translate into a higher cost and in the process affect profit.
To better assess the impact of a pricing policy cost, it is useful to split the service
implementation cost e of Eq. (3.9) in two components e = eb + ee, where eb is the basic
deployment cost of the service, e.g., network equipment and operation, while ee is dedicated
to the billing costs that depend on the particular pricing policy. Different pricing policies
will have different ee values.
We now note that the usage-based pricing policy of Section 3.5 has two major disadvantages. The first is its complexity that contributes to a high billing cost, i.e., eeu  eef ,
which could lower overall profit in spite of the policy’s ability to extract all service value
as profit. The second important disadvantage is that when Eq. (3.28) yields a non-empty
set of users requiring subsidies, the usage-based pricing calls for “cashback” payments to
those users, i.e., those whose allowance a exceeds their (home and roaming) usage. Having
to handle such cases further increases the service’s billing complexity and cost, and could
16

m∗ =

R1
θ=0

θ f (θ) dθ, where f (θ), θ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability density of θ.
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also negatively affect users’ usage patterns, i.e., by creating an incentive to consume less.
Hence, although some service providers have recently announced such a service option [42],
it remains highly unusual. The more common version of the usage-based policy is, therefore,
one with “no cashbacks,” which will however be unable to realize full service adoption when
subsidies are needed.
On the other hand, the simple fixed price policy of Section 3.7 often falls short of realizing
full adoption, in addition to yielding a much lower profit than feasible (because it does not
differentiate between users). however, its predictability of price may lead to higher user
satisfaction [61]. Moreover, its billing cost eef is low, which contributes to increasing profit.
In the next section we introduce a pricing policy, the price choice policy, aimed at
the shortcomings of the fixed price and usage-based policies. The policy seeks to, on one
hand, improve on the fixed price policy when it comes to realizing profit. On the other
hand, it targets a lower billing complexity than the usage-based policy, as well as a subsidy
mechanism that avoids direct cashbacks and instead gives low θ users the ability to offset
the impact of roaming traffic.

3.8.3

Price choice policy

The price choice policy gives all users the option to choose between two pricing schemes.
The two options for pricing under this policy are:



p1 (Θ, θ) = ph ,

(option 1)
(3.29)



p2 (Θ, θ) = ph + pr · θx − bm, (option 2)
where, as before, the adoption level x and volume of roaming traffic m are functions of
adoption set Θ. Users pick the option that yields the lowest price for them.
In option 1 users do not pay for roaming usage (as with FON), while in option 2 roaming
usage (as measured by θx) is charged at a unit price of pr . In return, option 2 compensates
users for the roaming traffic (m) their home access carries, at a rate of b per unit of traffic.
This offers a mechanism to subsidize users that see little value in the roaming feature of
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the service, and are negatively affected by having to share their home access with other
(roaming) users. In addition, the subsidy is directly related to the “service” rendered by
those users (the amount of roaming traffic they carry) rather than in the form of a cashback
for unused usage.
Both price options boast a fixed flat price for home usage, denoted by ph , as was the
case with the hybrid pricing policy of Section 3.6. In addition to that, the availability of
options in the price choice policy may improve users’ satisfaction with the service [61].
The price choice policy can also be expected to reduce billing costs eep compared to the
usage-based policy, as the provider no longer needs to track users’ home usage. Roaming
usage still needs to be tracked, but only for users who choose pricing option 2.
The lower complexity and deployment cost of the price choice policy, however, means
that this policy cannot convert all of the system value to profit (it suffers from the same
limitation as the fixed price policy for users that choose pricing option 1). This happens
mostly when γ is small, as the provider is then forced to use a small home price ph to attract
users. The next proposition offers a lower bound on the amount of system value the price
choice policy is unable to convert to profit.
Proposition 5. Assume γ is strictly less than r−cm∗ , such that r−cm∗ −γ = κ > 0, where,
as before, m∗ denotes the volume of roaming traffic at full adoption. Then the amount ve of
system value that the price choice policy cannot convert to profit is lower-bounded as

ve >

κ2
,
2(r − γ)

Proof. Consider the service when adoption is zero, i.e., x = 0 and m = 0. Users’ utility
under either pricing option is given by U ({}, θ) = γ(1 − θ) − ph . In order for anyone to
adopt the service, it is then necessary that ph < γ. Using this condition in the utility and
price functions at full adoption, gives the result after some algebraic manipulation.
The inevitable profit drop of Proposition 5 notwithstanding, the price choice policy may
still outperform (profit-wise) the usage-based pricing policy because of its lower cost. As
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Figure 3.7: Maximum feasible basic profit under different pricing policies compared to
maximum system value. Basic cost is eb = 0.1, but billing costs ee are not yet considered.
we shall see, it may also strictly outperform the usage-based policy, irrespective of cost,
when the usage-based policy operates in the “no-cashback” mode. Finally, it typically also
outperforms the fixed-price policy because of its ability to achieve a higher service value.
We illustrate those claims in the next section using a number of service configurations.

3.8.4

Comparing the performance of price choice policy

This section numerically compares the maximum profit under the price choice policy to that
under the usage-based and fixed price policies, which provides insight into the regimes where
each policy is more profitable than others. In the figures, we take the system parameters
to be r = 1.6 and eb = 0.1 (as γ varies), and assuming that θ has a uniform distribution, we
obtain m∗ = 0.5. These are representative values and perturbing them does not change the
overall nature of the results. Also in order to highlight the effect of subsidies as described
in Proposition 4, we use a relatively large c, taken to be c = 1.4.
Fig. 3.7 plots, as a function of γ, the maximum feasible basic profit (provider’s profit
after subtracting the basic costs eb but before subtracting the billing costs ee) under the three
different pricing policies of Section 3.8.2, and compares them to the maximum system value
(maximum system value is an upper-bound on the feasible basic profit under any policy).
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Figure 3.8: Maximum feasible net profit under price choice and usage-based policies when
eb = 0.1, and eeu − eep = 0.1
We showed in Section 3.5 that the usage-based pricing policy with subsidies (not plotted)
is able to achieve a basic profit equal to the system value across all γ values. However,
as Fig. 3.7 shows, the usage-based pricing policy without subsidies fails to achieve such a
high basic profit when γ is small (more precisely, when |ΘS | as described by Eq. (3.28) is
non-empty.)
For small values of γ, the fixed price policy yields a basic profit higher than that of the
usage-based policy without subsidies. The reason is, in this regime, a fixed-price policy only
attracts a limited number of sedentary users who generate minimal roaming traffic, hence
reducing the need for subsidies. However, the fixed price policy yields inferior basic profits
for a wide range of larger γ values as it cannot differentiate between users to recoup all of
the system value.
On the other hand, the price choice policy improves the basic profit in comparison to
the usage-based policy without subsidies for small γ values, and also remains competitive
for larger γ. This is because as γ increases towards r = 1.6, the provider may increase the
flat home usage price ph of the price choice policy without hindering adoption.
The basic profits plotted in Fig. 3.7, however, do not account for the differences in each
policy’s billing cost. As discussed before, different pricing policies have different billing
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(a) Between usage-based
without subsidies and price
choice policies (e
eu2 − eep )

(b) Between usage-based
with subsidies and price
choice policies (e
eu1 − eep )

(c) Between price choice
and fixed price policies (e
ep −
eef )

Figure 3.9: The threshold ee gap between a high-cost and a low-cost pricing policy, Parameters are r = 1.6, c = 1.4, and eb = 0.1.
costs ee and this will impact how the optimal net profit under different policies compare to
each other. For instance, assume that the billing cost eeu for the usage-based policy is larger
than the billing cost eep for the price choice policy, by a margin of 0.1, i.e., eeu − eep = 0.1.
Then the corresponding plots for their maximum net profit is as shown in Fig. 3.8. We see
that with this value of “e
e gap”, the price choice policy always outperforms the usage-based
policy without subsidies, and even outperforms the usage-based policy with subsidies for
most γ values.
We can quantify the threshold value of ee gap between any two pricing policies. The
threshold gives the maximum difference between the billing costs of a high-e
e policy and
a low-e
e policy, such that the high-e
e policy still generates more net profit. Fig. 3.9 shows
this threshold value for three different pairs of policies. For instance. Fig. 3.9b shows the
threshold ee gap between the usage-based policy with subsidies, and the price choice policy,
i.e., the threshold for eeu1 − eep . From the figure we see that the threshold gap is larger than
0.1 only for 0.2 < γ < 0.5, and that is also the interval in Fig. 3.8 where the usage-based
policy with subsidies outperforms the price choice policy (recall that in Fig. 3.8 we have
eeu1 − eep = 0.1).

3.9

Generalizations and Robustness

The user adoption model reflected in the utility function of Eq. (3.5) is obviously highly
stylized and predicated on various simplifying assumptions, namely,
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(a) Total welfare: optimal adoption
for maximum system value. Compare to Fig. 3.1.

(b) Usage-based pricing policy: values of
usage allowance a for which the system
goes to full adoption.

(c) Hybrid pricing policy: final adoption
level as a function of the parameters γ
and δh . Compare to Fig. 3.5.

(d) Fixed price policy: relative profit
drop from profit maximization to
welfare maximization. Compare to
Fig. 3.6.

Figure 3.10: Impact of relaxing modeling assumptions on the main findings. [1- Coverage κ
is a concave function of adoption x that saturates as x increases; 2- Users have a non-linear
utility function; 3- Users’ roaming characteristics has a non-uniform distribution].
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• A user’s propensity to roam, θ, is uniformly distributed in [0, 1],
• A user’s utility is a specific linear function of coverage κ and volume of roaming traffic
m,
• Adoption, x, accurately measures coverage κ,
• All users see the same coverage and contribute the same amount of traffic while
roaming.
Similarly, the different pricing policies discussed in this chapter rely on these assumptions, as well as on an implicit knowledge (by the service provider) of the range and values
of the different system parameters. This clearly raises valid questions regarding whether
our findings hold outside this framework.
This section, and more generally Appendix A.6, seeks to address this issue. It numerically investigates the extent to which relaxations of modeling assumptions and the
introduction of estimation errors in the system’s parameters affect the results. As expected, modifying the models’ assumptions produces quantitative changes in the outcomes.
However, as we show next, their main qualitative findings remain valid.
More specifically, the investigation demonstrates the robustness of our findings (summarized in the next section) against a broad range of perturbations. Results are presented
here only for representative scenarios, with the full set of results available in Appendix A.6.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. Section 3.9.1 restates the chapter’s
main findings for completeness. The methodology behind the robustness tests is outlined
in Section 3.9.2, while an illustrative example is presented in Section 3.9.3.

3.9.1

Main findings and insight

We briefly recall the main findings that emerged from the results of this chapter’s simple
model.
• Maximum total welfare: Whenever the system is capable of generating value, this
value is maximized at full (or close to full) adoption;
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• Usage-based pricing: Realizing the system’s maximum value under a usage-based
pricing policy calls for ensuring that users are offered a usage allowance that exceeds
a minimum threshold a.
• Hybrid usage-based pricing: When the value of home connectivity is high, the hybrid
pricing policy may not achieve maximum system value (because of the emergence of
a sub-optimal equilibrium) unless prices are sufficiently discounted (high values for
parameters δh and δr ). Such discounts prevent the service provider from maximizing
profit, unless it resorts to an introductory pricing scheme;
• Fixed pricing: Under a fixed price policy, profit and welfare maximization strategies typically differ unless the penalty associated with allowing roaming traffic (the
parameter c) is small.

3.9.2

Robustness testing methodology

In testing for robustness, we consider perturbations to the assumptions, parameters and
functional expressions of our model. Because those perturbations affect the model’s analytical tractability, their impact is evaluated by means of numerical simulations. The
simulations also consider the effect of different types of errors in the estimation of system
parameters on which the service provider relies when designing pricing strategies. We describe next the dimensions along which we perturb the original model. Additional details
can again be found in Appendix A.6.
• Non-uniform roaming distributions

We consider different probability distributions

for a user’s propensity to roam, θ. In particular, we consider distributions with both low
and high roaming modes (fewer or more users that roam frequently).
• Modified user utility functions The original model assumes a specific functional
expression for users’ utility that grows linearly with coverage (x) and decreases linearly with
the volume of roaming traffic (m). We relax the linearity assumption, and also consider
two different utility functions inspired by the models of [70].
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• Coverage saturation

The original model assumes that coverage increases linearly with

service adoption. We relax this assumption and consider a saturation effect for coverage,
i.e., coverage is now a concave function of adoption, which captures that adequate coverage
may be realized with less than 100% adoption.
• Users heterogeneity

We consider a scenario where users belong to two “types” with

different “profiles.” The type of a user affects that user’s utility as well as the volume of
roaming traffic she generates.

3.9.3

Robustness tests

Because of space limitations, we only report on the outcome of one experiment that combines
the first three perturbations of the previous section, namely, a non-uniform roaming distribution with a mode towards high roaming values, a non-linear utility function for users17 ,
and coverage that increases faster than adoption, i.e., saturates before full adoption. We
omit including different types of users in the experiment, as this additional perturbation
typically masks the effect of the others. Results reporting on its effect can, however, be
found in Appendix A.6, together with results for different utility functions and a range of
other scenarios.
Fig. 3.10 displays the results of the evaluation. It consists of four sub-figures, with each
sub-figure corresponding to one of the findings summarized in Section 3.9.1, and illustrating
the extent to which the corresponding finding has been affected. As we discuss next, the
figures illustrate that while quantitative changes can be observed, the overall qualitative
outcomes remain similar, thereby demonstrating the robustness of the findings. A similar
conclusion held across the broader range of scenarios found in Appendix A.6.
Consider first Fig. 3.10a that mirrors Fig. 3.1, namely, plots the adoption level that
maximizes total welfare as a function of the system parameters γ and e. The figure illustrates
that, as in the original model, when the system can generate positive value (the system cost
17

Super-linear in a user’s sensitivity to roaming traffic m, and sub-linear in her sensitivity to coverage x,
i.e., U (Θ, θ) = γ − c m1.2 + θ (r x0.8 − γ) − p(Θ, θ).
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e is not too high), this is achieved at or near full adoption. The wider “intermediate” area
that shows welfare being maximized slightly below full adoption is intuitive in light of the
assumption of coverage saturation for the system, i.e., reaching full adoption adds more
roaming traffic without meaningfully improving coverage.
Fig. 3.10b in turn displays that under the usage-based pricing policy, the system still
exhibits the characteristic “threshold behavior,” which had been identified in the original
model. Specifically, the pricing policy needs to offer users a certain minimum usage allowance, a, to successfully realize full adoption, and therefore maximum welfare. The exact
value of a is clearly different from that predicted by the original model, but the overall
behavior is still present.
Fig. 3.10c corresponds to Fig. 3.5. It shows that, as before, when the value of home
connectivity γ is large, the hybrid pricing policy exhibits regimes where a sub-optimal
equilibrium (e
x < 1) can arise, thereby preventing the system from reaching full adoption.
Overcoming this issue can again be accomplished by appropriately discounting the service
prices. The discount values are obviously different, but the mechanism is the same.
Finally, Fig. 3.10d parallels Fig. 3.6. It displays for the fixed price policy, the gap in
profit between profit maximizing and welfare maximizing strategies. As before, the gap is
small when the parameter c is small, and grows large as c increases.
The above results offer evidence that the findings of this chapter hold under more general
settings than those of the specific and relatively simple model used to preserve analytical
tractability. As mentioned earlier, further evidence of this robustness can be found in
Appendix A.6, which also investigates the impact of various errors in the provider’s estimates
for the different system parameters.

3.10

Conclusion

The work presented in this chapter was motivated by the emergence of UPC services that
feature both positive and negative externalities, and more importantly (negative) externalities that depend not just on the number of adopters, but also on which users have adopted.
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The goal was to develop an understanding of the conditions under which such services may
succeed and the “welfare” (value) they are able to generate.
As expected given the service’s strong positive externality, welfare is typically maximized
when adoption is maximum. More interestingly, maximum adoption and welfare can be
achieved through relatively simple pricing policies that also afford complete flexibility in
deciding how welfare is to be distributed between users and the provider of the service. Of
interest is the fact that pricing according to service usage is sufficient to capture differences
in how users value the service, and successfully realize both maximum welfare and arbitrary
welfare distribution.
The relative simplicity of usage-based pricing notwithstanding, it involves monitoring
overhead and may face acceptance challenges on the part of users. This motivated the
investigation of alternate policies, which offer a different trade-off between implementation
considerations, welfare maximization, and flexibility in welfare distribution.
We demonstrated that when users’ valuation of basic home connectivity γ is small
relative to the impact of roaming traffic cm, there are a group of users that will need to be
given monetary incentives (irrespective of the particular pricing policy), otherwise a UPC
system will not reach full adoption.
The chapter’s main contributions are in offering new insight into the viability of UPClike services, as well as simple (pricing) mechanisms to facilitate their successful and effective
deployment.
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Chapter 4

Opinion Formation in Ising
Networks
4.1

Introduction

Ising spin-glass-inspired models of interactions borrowed from statistical physics have been
adapted for use in economics, models of neural computation, and in social network settings [15, 20, 71, 74]. In this chapter we describe a variation on this theme with a view
to understanding essential features of opinion formation in social networks in a sanitized
setting.
Consider a fully connected network of n nodes, where node i holds a binary (for or
against) opinion xi ∈ {−1, 1} about an issue under consideration. A node’s opinion evolves
over time as a function of its own opinion and that of its network neighbors. A neighbor’s
opinion is weighed based on its influence. Neighbors have a symmetric influence on each
other which depends on their level of affinity. Affinity is biased positively or negatively
based on nodes’ party affiliations. Nodes from the same party are more likely to exhibit
a positive affinity bias. This chapter investigates the extent to which such party-based
influence biases affect opinion formation, and in particular which opinions emerge in each
party at equilibrium.
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The two models considered in this chapter differ in how the inter-nodal influences are
specified. In the random influence model, neighborhood influences are selected randomly
to be positive or negative with a bias based on party affiliation. Two principals from the
same party are more likely to have a positive affinity, while the influence on each other of
two principals from different parties is more likely to be negative. The second of the models
we consider, the profile-based model, specifies affinities in a more nuanced fashion. In this
model each node comes equipped with a profile—a vector of positions on a fixed set of prior
issues with nodes in the same party more likely to take similar positions on those issues.
Inter-nodal influences in this setting are determined based on profile similarity.
The two models share common properties, and in particular, opinions in both models
always converge to stable equilibria. However, they also exhibit significant differences. Of
most interest is the fact that with high probability the random influence model gives rise to
a partisan outcome with nodes in each party converging to a common opinion opposed to
that of nodes in the other party. In contrast, the profile-based model permits a more diverse
set of distinct fixed points, with the opinion equilibrium driven by the initial distribution
of opinions in each party.

4.2

Embedding a Party Structure in an Ising Network
Model of Interaction

In this section we first introduce the basic Ising model, and explain how a party structure
can be embedded in that model. Finally we show that in case of a two-party setting, we
can use symmetries to simplify the analysis of the model.

4.2.1

Ising Model

The basic Ising model is a stochastic system which specifies a dynamics on the vertices
{−1, +1}n of the n-dimensional cube. The system is characterized by a symmetric stochastic
matrix [wij ] of interaction weights. At any time the state of the system is represented by
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a state vector x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ {−1, +1}n which represents a collection of spins or, in
the current context, opinions in a community of n interconnected principals labelled with
indices 1 to n. Updates to the state are performed asynchronously according to some update
schedule: at each update epoch (only) one node i is selected and a state update xi 7→ xui
performed according to the sign of a linear form of the node’s current inputs,1

xui = sgn Si = sgn 

n
X


wij xj  ,

(4.1)

j=1

and all other nodal states are kept unchanged. We refer to Si = Si (x) as the update sum
for node i. In our context xj is the (current) opinion of node j, wij denotes the weight of
the influence node j has on node i, and xui represents the updated opinion of node i. The
updates determine a dynamics x(0) 7→ x(1) 7→ x(2) 7→ · · · in the state space of vertices
where, at any update epoch, the new state x(l + 1) differs from the previous state x(l) in at
most one coordinate (if the node update actually resulted in a change in sign). The specific
update schedule is not critical for our purposes; it suffices if each state is updated infinitely
often with probability one. A simple deterministic update schedule with this property is
a round-robin schedule of state updates; a stochastic example is provided by a random
update schedule where the node whose state is to be updated is selected randomly and
independently at each update epoch. Call any such update schedule honest.
We assume throughout that the matrix [wij ] of interaction weights is symmetric, wij =
wji , and wii is non-negative. In the context of interacting principals in a social network
this models a situation where inter-agent influences are bilateral and symmetric, each agent
having a positive self-reinforcement. A key classical result in this setting says that under
any honest update schedule the system dynamics converges to a fixed point (see [15, 49]).
A state x∗ is a fixed point (or equilibrium) of the system if, and only if, it satisfies2 the
1

For definiteness, set sgn(0) = −1.
There is an irritating possibility of the sum being zero in which case the adopted convention of the
sign function becomes important. But this has an exponentially small probability and we will ignore this
nuisance. Alternatively, assume n is even.
2
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stationary system of update equations

x∗i = sgn 

n
X


wij x∗j 

(1 ≤ i ≤ n)

j=1

i.e., each update sum Si (x) =

P

j

wij xj has the same sign as xi . This leads to the following.

Fixed point criterion. A state x is a fixed point of the system if, and only if, xi Si (x) > 0
for each i.
As Si (−x) = −Si (x), it follows that if x is a fixed point then so is −x, and vice versa.
Thus, fixed points appear in pairs. It is now naturally of interest to characterize the number
and nature of such equilibria.

4.2.2

Party Structure

In the classical Ising paradigm, the weights { wij , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n } are independent, standard
normal random variables. We consider a variation on this theme where there is an embedded
party structure with individuals within a party more likely to have a positive influence on
each other, while individuals across party lines tend to have a neutral or negative influence
on each other.
The general setting is as follows. The nodes {1, . . . , n} are partitioned into, say, m
groups G1 , . . . , Gm which determine party memberships in a multi-party system. For each
group Gk , the intra-group interaction weights { wij , i < j, (i, j) ∈ Gk × Gk } form a system
of (positively biased) exchangeable random variables. Likewise, inter-group interaction
weights { wij , (i, j) ∈ Gk × Gl } form systems of (negatively biased) exchangeable random
variables. The nature of the dynamics is now, of course, determined by the specifics of the
interaction distributions.
We restrict our attention in this chapter to a symmetric two-party system leaving extensions for elsewhere. In the setting at hand, {G1 , G2 } is a partition of the nodes into
memberships in two parties. We suppose further that the intra-party distributions are the
same for both parties, that is to say, { wij , i < j, (i, j) ∈ G1 × G1 or (i, j) ∈ G2 × G2 } is a
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system of (positively biased) exchangeable random variables, and the inter-party distributions are complementary, that is to say, the negatives of the inter-party interaction weights
have the same distributions as the intra-party interaction weights. Consequently, if we
define
w
eij ,




wij

i < j, (i, j) ∈ G1 × G1 or (i, j) ∈ G2 × G2



−wij

i < j, (i, j) ∈ G1 × G2 or (i, j) ∈ G2 × G1 ,

then { w
eij , i < j } is a system of positively biased exchangeable random variables. Therefore,
the symmetries inherent in the situation permit us to simplify exposition and consider an
equivalent single party system (though it should be borne in mind that these algebraic
simplifications will not be available when there are more than two parties). Next, we briefly
sketch the argument.

4.2.3

Single-Party Isometry

Begin with a two party partition {G1 , G2 } and an associated symmetric stochastic system
of weights [wij ]. Form a new membership partition {G01 , G02 } by moving one member, say,
k from G2 into G1 , G01 = G1 ∪ {k} and G02 = G2 \ {k}, associating with the new partition
0 ] where w 0 = w if i 6= k and j 6= k, w 0 = w ,
a new symmetric system of weights [wij
ij
kk
ij
kk
0 = −w
and wjk
jk for j 6= k, by simply negating the weights of all the interconnections

incident on k. We may now establish an isomorphism between dynamics in the {G1 , G2 } and
{G01 , G02 } systems by putting states x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) in the {G1 , G2 } system into one-to-one
correspondence with states x0 = (x01 , . . . , x0n ) in the {G01 , G02 } system, where x0 is obtained
from x by setting x0j = xj if j 6= k and x0k = −xk . It is now easy to verify that the update
sums in the two systems starting with states x and x0 , respectively, satisfy Sj0 (x0 ) = Sj (x) if
j 6= k and Sk0 (x0 ) = −Sk (x), and so a dynamics x(0) 7→ x(1) 7→ x(2) 7→ · · · in the {G1 , G2 }
system is exactly mirrored by the dynamics x0 (0) 7→ x0 (1) 7→ x0 (2) 7→ · · · in the {G01 , G02 }
system, the symmetry of the distributions ensuring that all probabilities are preserved.
By iterating the process we end up with a single party system with weights { w
eij , i < j }
forming an exchangeable system of random variables with a positive bias. The new system is
56

stochastically equivalent to the original two party system, the dynamics in the two systems
being isomorphic. The single party formulation provides the greatest transparency in the
statement of the results and the proofs and we assume without comment henceforth that we
are dealing with an equivalent single party system of nodes where the weights { w
eij , i < j }
form a system of exchangeable random variables. Also for notational purposes, we shall
simply use { wij , i < j } to denote the weights.

4.3

Random Influence Model

The interaction model most closely related to the classical Ising model of Gaussian influences
is to consider a system of independent variables with a drift. And the simplest of these arises
when we have signed Bernoulli influences. Next we formally introduce the random influence
model.

4.3.1

Model Formulation

Suppose 1/2 < p ≤ 1 and let { wij , i < j } be a system of signed Bernoulli trials with success
parameter p: P{wij = 1} = p and P{wij = −1} = 1 − p. [In the equivalent two party
system, the intra-party weights are +1 with probability p (and −1 with probability 1 − p)
for both parties, while the inter-party weights are +1 with probability 1 − p (and −1 with
probability p). In other words, two nodes are likely to positively influence each other if they
belong to the same party; they are likely to negatively influence each other if they belong to
different parties.] The algebra is simplest if there are no self-interactions, wii = 0, and we
so assume. Extensions of this simple model to varying distributions and self-reinforcement
may be handled by tweaking this basic framework and are provided in Section 4.3.5.
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4.3.2

Main Results

We begin by a characterization of the dominant fixed points in this setting. In view of the
fixed point criterion, we see that, for any given state x ∈ {−1, +1}n ,

P{x is a fixed point} = 1 − P

n
[

!
xi Si (x) ≤ 0 .

i=1

Write x+ = (1, 1, . . . , 1) for the vector all of whose components are +1 and in increasing
compaction of notation, write Si (x+ ) = Si+ for the partial sums corresponding to state x+ .
Naturally enough, we expect x+ and x− = −x+ to be fixed points. And this is indeed the
case (in a suitable probabilistic interpretation). Identifying the dependence on n explicitly,
write P + = Pn+ for the probability that x+ is a fixed point.
Theorem 1. Fix any 0 < δ < 1 and suppose

p≥

1
+
2

s

log(n/δ)
.
2(n − 1)

Then Pn+ ≥ 1 − δ. In particular, if p > 1/2 is bounded away from 1/2, then Pn+ → 1 as
n → ∞.
Proof. If the system is in state x+ the partial sums are given by

+
+
x+
i Si = Si =

X

wij x+
j =

j6=i

X

wij .

j6=i

The sum on the right represents a random walk with a positive drift. As the signed Bernoulli
variables wij have expectation 2p − 1, everything sets up nicely for an application of Hoeffding’s inequality [48, Theorem 2] (see [88, Section XVI.1] for the particular version considered
here). We hence obtain


X
+

P(x+
(wij − (2p − 1)) ≤ −(n − 1) (2p − 1)
i Si ≤ 0) = P
j6=i

(n − 1)2 (2p − 1)2
≤ exp −
2(n − 1)
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= exp −2(n − 1)

1
p−
2

2 !
.

By Boole’s inequality, it follows that

P

n
[

!

+
x+
i Si ≤ 0

≤

n
X

i=1


+
P x+
i Si ≤ 0

i=1


≤ n. exp −2(n − 1)

1
p−
2

2 !
≤δ

for the given selection of p.
Our proof shows that the probability that x+ , hence also x− , is a fixed point converges
very fast indeed, exponentially in n, to one. In the rest of this chapter we refer to these
states as partisan states. [The corresponding states in the equivalent two party model are
states where all nodes in a party have an identical opinion which is opposed to the common
opinion of the nodes in the other party.]
We can do a little better, the mechanism of proof permitting a characterization of the
region of attraction around the fixed points x+ and x− . The term region of attraction is
a little vague; more precisely, we would like to estimate the probability that a given initial
state x is mapped, eventually, over possibly many asynchronous steps, into, say, the fixed
point x+ , and determine for what range of Hamming distances d(x, x+ ) we obtain a high
probability convergence to the fixed point.
The situation with respect to x+ and x− is symmetric. Suppose, for definiteness, that
an initial state vector x is at Hamming distance 0 < m < n/2 from x+ . Write Bm for the

n
set of all m
such states x,
Bm = { x : d(x, x+ ) = m }.

For any x in Bm , let M (x) be the set of m nodes that have different opinions under x and
x+ , that is to say,
M (x) = { i : xi 6= x+
i }.
In an expressive terminology, we call these nodes non-conforming. Now, let Si (x) be the
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update sum of node i under state x ∈ Bm ,
X

Si (x) = −

X

wij +

wij .

j ∈M
/ (x)

j∈M (x)

A preliminary estimate of the probability that all nodes have positive update sum under
state x ∈ Bm sets the stage.
Lemma 4. Fix any m < n/2 and suppose x ∈ Bm . Then
P

n
\

!
(Si (x) > 0)

i=1

(n − 1 − 2m)2 (2p − 1)
≥ 1 − n · exp −
2(n − 1)

2

!
.

Proof. By Boole’s inequality, we see that

P

n
\

n
[

!
(Si (x) > 0)

=1−P

i=1

!
Si (x) ≤ 0

i=1

≥1−

n
X

(4.2)

P (Si (x) ≤ 0) .

i=1

The event {Si (x) ≤ 0} occurs if, and only if,

−

X
j∈M (x)

X

wij +

wij ≤ 0.

(4.3)

j ∈M
/ (x)

(Bear in mind that wii = 0.) Now first consider a node i ∈ M (x). Then the left side of
Eq. (4.3) is the sum of n − 1 random variables with mean (n + 1 − 2m)(2p − 1). Another
application of Hoeffding’s inequality shows then that
(n + 1 − 2m)2 (2p − 1)2
P (Si (x) ≤ 0) ≤ exp −
2(n − 1)

!
[i ∈ M (x)].

(4.4)

Next, consider a node i ∈
/ M (x). Then the left side of Eq. (4.3) is the sum of n − 1 random
variables with mean (n − 1 − 2m)(2p − 1). Hoeffding’s inequality hence shows that
(n − 1 − 2m)2 (2p − 1)2
P (Si (x) ≤ 0) ≤ exp −
2(n − 1)
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!
[i ∈
/ M (x)].

(4.5)

Comparing Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.5) we see that
(n − 1 − 2m)2 (2p − 1)2
P (Si (x) ≤ 0) ≤ exp −
2(n − 1)

!
(4.6)

for all i. Substituting the bound on the right into Eq. (4.2) completes the proof.
The introduction of a little notation and terminology helps streamline the results. Fix
0 < p < 1 and on the interval α ∈ [0, 1/2] define the function

f (α) = 2(1 − 2α)2 (p − 1/2)2 − h(α)

where, with logarithms to base e, h(·) is the binary entropy function (in nats) defined by

h(α) = −α log(α) − (1 − α) log(1 − α).

The function 2(1 − 2α)2 (p − 1/2)2 is decreasing in the interval α ∈ [0, 1/2] while h(α) is
increasing in this interval. It follows that f (α) decreases monotonically from a value of
f (0) = 2(p − 1/2)2 > 0 at α = 0 to a value of f (1/2) = − log 2 < 0 at α = 1/2. By the
intermediate value theorem of calculus, it follows that f has a unique root α0 = α0 (p) in
the interior of the interval (0, 1/2) at which f (α0 ) = 0. Fig. 4.1 shows the dependence of
α0 on p.
Say that a state x lies in the attraction region of the partisan fixed point x+ if, starting
with x as the initial state, the state updates converge, eventually, to the fixed point x+ .
Write A+ (x) for the event that x is in the attraction region of x+ .
Theorem 2. Select any small, positive . Fix any 1/2 < p < 1 and any value 0 < α <
α0 (p). If x is any state with d(x, x+ ) ≤ αn, then P(A+
x ) > 1 −  whenever n is sufficiently
large.
Proof. Suppose that the system is at a state x ∈ Bm for some m ≤ αn and the event
Tn
i=1 {Si (x) > 0} occurs. Now consider an arbitrary sequence of (asynchronous) opinion
updates according to the update rule specified in Eq. (4.1). Since all of the update sums
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Figure 4.1: Lower-bound on the radius of attraction region for the partisan fixed points as
a function of p.
are positive, the first node to change its opinion is a non-conforming node that becomes
conforming, the update moving the system to a state x0 ∈ Bm−1 . At this point we say
that one round of updates has happened, and the system has shrunk one step towards the
(closer) partisan fixed point. We denote by Rx the event that the system moves from a
particular state x ∈ Bm to any state x0 ∈ Bm−1 in one round of updates. It is now clear
T
that the occurrence of the event ni=1 {Si (x) > 0} implies the occurrence of Rx and so, by
lemma 4, we obtain

P (Rx ) ≥ P

n
\

!
{Si (x) > 0}

i=1

!


1 2
2
≥ 1 − n · exp −2n 1 − 2α −
(p − 1/2) ,
n

or, what is the same thing,

P (Rxc )

!


1 2
2
(p − 1/2) .
≤ n · exp −2n 1 − 2α −
n
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Another deployment of Boole’s inequality shows now that
!
P

[

Rxc

x∈Bm

!

 

n
1 2
2
(p − 1/2)
≤
n · exp −2n 1 − 2α −
n
m
!


exp(h(α) · n)
1 2
√
≤
(p − 1/2)2
n · exp −2n 1 − 2α −
n
n
!#
"


√
1 2
= n · exp n h(α) − 2 1 − 2α −
(p − 1/2)2
.
n

(4.7)

The expression on the right bounds from above the probability that at least one of the
states x ∈ Bm fails to demonstrate the shrink property Rx . One more application of Boole’s
inequality now gives

P


[

[

!

Rxc  ≤

m≤αn x∈Bm

X

P

m≤αn

[

Rxc

x∈Bm

!
≤n·P

[

1

Rxc

≤ n · n 2 . exp(−n · fn (α)),

(4.8)

x∈Bm

where fn (α) = 2(1 − 2α − 1/n)2 (p − 1/2)2 − h(α).
For every choice of 0 <  ≤ 1, the right side of Eq. (4.8) is strictly less than  if
3
2

log(n) − log()
< fn (α).
n

Since the left side of this inequality goes to 0 as n grows large, if fn (α) is bounded away
from zero then there exists n() such that for all n ≥ n(),

P


[

[

Rxc  < .

m≤αn x∈Bm

It now remains to be shown that if α < α0 then fn (α) > 0 is bounded away from zero
for n sufficiently large. Arguing as for f (α), we see that fn (α) is strictly decreasing in the
1
interval 0 ≤ α ≤ 21 − 2n
and goes from fn (0) = 2(1 − 1/n) (p − 1/2)2 > 0 at α = 0 to

1
1
< 0 at α = 12 − 2n
. By the intermediate value theorem again, it follows that fn
fn 12 − 2n
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has exactly one root α0,n in the interior of the interval 0, 12 −

1
2n



. But fn (α) differs from

f (α) only in a term of order 1/n and, by examination, it is clear that α0,n = α0 +O(n−1 ). It
follows that if α < α0 then α < α0,n for sufficiently large n and this concludes the proof.
To summarize, the states x+ and x− are fixed points (with high probability) for large
n, each having a large (linear in n) region of attraction. The estimates can be improved
but the results are intuitive (and limiting) and we won’t expend any further effort in this
direction.

4.3.3

Numerical Results

The analysis in Section 4.3.2 formally identifies a high-probability region of attraction to
a partisan fixed point, and establishes the connection between p and the frequency of convergence. We can numerically verify this, and also that the results of Section 4.3.2 are
conservative. For instance, Fig. 4.2 considers sample systems of population n = 30, and
plots the frequency3 of convergence to x+ or x− as the strength of party bias varies in
1/2 < p ≤ 1 and as the initial opinion mix increases from 0 (corresponding to all nodes
having the same opinion, e.g., x+ ), to 0.5 (corresponding to the maximum opinion mix,
an even split between +1 and −1 opinions). This figure confirms that at any given level
of opinion mix, the frequency of convergence to the partisan fixed points grows with the
strength of party bias, i.e., the probability of a positive edge-weight between members of
the same party, p. In particular, the figure suggests that there exists a threshold interval of
p values above which convergence frequency is very high. A trivial case is obtained when
p = 1; it can be verified (see Section 4.3.4) that at this value a partisan outcome is always
achieved and the system converges quickly4 .
The analysis also showed that the probabilistic attraction region grows linearly with n.
The growth of this attraction region with n is depicted through further simulations given in
Fig. 4.3. The figure shows curves that are similar in nature to the right-most cross section
3
4

As measured by simulation over 50, 000 different samples in the probability space.
In one “round” of updates.
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Figure 4.2: For the Random Influence model, the frequency of convergence to a partisan
state is plotted as a function of the initial dissent δ and the strength of party bias p in a
population of size n = 30. The simulation shows results aggregated over 50,000 random
network initializations for each value of the abscissae δ and p.
of Fig. 4.2 (corresponding to an initial opinion mix close to 0.5), but for four different
population sizes. Specifically, four networks of sizes 30, 100, 400 and 1000 are considered.
As before, edge weights are determined by a Bernoulli variable with success probability
p. Once a specific p value is chosen, we consider 50, 000 different random realizations of
the edge weights each with a random initial state. A random initial state is obtained by
randomly assigning +1 or −1 opinions to the nodes (with probability 1/2). The system
then starts the update process and eventually converges to a fixed point. At that point
we compute the fraction of time that the outcome is one of the partisan fixed points. This
fraction is plotted in Fig. 4.3 for different p values. The figure again illustrates the presence
of a “threshold effect,” where, for moderate population sizes, a partisan outcome rapidly
arises when p exceeds 1/2.
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Figure 4.3: Phase transition to partisan fixed points in the Random Influence model: The
frequency of convergence to a partisan state is plotted as a function of the strength of party
bias p with population size n as a parameter. Each point on the graphs represents the
empirical mean of 50,000 random trials with (randomly chosen) initial states at maximum
dissent.
To summarize, the two partisan fixed points x+ and x− have large probabilistic regions
of attraction that dominate the space of possible states; as n becomes large, this dominance
occurs for smaller values of p. Therefore, as n or p increases, we should see more and
more nodes of the same opinion in each party, the population of nodes holding the majority
opinion growing to potentially span the whole party.

4.3.4

Special Cases

In this section we consider the special case where the probability of a positive edge-weight
between members of the same party is p = 1. As mentioned earlier, In this case we will
show that the partisan outcome is always achieved and the system converges quickly5 . As
before and without loss of generality, taking |G1 | = n and |G2 | = 0 , we have a graph where
5

In one “round” of updates.

66

all the edge-weights between nodes are +1. As a result, the update sum for any node i is

Si =

n
X

wij xj =

j=1

n
X

xj ,

∀i.

j=1

Therefore sgn(Si ) is that of the majority opinion6 . Hence, node i does not change its
opinion if it is already aligned with that of the majority, and adopts the majority’s opinion
if it is not. The majority opinion is, therefore, unchanged (possibly strengthened), and
the next node’s update proceeds in a similar fashion. This continues until all nodes have
updated their opinion, at which point they all belong to the majority. The final outcome
is a partisan state with every node having the same opinion. This is consistent with our
previous findings.

4.3.5

Generalizations

In this section we consider extensions to the Random Influence model and outline their
effect, with proofs often relegated to the appendices.

Modified edge-weights w
First, an examination of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 reveals that both readily extend to
settings where there is self-reinforcement, i.e., wii > 0, and also to settings where the signed
Bernoulli variables wij arise from different Bernoulli processes and hence have different
probabilities.
Specifically, denote Wmin = mini {wii }, where wii is the self-weight of node i and can
be non-zero, and pmin = mini,j {pij }, where we have assumed that every edge-weight wij is
drawn from a different Bernoulli random variable, each with a probability pij of being +1.
A modified version of Theorem 1 can then be obtained (see Appendix B.1), which states
6

As before, the case of Si = 0 requires special care.
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that for any 0 < δ < 1,

P+
n

≥ 1 − δ,

if

pmin

1
Wmin
≥ −
+
2 2(n − 1)

s

log(n/δ)
.
2(n − 1)

Similarly, Theorem 2 can also be shown to hold after modifying the quantity α0 to now be
the unique solution of f (α, p) = 0, defined as

2
Wmax
f (α, p) = 2 (1 − 2α − 1/n) (pmin − 1/2) −
− α∆max + α log(α) + (1 − α) log(1 − α) ,
2n

where pmin is as defined before, Wmax = maxi {wii }, and


∆max = max max{pij } − min{pij } .
i

j

j

Zealots
Another extension to the basic Random Influence model is one that includes zealot nodes.
Zealots are nodes that put extremely large values on their own opinion and therefore never
change it. They, hence, influence the other nodes without getting influenced by them.
Let the attraction radius of the partisan fixed points in the absence of zealots be αn, and
assume that the total number of zealots in the network is z. Then it can be shown that the
attraction region of the partisan fixed points is at least αn − z.

Independent Group
We consider the presence of a group of independents Ga , in addition to the two parties
G1 and G2 . The independents have non-biased affinities towards every other node in the
network, i.e., the interaction weights {wij , i ∈ Ga } between a node i ∈ Ga and any other
node j in the network form a system of signed Bernoulli trials with success parameter
P{wij = 1} = 1/2. In this case the arguments of section 4.2.3 can still be used to merge the
two parties G1 and G2 into one party Gb . However, the model may not be further simplified
and we are left with one biased party Gb and the group of independents. Let the size of the
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Figure 4.4: The fraction of time that the system converges to a meta-partisan fixed point,
from a random, non-biased starting point when 1/2 of the nodes are independents.
biased party be |Gb | = nb and the size of the group of independents be |Ga | = na = n − nb .
In the presence of independents, the partisan states are no longer guaranteed to be fixed
points of the system. This is because we cannot identify the opinions of the independent
nodes with high probability. Therefore, we create a notation to be able to state the results
for the members of the biased party only. Specifically, we define xµ+ as a meta-partisan
state, for which xi = +1, ∀i ∈ Gb . Note that under xµ+ the independent nodes can take any
opinion and therefore there are a total of 2na such meta-partisan states. For a meta-partisan
state, a modified version of Theorem 1 can now be obtained (see Appendix B.2), which states
c+ that
that, starting from any of the meta-partisan states xµ+ , there is a high probability P
the system remains within the set of the meta-partisan states indefinitely.
We can also numerically investigate the convergence frequency to the meta-partisan
fixed points in the presence of independents. The results are shown in Fig. 4.3.5 in which
a phase transition is evident, similar to that in Fig. 4.3.
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Graphs with Erdős-Rényi structure
The analysis of Section 4.3.2 was for a fully-connected graph, where all nodes interact with
each other. In this section, we will consider a graph with Erdős-Rényi structure G(n, ρ),
where n is, as before, the number of nodes in the graph (or the number of agents), and an
edge between any two nodes exists independently with a probability ρ > 0. This system can
be thought about as one where wij ∈ {−1, 0, +1}, and it is easy to verify that the singleparty isometry argument of Section 4.2.3 still holds. Hence, we can take the edge-weight
probabilities to be
P{wij = +1} = ρ · p,
P{wij = −1} = ρ · (1 − p),

and

P{wij = 0} = 1 − ρ.
Therefore, if ρ is relatively large (e.g., , a constant arbitrary number, not shrinking with
n), then we can use the above probabilities in the derivations of Section 4.3.2 to obtain
equivalent results.
However, a more careful analysis allows us to do better, obtaining results even if the
ρ , ρn values asymptotically decrease towards 0 as n becomes large. That is what we aim
for in the rest of this section. In particular, we will outline the steps to derive a version of
Theorems 1 for the Erdős-Rényi graph with asymptotically small ρ , ρn . Similar steps can
be taken for obtaining a version of Theorem 2.
Let Ni be the neighborhood set of node i, i.e.,

Ni = {j | wij 6= 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n},

and denote the size of this neighborhood set by |Ni |. The expected value of |Ni | is ρn. Let
A denote the event that |Ni | is in the n–vicinity of its expected value, where  = α ρ for
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some fixed 0 < α < 1. Therefore,

A : −n ≤ |Ni | − ρn ≤ n.




We define a function f (α) on 0 < α < 1, as f (α) = c (1 + α) log(1 + α) − α

where c is a

constant 0 < c ≤ 1. It is easy to verify that f (α) > 0 on its domain.
We are now set to start with a lemma, which provides a bound on the probability that
Ac , the complement of A , occurs.
Lemma 5. The probability that |Ni | lies outside the n–vicinity of its expected value satisfies
P (Ac ) ≤ 2 exp (−nρf (α)) .

Proof. Let I(wij ) be an indicator function for existence of the edge wij , i.e.,

I(wij ) =




1,

if wij 6= 0 (wij exists),



0,

if wij = 0 (wij does not exist),

Therefore the expected value of I(wij ) is ρ, and we can use Chernoff’s inequality (see [88,
Section XVII.1] to get


X
P (|Ni | − ρn > n) = P 
I(wij ) > n ρ (1 + α)
j6=i

(4.9)




≤ exp −n D ρ(1 + α), ρ
,
where D(·, ·) is the relative entropy function between two Bernoulli distributions with the
given success probabilities, and can be written as




1 − ρ (1 + α)
D ρ(1 + α), ρ = ρ(1 + α) log(1 + α) + (1 − ρ (1 + α)) log
1−ρ


1 − ρ (1 + α)
= (1 + α) log(1 + α) ρ + (1 − (1 + α) ρ) log
.
1−ρ
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(4.10)

We can write the series expansion for log(·) to get

log

1 − ρ (1 + α)
1−ρ


=−

αρ
α3 ρ3
α2 ρ2
−
− ··· .
−
1 − ρ 2 (1 − ρ)2 3 (1 − ρ)3

Using the expansion in Eq. (4.10) gives



αρ
D ρ(1 + α), ρ = (1 + α) log(1 + α) ρ −
+ O ρ2
1−ρ

= (1 + α) log(1 + α) ρ − α ρ + O ρ2


> c (1 + α) log(1 + α) − α ρ
= ρ f (α),

where the constant c is chosen appropriately to account for the higher order terms O n2 .
Use the above in Eq. (4.9), and similarly compute the probability P (|Ni | − ρn < −n) to
conclude the proof.

We now provide the steps necessary to obtain a result similar to that of Theorem 1. As
+
+
before, we shall start with the partial sums, x+
i Si . If the system is in state x the partial

sums are given by
+
+
x+
i Si = Si =

X

wij x+
j =

j∈Ni

X

wij .

j∈Ni

The sum on the right represents a random walk with a positive drift, and will depend on
the specific value of Ni . Therefore, we condition the rest of the computation on the value
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of Ni .

+

P(x+
i Si ≤ 0) = P


X

wij ≤ 0

j∈Ni


= P


X



wij ≤ 0 A  × P(A ) + P 

j∈Ni

wij ≤ 0 Ac  × P(Ac )

j∈Ni


≤ P


X


X

wij ≤ 0 A  × 1 + 1 × P(Ac )

j∈Ni

(4.11)
Where Ac is the complement of the event A , and its probability was computed in Lemma 5.
On the other hand, and remembering that  < ρ, an application of Hoeffding’s inequality
as before gives

P


X



wij ≤ 0 A  ≤ P 

j∈Ni


X

wij ≤ 0 |Ni | = ρn − n

j∈Ni

(4.12)


≤ exp −2n(ρ − ) p −

1
2

2 !
.

Using Eq. (4.12) and Lemma 5 in Eq. (4.11) gives

2 !
1
+
+ 2 exp (−n ρf (α)) .
P(x+
i Si ≤ 0) ≤ exp −2 n ρ (1 − α) p −
2

(4.13)

Now we can, as before, use Boole’s inequality to get

P

n
[
i=1

!
+
x+
i Si

≤0



≤

n
X


+
P x+
i Si ≤ 0

i=1


 !
1 2
≤ n · exp −2 n ρ (1 − α) p −
+ 2n · exp (−n ρf (α)) .
2
Now we can pick specific values of 0 < α < 1 and obtain suitable asymptotic results.
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4.4

Profile-Based model

The Random Influence model is attractive in its simplicity and elegance, and as shown in
the previous section, results in opinions which conform along party lines. Somewhat more
nuanced and varied opinion formations arise in the profile-based model that we describe
next.

4.4.1

Model Formulation

In the profile-based model each node i has a profile πi = (πi1 , . . . , πiκ ) ∈ {−1, +1}κ where
each entry in the profile takes a positive (+1) or negative (−1) value based on the node’s
known position regarding one of κ independent topics. The influence weight wij between
two nodes is specified as the inner product of their profiles, i.e.,

wij = πi · πj =

κ
X

πik πjk .

k=1

We suppose that the profile bits are randomly chosen for each node and independently across
nodes. Reusing notation for success probabilities, suppose 1/2 < p < 1. The sequence of
profile bits { πij , 1 ≤ j ≤ κ, 1 ≤ i ≤ n } then constitutes a family of independent, signed
Bernoulli variables with success parameter p: P{πij = +1} = p, P{πij = −1} = 1 − p. By
symmetry, the collection of weights { wij , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n } forms an exchangeable system of
random variables in the de Finetti sense, each weight wij having a positive bias.
Our description is for the equivalent single party formulation of section 4.2.3. In the
two party formulation, the profile bits for members of one party are ±Bernoulli(p) while the
profile bits for members of the other parts are ±Bernoulli(1 − p). Thus, if i and j are nodes
in the same party then wij is likely to be positive; if they are from different parties then
wij is likely to be negative. The equivalence between the two formulations is as outlined in
Section 4.2.3.
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Π0 = (−1, −1 − 1)
Π1 = (−1, −1 + 1)
Π2 = (−1, +1 − 1)
Π3 = (−1, +1 + 1)
Π4 = (+1, −1 − 1)
Π5 = (+1, −1 + 1)
Π6 = (+1, +1 − 1)
Π7 = (+1, +1 + 1)
Table 4.1: Profile vectors for κ = 3.

4.4.2

Cluster-Based Analysis

For a profile size of κ, there are 2κ distinct profile types, each associated with distinct profile
vectors, Πν , 0 ≤ ν < 2κ . It is useful to index the profile vectors according to their entries,
such that Πν = 2bν − 11×κ , where bν is the binary vector7 representation of decimal ν,
and

11×κ is the 1 × κ vector of all 1s. For instance, the all “−1” profile is denoted by Π0 ,

and the all “1” profile is denoted by Π2κ−1 . For the case of κ = 3, we have listed all the 2κ
different profile types in table 4.1.
Nodes that have the same profile type can be grouped into what we term a cluster. Let
cluster Cν be the set of all nodes whose profile is equal to Πν . In what follows we show
that nodes in the same cluster always converge to the same opinion. Therefore, given a
partitioning of nodes into clusters, cluster opinions fully describe the state of the system,
so that fixed points only need to be characterized at the cluster level, i.e., what opinion
prevails in each cluster.
Proposition 6. At equilibrium, nodes in a cluster all have the same opinion.
Proof. Let i and j be any two nodes in Cν . Per the fixed point criterion, at equilibrium,
the update sums for i and j satisfy xi Si > 0 and xj Sj > 0. Noting that πi = πj = Πν and
7

If needed, higher-order zeros are appended on the left to make bν of the length κ.
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using it in the inner product wik = πi · πk , we have

0 < xi Si = xi
= xi

n
X
k=1
n
X

wik xk
(Πν · πk ) xk

k=1

= xi

X


(Πν · πk ) xk + x2i + xi xj (Πν · Πν )

k6=i, j

= xi

X

(Πν · πk ) xk + κ x2i + xi xj



k6=i, j

, xi S + κ(xi xj + 1),
where S stands for the sum

P

k6=i, j

(Πν · πk ) xk . Likewise,

0 < xj Sj = xj

X

(Πν · πk ) xk + κ x2j + xj xi



k6=j, i

= xj S + κ(xj xi + 1).
Now suppose the proposition is not true, i.e., xi xj = −1. Then we replace xi xj = −1 and
xj = −xi in the above equations to get xi S > 0 and −xi S > 0. This is a contradiction and
completes the proof.
Let cν denote the size (number of nodes) of cluster Cν and let c be the vector of cluster
sizes, c = (c0 , . . . , c2κ −1 ). Furthermore, write Xν for the common opinion of cluster Cν
and let X be the vector of all cluster opinions X = (X0 , . . . , X2κ −1 ). Then,
Corollary. Given a vector of cluster sizes, cluster opinions fully describe the system at
equilibrium up to a re-labelling of the nodes.
Proof. Consider any specific vector of realized cluster sizes c = (c0 , . . . , c2κ −1 ). We introP
duce a nominal labelling of nodes, which labels the cν nodes in cluster Cν as ν−1
η=0 cη +
Pν−1
Pν−1
1, η=0 cη + 2, . . . , η=0 cη + cν . For this nominal labeling, Proposition 6 states that the
cluster opinions X determine the opinions of all nodes and hence the state of the system.
We shall refer to this state as the nominal state corresponding to c and X. Note, however,
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that for a given combination of cluster sizes c, there are n!/

Q2κ −1
η=0

cη ! different permutations

of nodes and therefore labels that realize those cluster sizes. Each such permutation corresponds to a different state, which can, however, be mapped to the corresponding nominal
state simply by relabelling its nodes.

Hence, in the rest of this chapter we only consider the system’s nominal states, which
we simply refer to as states for conciseness. As a result, the state of the system can now
be fully described solely by the vector of cluster opinions X = (X0 , . . . , X2κ −1 ). State X
is stable if all clusters are stable, i.e., their updated opinion equals their current opinion.
The updated opinion of cluster Cν can be obtained considering any of its member nodes.
Specifically,
Lemma 6. A state X is a fixed point if and only if,

Xν = sgn

κ −1
2X

!
(Πν · Πν 0 ) cν 0 Xν 0

0 ≤ ν ≤ 2κ − 1.

,

ν 0 =0

The stability of a state X is, therefore, determined by the vector of realized cluster sizes
c = (c0 , . . . , c2κ −1 ).
Using a simple combinatorial counting argument, lemma 6 proffers a crude upper bound
κ

of 22 , the maximum number of cluster–level states, for the number of possible fixed points.
While the bound is not particularly sharp, it is already informative: the number of fixed
points in the profile-based model is bounded. As we shall see, the number of fixed points
is not trivially small nor are they so large (growing with n) that analysis is fruitless. The
number of fixed points falls in the Goldilocks zone of not too many and not too few.
κ

Lemma 7, that follows, shows that the bound 22 can be improved by considering
symmetries across clusters.
Recall for the ν th profile vector that Πν = 2bν − 11×κ , where bν is the binary vector
representation of decimal ν, and

11×κ is the 1 × κ vector of all 1s.

Lemma 7. At equilibrium, clusters Cν and C2κ −1−ν have opposite opinions.
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Proof. For the respective profiles Πν and Π2κ −1−ν corresponding to these clusters, we have
Πν + Π2κ −1−ν = 2bν − 11×κ + 2b2κ −1−ν − 11×κ
= 2 (bν + b2κ −1−ν − 11×κ )
= 2 (11×κ − 11×κ ) = 0,
and as a result
Πν = −Π2κ −1−ν .
Furthermore, since the system is at equilibrium, updated and current opinions are identical.
Therefore using lemma 6 we have

Xν = sgn

κ −1
2X

!
(Πν · Πν 0 ) cν 0 Xν 0

ν 0 =0

= − sgn

κ −1
2X

!
(Π2κ −1−ν · Πν 0 ) cν 0 Xν 0

ν 0 =0

= −X2κ −1−ν .
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 7 establishes that any fixed point is of the form X = [XL , −XL ], where XL
is a vector of size 2κ−1 consisting of −1 and +1 entries only. Then we have the following
κ

theorem which is an improvement over the bound 22 that we previously discussed..
κ−1

Theorem 3. The number of fixed points is upper-bounded by 22

.

For a fixed κ, Theorem 3 gives a constant upper-bound on the number of fixed points
which does not depend on the number of nodes n. In the case of κ = 3 this upper bound is
κ−1

22

= 16, and those 16 possible fixed points are listed in table 4.2.

As we shall see later, even the bound given in Theorem 3 is not particularly tight; several
of these states may not be feasible fixed points. For instance, a numerical experiment for
κ−1

the case of κ = 3 shows that the number of realized fixed points is less than 22
and changes with p. The result is shown in Fig. 4.5.
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= 16,

state index

X0

X1

X2

X3

X4

X5

X6

X7

0

−1

−1

−1

−1

+1

+1

+1

+1

1

+1

−1

−1

−1

+1

+1

+1

−1

2

−1

+1

−1

−1

+1

+1

−1

+1

3

+1

+1

−1

−1

+1

+1

−1

−1

4

−1

−1

+1

−1

+1

−1

+1

+1

5

+1

−1

+1

−1

+1

−1

+1

−1

6

−1

+1

+1

−1

+1

−1

−1

+1

7

+1

+1

+1

−1

+1

−1

−1

−1

8

−1

−1

−1

+1

−1

+1

+1

+1

9

+1

−1

−1

+1

−1

+1

+1

−1

10

−1

+1

−1

+1

−1

+1

−1

+1

11

+1

+1

−1

+1

−1

+1

−1

−1

12

−1

−1

+1

+1

−1

−1

+1

+1

13

+1

−1

+1

+1

−1

−1

+1

−1

14

−1

+1

+1

+1

−1

−1

−1

+1

15

+1

+1

+1

+1

−1

−1

−1

−1

Table 4.2: Opinions of different clusters (opinion Xν corresponds to to cluster Cν ) under
all 16 potential fixed points (indexed 0 to 15) for κ = 3
As per Lemma 6, whether a specific state is a fixed point depends on the particular
realization of the cluster sizes c, which are stochastic values. However, in the following we
establish that with probability approaching 1, expected values of cluster sizes are sufficient
to characterize feasible fixed points.

4.4.3

Concentration at the Cluster Level

In this section we first compute the expected sizes of the clusters, then we will show that
these expected values can be used to characterize feasible fixed points.
Since the probability distribution of every profile entry is known, the probability µν that
a node profile is of a certain type Πν can be readily computed. For κ = 3, for example,8
µ0 = q 3 and µ1 = q 2 p, where q = 1 − p. Expected cluster sizes can now be easily computed
8

Considering the single-party equivalent model.
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(a) n = 400 and p = 0.8

(b) n = 2000 and p = 0.8

(c) n = 100 and p = 0.9

Figure 4.5: Probability mass function of the number of observed fixed points for κ = 3.
as follows.
Let Ij (Π) be an indicator random variable which takes value +1 if πj = Π, and 0 if
πj 6= Π. It is clear that E (Ij (Πν )) = µν . Furthermore, the size cν of cluster Cν can be
written in the form
cν = |Cν | =

n
X

Ij (Πν ).

(4.14)

j=1

By additivity, the expected cluster size is hence given by

E(cν ) =

n
X

E (Ij (Πν )) =

j=1

n
X

µν = nµν .

j=1

In any realization of the profile vectors, cluster sizes will vary around these expected
values, and these variations can conceivably affect the set of possible fixed points. Fig. 4.5
illustrates this by plotting the distribution of the number of fixed points obtained across
a set of 10, 000 realizations for κ = 3 and different combinations of n and p. We see that
while, as expected, the upper bound of 16 holds, the number of observed fixed points varies
as a function of p. More interesting though is the fact that as n increases for a constant
p (Fig. 4.5a and Fig. 4.5b), the number of observed fixed points appears to concentrate
on fewer values. We formalize this insight next, starting with a lemma that bounds the
probability of cluster size variations around their mean value.
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Lemma 8. The fractional cluster size cν /n is concentrated at its mean value µν . Specifically: fix any  > 0. Then

P


 c

ν
− µν ≤  ≥ 1 − 2 exp −2n2 .
n

Proof. Start from Eq. (4.14) and note that since the profiles πj and πj 0 of nodes j 6= j 0 are
independent of one another, Ij (Πν ) and Ij 0 (Πν ) are also independent for any ν. Therefore
Eq. (4.14) expresses cν as the sum of n independent random variables, each of which satisfies
Ij (Πν ) ∈ {0, 1}. This allows for an application of Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 1 of [48]),
which gives
P

c

ν

n



− µν ≥  ≤ exp −2n2

and
P

c

ν

n



− µν ≤ − ≤ exp −2n2 .

An application of Boole’s inequality shows hence that

P

 c


ν
− µν ≥  ≤ 2 exp −2n2 .
n

Taking the complement of both sides finishes the proof.
Now that we know cν /n is close to µν , we will show that for identifying the possible
outcomes it typically suffices to only investigate the expected value of cluster sizes, nµν , or
the expected fractional size, µν .
To facilitate the statement of the result and its derivation, we define an update sum Sν
for cluster Cν based on lemma 6. Specifically,

Sν ,

κ −1
2X

ν 0 =0

(Πν · Πν 0 ) cν 0
Xν 0 .
κ
n

(4.15)

We have scaled Sν by a factor κ · n > 0 from the expression in lemma 6, which does not
change its sign and therefore does not change any of the update decisions. Note that the
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cν 0
n

expected value of the term

on the right is µν which is a function of p, the probability

that a profile entry is positive. Therefore, taking the expected values from both sides of
this equation, shows that the expected value S ν of the update sum is a function of state X
as also of p, and it will be useful to take explicit note of this by writing S ν = S ν (X, p). It
will also be convenient to define

σ(p) ,

min

S ν (X, p) .

0≤ν≤2κ −1
X∈{−1,+1}2

κ

Theorem 4. For any p such that σ(p) > 0, the probability Qn that the set of fixed points
of the system under actual cluster sizes cν is the same as that under expected cluster sizes
nµν is bounded from below by

Qn ≥ 1 − 2



κ+1

exp −n

σ(p)
2κ

2 !
.

In particular, Qn → 1 as n → ∞.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 8 we saw that the probability that any of the cν values lies

outside [µν − , µν + ] is bounded by 2 exp −2n2 . By Boole’s inequality we see that
the probability that at least one of the cν values lies outside that interval is bounded by

2κ × 2 exp −2n2 . Taking complements we obtain
!
o
\ n cν

− µν ≤ 
≥ 1 − 2κ+1 exp −2n2 .
P
n
ν
Now consider Eq. (4.15), and note that replacing

cν 0
n

with µν 0 can introduce an error of at

most  to each term in the sum and at most 2κ to the total sum. Therefore
!
P

\

κ


≥ 1 − 2κ+1 exp −2n2 .

Sν − Sν ≤ 2

ν
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(4.16)

If σ(p) 6= 0, then we can pick  <

σ(p)
2κ ,

e.g.,  =

σ(p)
2κ+1/2

and Eq. (4.16) becomes

!
P

\

Sν − Sν ≤ σ(p)

!
≥P

\

κ

Sν − Sν ≤ 2

ν

ν

≥ 1 − 2κ+1 exp −n



σ(p)
2κ

2 !
.

But Sν − Sν ≤ σ(p) means that Sν and Sν have the same sign. Since the sign of the
update sums determines the dynamics of the system, this concludes the proof.
Note that at any point p such that σ(p) = 0 the condition of Theorem 4 does not
hold. However, the zeros of σ(p) are determined by the zeros of the constituent polynomials
comprising the update sums and so are finite in number by the pigeonhole principle. It
follows that σ(p) is strictly positive except at a finite set of p values.
Corollary. Except for a finite set of p values, the set of fixed points in a profile-based
network with random cluster sizes is, with probability approaching one as n → ∞, the same
as that for a deterministic profile-based network with cluster sizes fixed at their expected
values.
As a result of Theorem 4 and the corollary, we can describe the fixed points of the
profile-based model in a compact way. In the following we formulate an explicit matrix
equation for these fixed points. As before, let Πi , i = 0, ..., 2κ − 1, be the ith profile type
of length κ. Then we can represent the system by a graph of 2κ nodes, where each node
represents a cluster. The influence of cluster j on cluster i is determined by the combined
effect of the expected size µj of cluster j together with the inner product (Πj · Πi ). These
effects are lumped into the weighted edge from j to i which we denote by

aij = µj (Πj · Πi ) , i, j = 0, ..., 2κ − 1.
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The adjacency matrix A = [aij ] for the graph of clusters can now be written in the form


κpκ



 κ
 p Π0 · Π1


..


.


pκ Π0 · Π2κ −1

p(κ−1) qΠ

1

· Π0

p(κ−2) q 2 Π

κp(κ−1) q
..
.

..

...

.


2

· Π0 . . . 


... 







whence the fixed points of the system are the solution to the system of simultaneous equations specified by
sgn(AX) = X,
where X is the vector of cluster opinions, and the signum operation applied to a vector is
to be interpreted component-wise. Note that as per the Corollary of Proposition 6, this
equation describes the nominal fixed points of the system, not the specific node opinions.
We solved the above system of equations for different values of of κ and p, and the
result is reported in what follows. Specifically, Table 4.3 is for a profile size of κ = 3, and
determines, for all of the states previously given in Table 4.2, whether or not the state is
a fixed point, and if so, for what values of p. We classify the fixed points of Table 4.3
according to the size of the p interval in which the fixed point is feasible, or persists. As
such, we name the states 1, 2, 4, 11, 13 and 14 the “weakly persistent” fixed points. States
0, 3, 5, 10, 12 and 15 are the “moderately persistent” fixed points, and finally the “strongly
persistent” fixed points are states 7 and 8.
A distinguishing aspect of the profile-based model is that dissent from the majority
position is present in all three types of fixed points. This is made precise in the following
Theorem 5. For profiles of size κ = 3, the number of dissenting nodes is of order n for
all three types of fixed points. More precisely, if p represents the strength of party bias and
q = 1 − p, then the fraction of dissenting nodes is, with probability approaching one as
n → ∞, equal to q 3 + 2qp2 + q 2 p, q 3 + 2q 2 p + qp2 , and q 3 + 3q 2 p, for weakly persistent,
moderately persistent, and strongly persistent fixed points, respectively.
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state index
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

p ∈ (0.5, 0.78)
feasible
feasible
feasible
feasible
feasible
feasible

p ∈ (0.78, 0.86)
feasible

feasible
feasible

feasible
feasible

feasible
feasible
feasible
feasible
feasible
feasible

feasible

p ∈ (0.86, 1)

feasible
feasible
feasible
feasible

feasible

feasible

Table 4.3: Feasibility range for each of the fixed points (for κ = 3)
The proof requires nothing more than a careful tabulation of the sizes of dissenting
clusters for fixed points of each type; we provide the details in the Appendix.
Fig. 4.6 illustrates Theorem 5 by showing the extent of intra-party dissent for each of the
three types of fixed points. While intra-party dissent is most pronounced in the ephemeral
fixed points it is present even in the strongly persistent fixed points: the departure from
unanimity persists, albeit as an irritating minority to a partisan majority, at any level of
bias short of certainty.
Fig. 4.7 plots the number of fixed points for three different values of κ. As expected
from Theorem 6 for κ = 3 and κ = 5, when p gets sufficiently close to 1 only two fixed
points remain feasible. In the case of the even number κ = 4, however, the number of fixed
points never drops to 2. This is because, again by Theorem 6, there are some clusters that
are not forced to change their opinions, and therefore they maintain some level of diversity.
The behaviors in figures 4.7a and 4.7b show a monotone decrease of number of fixed
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Figure 4.6: Intra-party dissent at equilibria when interactions are based on biased profiles.
The relative size of the dissenting minority within the parties is plotted as a function of the
strength of party bias p for each of the three fixed point classifications in the case of profiles
of size κ = 3. (a) Weakly persistent fixed points. (b) Moderately persistent fixed points.
(c) Strongly persistent fixed points.
points as p increases. This could suggest that as p becomes larger, the increasing disparity
in cluster sizes results in elimination of fixed points. While this intuition is valid for small
κ, it does get violated as κ becomes larger and the interactions become more complicated.
For instance, Fig. 4.7c gives evidence for a counter example where there is a rise in the
number of fixed points at a specific p value. The presence of such instances was analytically
and numerically verified.
In the rest of this section we compute the number of fixed points for p values close to
1, and show that for such p values the cluster sizes become so disproportionate that the
diversity in opinions gets eliminated. In particular, when p is sufficiently large, the opinions
of most clusters at equilibrium will be determined be the opinion of one dominant cluster.
Let C (λ) denote a cluster whose profile has exactly λ entries that are +1 (and, hence,
κ − λ entries that are −1).
Theorem 6. There exists p∗ < 1 such that for all p in the interval p∗ ≤ p < 1, and with
probability approaching 1 as n grows large, the opinion of any cluster C (λ) agrees with that
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(a) κ = 3

(b) κ = 4

(c) κ = 5

Figure 4.7: The expected number of fixed points in the profile-based model. As seen in (c),
this number is not monotone in p.
of C (κ) if λ > κ/2 and disagrees with that of C (κ) if λ < κ/2. Moreover, the opinions of
clusters of type C (κ/2) are unaffected9 by the ensemble of clusters of other types.
Proof. The expected size of (the only) C (κ) is pκ which eventually outgrows that of all other
clusters combined, as p approaches 1. Since any cluster with λ < κ/2 or λ > κ/2 has a
non-zero edge-weight to C (κ) , this cluster contributes a dominant effect and determines the
opinion of C (λ) , either positively or negatively, based on the sign of their edge-weight. The
proof for C (κ/2) is in appendix B.3.
Based on Theorem 6, while the opinion of cluster C (κ) determines that of clusters with
λ > κ/2 and λ < κ/2 entries taking value +1 in their profiles, it does not determine the
opinions of clusters with λ = κ/2. The latter are centric clusters that have exactly κ/2
entries of +1 in their profiles and are only present when κ is an even number. This is
because the centric clusters incur an overall zero influence from the outside world if p is
large enough. Consequently, those clusters can decide independently of the rest of the
network.
9

Only for even κ. Also, when the cluster sizes are not exactly the expected values, the outside effect on
clusters of type C (κ/2) is non-zero but negligible.
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Figure 4.8: Convergence to fixed points of different types for the Profile-based model: The
frequency of convergence to each of the three types of fixed points is plotted as a function of
the initial dissent δ and the strength of party bias p when κ = 3. Each point was obtained
by aggregating 50,000 random initializations in a population of size n = 100. (A) Weakly
persistent fixed points. (B) Moderately persistent fixed points. (C) Strongly persistent
fixed points.

4.4.4

Numerical Results

In this section we use numerical experiments to observe the convergence frequency to, and
attraction region of, each of the three types of fixed points that we earlier identified for
κ = 3.
Fig. 4.8 sheds more light on the convergence rate to the three types of fixed points
for κ = 3. While the strongly persistent fixed points become more dominant as the party
bias increases, the ephemeral (weakly and moderately persistent) fixed points have a nonnegligible influence when the bias is small. (Figs. 4.6 and 4.8 in tandem clarify the relation
between the initial and final levels of dissent.)
Note that Fig. 4.8 may not be very informative about the attraction regions of the fixed
points. Such a plot is given in Fig. 4.9, where the axes measure the distance from the
specified fixed points, rather than measuring the initial dissent.

4.4.5

Special Cases

In this subsection, we analyze the system for some special cases of profile length. In the
event that a manual analysis becomes too lengthy to perform, we have used computational
tools to facilitate the solution. Proofs are in appendix B.4.
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(a) A weakly persistent equilibrium

(b) A moderately persistent
equilibrium

(c) A strongly
equilibrium

persistent

Figure 4.9: Statistical attraction region for the three types of fixed points when κ = 3.
Each point was obtained by aggregating 1,000 random initializations in a population of size
n = 100.
Proposition 7. Profile of size 1. For any network size n, the profile-based model with
profile size κ = 1 has exactly two stochastic fixed points. Note that when κ = 1, the profile
vector πi is just a scalar.
The case κ = ∞ presents another extreme of profile size.
Proposition 8. Profile of size ∞. Suppose κ = κn grows sufficiently rapidly with n so that

κn =

2n2
(4p2 − 4p + 1)2

(log(n) + log(n + 1)).

Then with probability tending to one as n → ∞, the only fixed points are the pair of partisan
fixed points x+ and x− .
A very large historical record captured in the profile has the effect of smoothing out all
the wrinkles in the dynamics and collapsing the fixed points to two.
Note that while both κ = 1 and κ = ∞ result in only two fixed points, the compositions
of these fixed points are very different—stochastic in one case, deterministic in the other.
As κ grows from 1 to ∞, the nature of the fixed points changes gradually and a range of
diverse and interesting possibilities appear for finite κ values. Next we consider a few finite
κ values.
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Πa = (+1, +1)
Πb = (−1, −1)
Πc = (+1, −1)
Πd = (−1, +1)
Table 4.4: Profile types for κ = 2
Profile of size 2.

If κ = 2, any profile is one of the four types given in Table 4.4, where we have labeled
them with indices a, b, c and d. Nodes with types a and b behave regardless of nodes with
types c and d, and vice versa. This is because those profiles have an inner product of zero
which results in zero edge-weight. As a result, nodes with types a and b will behave similar
to the κ = 1 case, demonstrating two different outcomes. Similarly, nodes with types c and
d will demonstrate two different outcomes. Overall, the results are independent of the value
of p; we obtain four different fixed points which are determined stochastically, i.e., based
on the specific initialization of profile values.

4.4.6

Generalizations

In this section we consider extensions to the Profile-based model and outline their effect,
with proofs often relegated to the appendices.

Modified Probability for Profile Entries
Since each profile entry of a node reflects the node’s position on one of κ independent topics,
a natural extension to this section’s model is obtained by assuming different probability
distributions for each of the κ profile bits. For example, consider that for any node i the entry
k of the profile is a signed Bernoulli variable with success parameter pk : P{πik = +1} = pk ,
P{πik = −1} = 1 − pk . Under this modification, it can be shown that the relative sizes of
the clusters change, but the results still hold.
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Zealots
Inclusion of zealots in the profile-based model is more challenging than it is in the Random
Influence model. In particular, assessing the effect of zealots depends not only on how they
are distributed across clusters, but it is also rendered more difficult by the fact that their
presence invalidates Proposition 6. Hence, unlike the Random Influence model, we are not
able to incorporate the zealots in the profile-based model.

Independent Group
An extension to the profile-based model is one in which there is a group of independent
nodes. For these nodes, each profile bit is chosen randomly with probability 1/2. The
presence of such a population changes the cluster sizes and hence by lemma 6 changes the
fixed points of the system. Although a very large independent population can considerably
change the count of fixed points seen in Fig. 4.7, the general results of this section hold
even in the presence of independents.

Graphs with Erdős-Rényi structure
Introducing an Erdős-Rényi graph structure for the profile-based model is challenging, as
such a structure conflicts with the native structure that exists in the profile-based model,
and modifies important aspects of the current model that our analysis relied upon. The
reason for the conflict, is that the current profile-based model has a type of structure that is
natively implemented. For instance, if the inner product of the profiles between two nodes
is zero, then the two nodes do not influence each other. This is somewhat similar to the
disconnection effect that an Erdős-Rényi graph brought to the Random Influence model.
The native structure of the profile-based model goes beyond the first order mutual
interactions, and as shown in Appendix B.3, there can be relatively large clusters that are
wholly (in effect) disconnected from the rest of the graph.
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4.5

Conclusion

To summarize, when interactions are directly influenced by party biases then, even for the
slightest of biases, p = 1/2 + , if the population is large enough, the two partisan states
dominate the space: even high levels of initial dissent are quickly extinguished and opinions
converge to one of the partisan fixed points.
The mere fact of party membership, however tenuous, is sufficient to drive a tendency
of the party to cohere. There is a marked tendency to unanimity within parties if the
influence of party affiliation on interactions is direct. However, dissent is enabled when the
influence of party affiliation is indirect. Other sociological factors, of course, will modulate
this tendency to cohere but the existence of such a strong driving force based on party
membership alone explicates a fundamental mechanism at work in the dynamics of opinion
formation in a precise and quantifiable way.
When the interactions are indirectly influenced by party biases, there is more variety
in the outcomes. The lessons that we draw from the relatively small profile of κ = 3 carry
over to larger values of κ though the complexity of the fixed point structure ineluctably
increases as shown in Fig. 4.7. The following features hold in general: (i) Small party biases
lead to the most unconstrained systems characterized by a bounded number of possible
stable opinion mixes. (ii) As the bias p increases the possible behaviors are generally more
constrained and in the limit of large p the behavior is dictated by a few dominant fixed
points. (iii) All fixed points contain minority dissenting positions though the dissenting
fraction is small if the party bias is large.
Extensions to many parties, varying strengths of party influences, the presence of independents and zealots, self-reinforcement, and localized interactions where considered, which,
often follow readily without a significant change in the essential nature of the results.
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Appendices
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Appendix A

Extras for UPC models
A.1

Discrete Dynamics

In this section we propose a discrete dynamic platform and formally describe how the
equilibria of the UPC system are determined over this platform. With Eq. (3.5) in place, it
is possible to investigate the dynamics of user adoption over time. We formulate a discretetime model that evaluates user adoption decisions at successive epochs. For simplicity1 ,
at epoch (n + 1) all users are assumed to know the system state produced by adoption
decisions at epoch n. Users with a non-negative utility then proceed to adopt. Specifically,
the utility at epoch (n + 1), Un+1 (Θ, θ), of a user with roaming value θ is given by

Un+1 (Θ, θ) = γ − c mn + θ (r xn − γ) − p(Θ, θ) ,

(A.1)

where xn and mn are the adoption level and volume of roaming traffic produced by adoption
decisions at epoch n.
Using Eq. (A.1) and denoting H(x) ≡ xn+1 as a function of x ≡ xn , we can characterize
the evolution of H(x) and identify adoption equilibria. Equilibria can be interior equilibria,
i.e., correspond to x ∈ (0, 1), or boundary equilibria, i.e., associated with x = 0 or x = 1.
1

Numerical results confirm that a more realistic, diffusion-based adoption model produces similar results.
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Interior equilibria satisfy the equation

H(x) = x .

(A.2)

Boundary equilibria need not satisfy Eq. (A.2) and instead verify either xn = 0 ≥ xn+1 or
xn = 1 ≤ xn+1 .

(a) γ = 0.8, e = 0.75, c = 0.6, b =
0, r = 1.6. In this case, the optimal
value is achieved at x = 1 (Corresponding to the dark solid-colored region in
Fig. 3.1).

(b) γ = 1.3, e = 1.145, c = 0.6, b =
0, r = 1.6. In this case, the optimal
value is achieved at x ≈ 0.14 (Corresponding to the gradient-colored region
in Fig. 3.1).

Figure A.1: System’s total value as a function of x for different sets of parameters.

A.2

Derivations for the Optimal Total Welfare

Section 3.3.2 identified the optimal total welfare for a given adoption level x as

∗

V (x) =



γ 2
3

 r−c
2 x − 2 x + (γ − e)x

if x <

γ
r−c



− r−c x3 + ( γ + r − c)x2 − ex
2
2

if x ≥

γ
r−c ·
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Denote the above two expressions by V1∗ (x) and V2∗ (x) for x <

γ
r−c

and x ≥

γ
r−c ,

respectively

(shown in Fig. A.1a as dashed line and solid line, respectively).
Finding the maximum welfare is done in two steps. We first compute the maximum of
each function V1∗ (x) and V2∗ (x), and then find the global maximum by comparing the two
local maxima.

A.2.1

Maximum of V1∗ (x)

For easy reference, we repeat the expression of V1∗ (x) here.
V1∗ (x) =

r−c 3 γ 2
x − x + (γ − e)x ,
2
2

x<

γ
.
r−c

It is easy to find the roots of this expression as



x = 0


x =

γ
±
2

q

γ2
−2(γ−e)(r−c)
4

r−c

(A.3)
,

if they exist (are real numbers). Also its derivative is
3
∂V1∗ (x)
= (r − c)x2 − γx + γ − e,
∂x
2
and the two roots of

∂V1∗ (x)
∂x

(A.4)

are given by



x11 =


x12 =

γ−

γ+

√
√

γ 2 −6(γ−e)(r−c)
3(r−c)

(A.5)

γ 2 −6(γ−e)(r−c)
·
3(r−c)

In order to find the maximum total welfare in x <

γ
r−c

regime, we take a step-by-step

approach, with each step expressed in a lemma.
Lemma 9. if e ≥ γ, then V1∗ (x) ≤ 0 for all values of x ∈ [0,

γ
r−c ].

Proof. First assume that e > γ. From Eq. (A.3) and since r − c > 0, the condition e > γ
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guarantees that V1∗ (x) has indeed three roots, x1 < 0, x2 = 0 and x3 >

γ
r−c .

On the other

hand, at x = 0 the derivative of V1∗ (x) is g − e < 0. Therefore V1∗ (x) goes from 0 to negative
values for x > 0, and may not become non-negative again until its next root at x3 >

γ
r−c .

Moreover, if e = γ, then the three roots of Eq. (A.3) are x1 = 0, x2 = 0, and x3 =

γ
r−c .

At x = 0 the second derivative of V1∗ (x) is −γ. Therefore, as before, V1∗ (x) goes from 0 to
negative values for x > 0, and may not become non-negative again until its next root at
x=

γ
r−c .

This lemma shows that total welfare is not positive for x <

γ
r−c

if e ≥ γ. We next look

at the case where e < γ.
Lemma 10. If e < γ, then the maximum of V1∗ (x) over values of x ∈ [0,

γ
r−c ]

happens at

either x = x11 (if it is real) or x = γ/(r − c).
Proof. If e < γ it can be easily verified that x11 > 0 and x12 <

2γ
3(r−c)

< γ/(r − c) (if they

are real). Since V1∗ (x) is an increasing function of x except for x11 < x < x12 , the desired
result follows.
consequently, we deduce that if x11 and x12 are imaginary, then the maximum of V1∗ (x)
over values of x ∈ [0,

γ
r−c ]

happens at x = γ/(r − c). More precisely, if e satisfies

f3 : e < γ −

γ2
,
6(r − c)

then the maximum of V1∗ (x) over values of x ∈ [0,

A.2.2

γ
r−c ]

(A.6)

happens at x = γ/(r − c).

Maximum of V2∗ (x)

For easy reference, we repeat the expression of V2∗ (x) here.
V2∗ (x) = −

γ
r−c 3
x + ( + r − c)x2 − ex ,
2
2
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x≥

γ
.
r−c

It is easy to find the roots of this expression as



x = 0


x =

γ
+r−c∓
2

(A.7)

√

(γ/2+r−c)2 −2e(r−c)
,
r−c

if they exist (are real numbers). Also its derivative is
∂V2∗ (x)
3
= − (r − c)x2 + (γ + 2r − 2c)x − e.
∂x
2

(A.8)

We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 11. If the roots of

∂V2∗ (x)
∂x

are imaginary, then V2∗ (x) is always negative on its

domain.
Proof. If the roots are not real then the expression for derivative always has the same sign
as of its first coefficient, − 23 (r − c). Since r − c > 0, then the derivative is always negative,
and therefore V2∗ (x) is a decreasing function of x. On the other hand, since V2∗ (x = 0) = 0,
therefore V2∗ (x) < 0, ∀x ∈ [γ/(r − c), 1).
The two roots of

∂V2∗ (x)
∂x

are given by




x21 =

√

γ+2r−2c−

√



x22 =

γ+2r−2c+

(γ+2r−2c)2 −6e(r−c)
3(r−c)

(A.9)

(γ+2r−2c)2 −6e(r−c)
·
3(r−c)

By algebraic manipulation we can show that these two roots are imaginary if and only if γ
satisfies
−2(r − c) −

p
p
6e(r − c) < γ < −2(r − c) + 6e(r − c).

But the first inequality is always satisfied by positivity of γ. Therefore the roots in Eq. (A.9)
are imaginary if and only if γ satisfies

γ < −2(r − c) +
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p
6e(r − c),

or equivalently the roots in Eq. (A.9) are real if and only if γ satisfies

f2 : γ ≥ −2(r − c) +

p

6e(r − c),

(A.10)

which, by lemma 11 is required for positivity of V2∗ (x).
Now, lets see what happens when Eq. (A.10) is satisfied and therefore the roots of
∂V2∗ (x)
∂x

are real. Since r − c > 0, the derivative is always negative except in between its

roots. Then note that as for the smaller root, x21 > 0. So

∂V2∗ (x)
∂x

< 0 at a neighborhood

of x = 0 and therefore V2∗ (x) is decreasing until a value larger than x = 0. After that,
V2∗ (x) starts increasing again until x = x22 where it again starts to decrease and continues
to decrease indefinitely. Considering that V2∗ (x = 0) = 0, we deduce that if V2∗ (x) has a
positive maximum in x ∈ [γ/(r − c), 1) then it happens at min{1, x22 }. On the other hand,
and considering that [γ/(r − c), 1) is only non-empty if γ ≤ r − c, we can perform algebraic
manipulations to show that in its valid domain, x22 < 1 if and only if e > γ + (r − c)/2.
Therefore, for all values of

f1 : γ ≥ e − (r − c)/2,
the maximum of V2∗ (x) happens at x = 1 or x = 0, and is the bigger of

(A.11)
r−c+γ
2

− e or 0,

respectively.
As mentioned before, we finally compare the maxima of V1∗ (x) and V2∗ (x) for the common
parameter ranges. For instance, when Eq. (A.6) is satisfied, it can be shown that Eq. (A.11)
is also satisfied, and the bigger of the two maxima happens at x = 1. Completing the steps
and using numerical comparisons when necessary, results in Fig. 3.1.

A.3

Derivations for Hybrid Usage-Based Policy

Section 3.6 presented the hybrid usage-based pricing policy that combines a fixed price for
home connectivity, and a usage-based price for connectivity while roaming.
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Also, Lemma 2 provided conditions under which full adoption x = 1 is an equilibrium.
However, that Lemma did not guarantee the uniqueness of x = 1 equilibrium. Indeed, the
progression of adoption levels towards x = 1 can stall before full adoption is reached. We
explore next when this arises (assuming that the conditions of Lemma 2 hold).

A.3.1

Condition for uniqueness of x = 1 equilibrium

Consider a scenario where not all users have positive utility when coverage is low, so that
only a subset Θ 6= [0, 1] of users initially adopt. This initial adoption triggers other users to
re-evaluate their utility U (Θ, θ), which then determines a new set of adopters Θnew , such
that Θnew = { θ | U (Θ, θ) > 0 }. Basic algebraic manipulation yields that Θnew comprises
either all users (if x(δr +γ)−γ ≥ 0), or users that verify θ <

c/2−cm+δh
γ−x(δr +γ)

(if x(δr +γ)−γ < 0),

where x and m are determined by the (old) set of adopters Θ. This implies that for any
adoption level x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the set Θ of adopters is [0, x]. Using Eq. (3.3), this set yields a
roaming traffic of the form m =

x2
2 ,

which using Eq. (3.20) characterizes the utility of user

θ as
c
U (Θ, θ) = (1 − x2 ) + δh + θ(x(δr + γ) − γ).
2
Consequently, the new level of adoption xnew = |Θnew | can be expressed as a function
of the previous level x. Letting H(x) , xnew and solving for U (Θ, θ) > 0 gives2

H(x) =


2


 c/2(1−x )+δh

if x(δr + γ) − γ < 0



1

if x(δr + γ) − γ ≥ 0·

γ−x(δr +γ)

Adoption equilibria satisfy H(x) = x, and can, therefore, be characterized by solving this
equation. It can be shown that
Lemma 12. when the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, x = 1 is the unique equilibrium if and
2

For notational simplicity, we omit the constraints which ensure that like x, H(x) is lower-bounded by 0
and upper-bounded by 1.
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only if γ satisfies
γ < c + 2δh + 2

p
(c/2 + δh )(δr + δh ).

Proof. It is easy to see that the second expression for H(x) satisfies H(x) = x only at x = 1,
and therefore if there are any equilibria at x < 1, they must satisfy H(x) = x for the first
expression of H(x), i.e.,

H1 (x) ,

c/2(1 − x2 ) + δh
=x
γ − x(δr + γ)

for x(δr + γ) − γ < 0.

We first show that if γ satisfies the condition of the Lemma, then no such equilibria may
exist at x < 1.
Basic algebraic manipulation turns the above equation into

Q(x) , (γ + δr − c/2) x2 − γx + c/2 + δh = 0,

which is a quadratic equation in x and for simplicity we denote it by Q(x) = 0. We then
compute the discriminant for this equation as
∆x = γ 2 − 4(c/2 + δh )(γ + δr − c/2)
= γ 2 − γ(2c + 4δh ) − 4(c/2 + δh )(δr − c/2),
which, in turn, is a quadratic polynomial in γ. The roots of the discriminant are
p
γ1 = c + 2δh − 2 (c/2 + δh )(δr + δh )
p
γ2 = c + 2δh + 2 (c/2 + δh )(δr + δh )

and

and the discriminant is negative for γ values in the range (γ1 , γ2 ).
Now consider one such γ value in the range (γ1 , γ2 ), which is arbitrarily close to γ2 , i.e.,
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γ = γ2 −  for an arbitrarily small  > 0. Therefore, the coefficient of x2 in Q(x) becomes


p
γ + δr − c/2 = c + 2δh + 2 (c/2 + δh )(δr + δh ) −  + δr − c/2
= c/2 + (δh + δr ) + δh + 2

p
(c/2 + δh )(δr + δh ) − ,

which is guaranteed to be positive if  is chosen small enough, e.g.,  = (δh + δr )/2. (Note
that − is the only negative term in this expression.) On the other hand, by the previous
discussion, ∆x is negative at γ = γ2 − . Therefore at γ = γ2 −  we have Q(x) > 0, ∀x
(Of course, by ∀x we mean values of x for which H(x) = H1 (x), i.e., those which satisfy
x(δr + γ) − γ < 0).
Furthermore, the only terms in Q(x) that depend on γ are γ(x2 − x). Therefore since
x2 − x < 0, ∀x, it follows that Q(x), ∀x is a decreasing function of γ. Hence for any
γ 0 ≤ (γ2 − ) we also have Q(x) > 0, ∀x, which means H1 (x) 6= x, and it follows that x < 1
may not be an equilibrium.

Lemma 12 then ensures that adoption increases monotonically until reaching full adoption. The condition of this Lemma was previously referred to in Eq. (3.21).

A.3.2

Depiction of temporary pricing

Fig. A.2 shows the final adoption level for the hybrid pricing policy under the original model.
The figure illustrates the presence of a region of (γ, δh ) values where the system does not
go to full adoption, and shows that by increasing the discount factor δh we can avoid that
region, hence realizing full adoption.
This can be seen from the three sample points indicated by pins in Fig. A.12a. Pin a
indicates a point where the system reaches full adoption. Pin b, on the other hand, is at a
point where the system converges to a lower equilibrium and full adoption is not possible.
However, by increasing the value of δh , we move to Pin c where, once again, the system
converges to full adoption. The details of system’s convergence at each pin is described
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Figure A.2: Final adoption level for the hybrid usage-based pricing policy, as γ and δh
vary, with pins corresponding to figures Fig. A.3a, Fig. A.3b and Fig. A.3c, respectively.
Parameters are c = 0.8, δr = 0, with different γ and δh values.

(a) γ = 0.8, δh = 0.01

(b) γ = 1, δh = 0.01

(c) γ = 1, δh = 0.05

Figure A.3: H(x) for the hybrid usage-based pricing policy. Fig. (a) has a single equilibrium
at full adoption. Fig. (b) has parameter values which result in sub-optimal equilibria.
Fig. (c) has the same parameter γ as Fig. (b), but a higher δh , and shows how increasing
δh eliminates the sub-optimal equilibria. Parameters are c = 0.8, δr = 0, with different γ
and δh values.
below.
Fig. A.3 plots the function H(x) under the original model for three values of (γ, δh )
pair. Figures A.3a, A.3b and A.3c correspond to the three pins in Fig. A.12a, respectively.
Fig. A.3a corresponds to a scenario where the multiple-equilibria problem does not exists.
Fig. A.3b however, has this problem, and by adjusting its δh parameter we are able to
eliminate the equilibria at x < 1, which results in Fig. A.3c. In the cases of Figs. A.3a
and A.3c, the system (starting from zero adoption) will eventually go to full adoption,
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while in the case of Fig. A.3b the presence of the stable equilibrium xs means the final
adoption level will be x(∞) = xs u 0.7.

A.4

Fixed Price Policy

The simplest pricing policy is one with a single fixed and flat-rate price, i.e., p(Θ, θ) = p.
With this pricing policy, Eq. (A.1) becomes

Un+1 (Θ, θ) = γ − p − c mn + θ (r xn − γ) .

(A.12)

Since a user’s utility is a function of the adoption set Θ, evaluating the system state calls
for first characterizing Θ. The next proposition allows us to understand the composition of
Θ.
Proposition 9. For all choices of p, γ and c, the set of adopters is characterized by a range
b 1], 0 ≤ θb ≤ 1.
of θ values of the form [0, θb ] or [θ,
Proof. From Eq. (A.12), we have:

Un (Θ, θ) = βn−1 + θαn−1 ,

where βn−1 = γ − p − c mn−1 and αn−1 = r xn−1 − γ. For a user to have a positive utility,
and therefore adopt, its θ value must satisfy θαn−1 > −βn−1 . This translates into different
conditions depending on the sign and value of αn−1 .
If αn−1 < 0, i.e., xn−1 < γ/r, θ needs to satisfy θ < −βn−1 /αn−1 . Hence, the set of
adopters at epoch n is either empty or corresponds to users with θ values in an interval
of the form [0, θbn ), where θbn = (−βn−1 /αn−1 )[0,1] and we have used the notation (x)[0,1] to
denote the projection of x on the interval [0, 1].
If αn−1 > 0, i.e., xn−1 > γ/r, θ must now satisfy θ > −βn−1 /αn−1 . In this scenario, the
set of adopters at epoch n is again either empty or corresponds to users with θ values in an
interval of the form (θbn , 1] where θbn = (−βn−1 /αn−1 )[0,1] .
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Finally, if αn−1 = 0, i.e., xn−1 = γ/r, then Un (θ) = βn−1 , ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1]. The set of
adopters in this last case is either the empty set (if βn−1 ≤ 0) or the entire interval [0, 1] (if
βn−1 > 0).
As a result of proposition 9, we shall capture the adopters’ set Θn at epoch n through
an adoption vector, Xn , that includes the number of adopters, xn , and specifies their θ
values through a simple binary variable. Using Eq. (A.12) and denoting H(X) ≡ Xn+1 as a
function of X ≡ Xn , we want to characterize the evolution of H(X) and identify adoption
equilibria. We will drop the Θ notation hence forth and simply denote the utility under a
flat-rate price at epoch n by Un (θ).
From the proof of Proposition 9, we derive expressions for xn , for the three possible
conditions on αn−1 .


θbn




xn =
1 − θbn




I
[βn−1 ] ,

if xn−1 < γ/r

(A.13a)

if xn−1 > γ/r

(A.13b)

if xn−1 = γ/r

(A.13c)

As mentioned before, proposition 9 also establishes that the adoption state at epoch n, Xn ,
can be represented as a two-dimensional vector Xn = (xn , yn ), where yn is a binary variable
that indicates the “type” of adoption interval of Proposition 9. Specifically,

yn =




0

if adopters ∈ [0, θbn ), i.e., xn−1 < γ/r



1

if adopters ∈ [θbn , 1], i.e., xn−1 ≥ γ/r

(A.14)

where we arbitrarily took yn to be 1 for the case where xn−1 = γ/r. We also note that as
shown in the proof of Proposition 9, the value of yn solely depends on xn−1 , i.e., yn = 0
when xn−1 < γ/r and yn = 1 when xn−1 ≥ γ/r. In other words, the identity of adopters at
epoch n depends on the number of adopters at epoch (n − 1).
The rest of this section is devoted to characterizing equilibria and the dynamics that
lead to them. We start with a number of preliminary results on which the derivations rest.
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A.4.1

Preliminary Results

Assume that when the service is introduced at n = 0 there are no adopters; thus x0 = 0
and m0 = 0. At the next epoch, n = 1, the utility U1 (θ) of a user with roaming value θ is

U1 (θ) = γ − p − θ γ

At epoch 1 adopters consist, therefore, of users with a θ value such that θ < (γ − p)/γ.
Hence, x1 = (γ − p)/γ when γ ≥ p, and x1 = 0 otherwise. In other words and as stated in
Proposition 10, a positive adoption requires γ > p, i.e., the price cannot exceed the utility
that users derive from home base connectivity. This is likely to hold in practice, e.g., the
price of basic Internet connectivity is such that many have adopted the service even in the
absence of a roaming option. Throughout the analysis this condition is assumed to hold.
Note that under this assumption, x = 0 can not be an equilibrium.
Proposition 10. Starting from an initial state of zero adoption, non-zero adoption is
possible only if γ > p.
In the next proposition, we formally establish that the vector Xn fully characterizes the
adoption process, namely, that mn can be computed once Xn is known.
Proposition 11. The vector Xn = (xn , yn ), together with the parameters γ, p, r and c,
are sufficient to compute a user’s utility at epoch (n + 1) as expressed in Eq. (A.12).
Proof. From Eq. (A.1), a user’s utility at epoch (n + 1) depends on γ, p, r, c, xn , and mn .
It therefore suffices to show that mn can be computed based on γ, p, r, c, xn , and yn . We
consider separately the cases yn = 0 and yn = 1.
If yn = 0, adopters are users with θ ∈ [0, θbn ), so that θbn = xn and mn is given by:
Z
mn =
0

xn

1
θ dθ = x2n ,
2

if yn = 0

(A.15)

Conversely, when yn = 1 adopters are users with θ > θbn . Thus θbn = 1 − xn and mn is given
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by
Z
mn =

1

1
θ dθ = (−x2n + 2xn ) ,
2
1−xn

if yn = 1

(A.16)

This establishes that, Un+1 (θ) can be computed based on Xn and the parameters γ, p, r
and c. Note that this also ensures that Xn+1 can be computed, and therefore the evolution
of the adoption process can be tracked.

A.4.2

Characterizing Adoption Evolution

We now turn to exploring the evolution of the adoption vector Xn . Our goal is to characterize adoption dynamics and identify eventual equilibria. As mentioned earlier, equilibria
are either solutions of
H(X) = X,

(A.17)

or boundary points of the interval [0, 1]. The main difficulty in solving Eq. (A.17) stems
from the fact that Xn is a two-dimensional vector. In particular, although Eqs. (A.15)
and (A.16) show that a user’s utility at epoch (n + 1) is solely a function of xn , the choice of
which equation to use depends on yn or in other words on xn−1 , i.e., Un+1 (θ) is a function
of both xn and xn−1 .
As a result, exploring adoption dynamics calls for accounting for adoption levels in
the previous two epochs. This is reflected in the approach we describe next. Specifically,
we consider separately the cases yn = 0 (xn−1 < γ/r) and yn = 1 (xn−1 ≥ γ/r), and
correspondingly introduce the notation H1 (x) ≡ H(x, 0) and H2 (x) ≡ H(x, 1) to investigate
the evolution of adoption in these two scenarios. As we shall see, these two cases will each
be divided in two further sub-cases.

Adoption Evolution under H1 (x), i.e., yn = 0
In this scenario, Eq. (A.15) is used to compute Un+1 (θ), which when combined with Eq. (A.1)
gives
c
Un+1 (θ) = γ − p − x2n + θ (r xn − γ) .
2

107

(A.18)

Eq. (A.18) allows us to determine the adoption threshold θbn+1 at epoch (n + 1), i.e., the θ
value such that Un+1 (θbn+1 ) = 0 :
γ − p − 2c x2n
.
θbn+1 =
γ − r xn
To compute the new system state Xn+1 at epoch (n + 1), we distinguish between the cases
yn+1 = 0 and yn+1 = 1, with Eq. (A.13) correspondingly identifying the expression of xn+1 .
When yn+1 = yn = 0, both xn and xn−1 are below γ/r. Therefore even when xn+1 is
above γ/r, the set of adopters at epoch (n + 1) is still of the form [0, θbn+1 ). Since both xn
and xn+1 consist of the same type of adopters, we say that adoption stays in the “home”
region, and for convenience introduce the notation xn+1 ≡ H1h (x). Eq. (A.13a) then states
that xn+1 = θbn+1 , so that
H1h (x) =

γ − p − 2c x2
.
γ −rx

(A.19)

When yn+1 = 1 and yn = 0, we have xn ≥ γ/r while xn−1 was below γ/r, and the set of
adopters at epoch (n + 1) is of the form (θbn+1 , 1]. We denote this configuration as xn+1
being in the “away” region, and correspondingly introduce the notation xn+1 ≡ H1a (x).
Eq. (A.13b) then states that xn+1 = 1 − θbn+1 , so that

H1a (x) =

c 2
2x

−rx+p
γ −rx

(A.20)

Adoption Evolution under H2 (x), i.e., yn = 1
In this scenario, Eq. (A.16) is used in equation Eq. (A.1), which gives:
c
Un+1 (θ) = γ − p − (−x2n + 2xn ) + θ(r xn − γ) .
2

(A.21)

As before, from Eq. (A.21) we find the adoption threshold θbn+1 for which Un+1 (θbn+1 ) = 0.
This gives:
γ − p − 2c (−x2n + 2xn )
θbn+1 =
.
γ − r xn
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Following the approach used for H1 (x), we consider separately the cases where yn+1 = 1
and yn+1 = 0.
When yn+1 = yn = 1, adopters at epoch (n + 1) remain characterized by a range
θ > θbn+1 , which as before we term the home region. Similarly, we let xn+1 ≡ H2h (x), which
using Eq. (A.13b) gives
H2h (x) =

c 2
2x

+ (r − c)x − p
rx−γ

(A.22)

When yn+1 = 0 and yn = 1, xn is now below γ/r while xn−1 was above γ/r, and the set
of adopters at epoch (n + 1) is of the form [0, θbn+1 ). We again denote this configuration as
xn+1 being in the awayregion, with the corresponding notation xn+1 ≡ H2a (x). Eq. (A.13a)
gives
H2a (x) =

c 2
2x

− cx + γ − p
γ −rx

(A.23)

In summary, the adoption state at epoch (n + 1), Xn+1 , has been characterized by
considering the four possible combinations of adoption levels in epochs (n − 1) and n. In
the next sections, these results are leveraged to identify possible equilibria and characterize
adoption dynamics.

A.4.3

Characterizing Equilibria

This section leverages the results of Section A.4.2 to identify the type of equilibria to which
adoption can converge. Consistent with the discussion of the previous section, we introduce
the notation Hh (x) for the function defined as H1h (x) in the interval [0, γ/r) and as H2h (x)
in the interval [γ/r, 1], and Ha (x) for the function defined as H2a (x) in [0, γ/r) and as
H1a (x) in [γ/r, 1].
Since any equilibria must satisfy yn+1 = yn , we can rule out half of the combinations of
the previous section. Specifically, when yn = 0, only vectors of the form Xn+1 = (H1h (x), 0)
need to be considered. Conversely, when yn = 1, candidate equilibria must be of the
form (H2h (x), 1). Equilibria, therefore, correspond to either points x ∈ (0, γ/r) that verify
H1h (x) = x, points x ∈ [γ/r, 1) that verify H2h (x) = x, the point x = 0 if H1h (0) ≤ 0, or
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the point x = 1 if H2h (1) ≥ 1.
We therefore explore the relative positions of the functions H1h (x) and H2h (x) with
respect to x, and their possible intersections with x. Intersections identify equilibria or
fixed points, while the position of H1h (x) and H2h (x) relative to x determines the “nature”
of these fixed points, i.e., stable, or unstable, or associated with orbits either periodic or
chaotic3 . The derivations are mechanical and can be found in Appendix A.5. We distinguish
between stable fixed points (•) with monotonic trajectories (towards the fixed point inside
its attraction region), unstable fixed points (◦) again with monotonic trajectories (away
from the fixed point), and fixed points associated with an “orbit” () that can be either
convergent, periodic, or chaotic for different (p, l) pairs. Table 3.1 summarizes possible
combinations of equilibria in each of the intervals [0, γ/r) and [γ/r, 1], where — denotes the
absence of fixed point in that interval.
Case 1 of Table 3.1 corresponds to a scenario where no fixed point exists. We discuss later
when and why this arises, but adoption patterns essentially never stabilize. Cases 2, 20 , 3
and 30 are instances where a single fixed point exists in either [0, γ/r) or in [γ/r, 1]. In
Cases 2 and 3, the fixed point corresponds to a stable equilibrium, while in Cases 20 and 30
it can be associated with more complex trajectories that need not converge, e.g., exhibit
periodic orbits or chaotic adoption patterns. Cases 4 and 5 correspond to a scenario with
both a stable and an unstable equilibrium in either [0, γ/r) or in [γ/r, 1], with the adoption
always converging to the stable fixed point. Cases 6 and 7 exhibit different combinations
of equilibria in [0, γ/r) or in [γ/r, 1], with one having a single stable equilibrium and the
other having both a stable and an unstable equilibrium. The important feature of these two
latter cases is the presence of two stable equilibria, one in [0, γ/r) and the other in [γ/r, 1].
As a result, final adoption levels can differ based on initial adoption values, i.e., they can
vary based on the level of seeding when the service was first offered. A similar situation is
present in Case 8, where the two ranges both have a stable and an unstable equilibrium.
In the next section, we characterize the trajectories associated with the different combi3

If either x = 0 or x = 1 are equilibria, they are stable equilibria.
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nations of Table 3.1, while Section A.4.5 articulates implications for a UPC service offering.

A.4.4

Classifying Adoption Dynamics

Table 3.1 readily identifies several possible patterns of adoption. Specifically, adoption
dynamics can be of the form:
i) Absence of convergence to an equilibrium. This arises in Cases 1, 20 , and 30 . In Case 1,
this is independent of the initial adoption level, as the absence of a fixed point gives
rise to chaotic adoption patterns that never converge. The situation is more subtle in
Cases 20 and 30 , for which a fixed point does exist. However, even when a small region of
attraction exists around this fixed point, adoption trajectories typically remain outside
of it, and orbit around it in either periodic or chaotic manner. Such patterns are
common in dynamical systems [12]. The derivations that led to the identification of
those trajectories as well as an illustrative example can again be found in Appendix A.5.
The conditions under which they arise are discussed in Section A.4.5;
ii) Convergence to a single stable equilibrium in either [0, γ/r) or [γ/r, 1], independent of
initial penetration. This arises in Cases 2, 3, 4, and 5, where a single stable equilibrium
exists in the entire adoption range. In those cases, adoption proceeds monotonically
towards the equilibrium, either increasing or decreasing depending on the value of the
initial adoption level. As it does not affect the final outcome, seeding is of no benefit
in these scenarios;
iii) Convergence to one of two stable equilibria in [0, γ/r) or [γ/r, 1], dependent on initial
penetration. This arises in Cases 6, 7, and 8, where a stable equilibrium exists in both
[0, γ/r) and [γ/r, 1]. These are instances where seeding may be of value, as it can affect
the final adoption level. In particular, a high enough level of seeding can allow the
service to realize a much higher final adoption (in [γ/r, 1] as opposed to [0, γ/r)). As
in Case ii), trajectories are monotonic towards the final adoption level.
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The trajectories of the three types of possible outcomes that have been identified can be
easily constructed using a standard cobweb plot4 based on the functions Hh (x) and Ha (x).
For illustration purposes, we consider an example associated with Case 8 from Table 3.1,
which involves stable and unstable equilibria in both [0, γ/r) and [γ/r, 1]. The shapes of the
corresponding functions Hh (x) (solid line) and Ha (x) (dash-dot line) are shown in Fig. A.4,
together with three adoption trajectories associated with different initial adoption levels.
In the first scenario, there are no initial adopters, i.e., x0 = 0, and adoption increases
monotonically until it reaches about 10%, the stable equilibrium in [0, γ/r). In the second
scenario, seeding has been used to create an initial adoption level x0 ≈ 35%. As we can see,
this is not enough to prevent adoption from declining back to 10%, the stable equilibrium
in [0, γ/r). To avoid such an outcome, seeding needs to be further increased, as done in the
third scenario where initial adoption is set to around 46%. In this case, the adoption trajectory enters the interval [γ/r, 1] and eventually converges to the higher adoption equilibrium
in that interval (around 85%). The trajectory also illustrates the use of the function Ha (x)
when first entering [γ/r, 1] from [0, γ/r). We note that although a high level of adoption is
ultimately realized, the associated seeding “cost” is high.
In the next section, we characterize how system parameters, in particular the price
p, map to different equilibria and trajectories, and identify possible implications for UPC
service offerings.

A.4.5

Interpretations

Recall that adoption trajectories and equilibria are determined by the “shape” of the functions Hh (x) and Ha (x) and how they intersect the line x. The shape of those functions
depends in turn on the parameters γ, c, r, and p (see Eqs. (A.19) and (A.22)). As a result,
it is no surprise that both adoption outcomes and trajectories are determined by values of
these parameters and in particular, for any γ and r value, associated with distinct “regions”
of the (p, c)−plane, i.e., contiguous ranges of p and c values. Fig. A.5 identifies the regions
4

See http://code.google.com/p/cobweb2008/ for an illustrative applet.
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Figure A.4: Hh (x) (solid) and Ha (x) (dash-dot) for Case 8.
of the (p, c)−plane that map to the ten combinations of table 3.1, and correspondingly
Behaviors i), ii), and iii) used earlier to classify adoption dynamics. The boundaries of
those regions are derived from constraints on the parameters, with Table A.1 providing the
corresponding functional expressions. Details on the derivations are again in Appendix A.5.

Behavior i)
This maps to regions 1, 20 and 30 of Fig. A.5, and is associated with configurations that do
not yield convergence to an adoption equilibrium.
Region 1 consists of relatively low values of p but rather large values of c. This produces
the following dynamics: When there are few or no users in the network, coverage is low
and frequently-roaming users find the service unattractive despite the low p. In contrast,
sedentary users are unaffected by the limited coverage, so that the low p value entices them
to adopt. As they adopt, coverage improves and the service becomes attractive to roaming
users. With more users adopting, coverage continues improving. The associated growth
in roaming traffic, however, starts to negatively affect sedentary users that derive little
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Figure A.5: Regions of the (p, c) plane corresponding to different combinations of equilibria
as given by Table 3.1. This is a sample illustration for γ = 1 and r = 2.
benefits from the improved coverage. This leads some of them to disadopt, which reduces
coverage so that eventually roaming users start leaving as well. Once roaming traffic has
been sufficiently reduced, the service becomes again attractive to sedentary users, and the
cycle repeats.
A similar, though more nuanced process is at work in regions 20 and 30 . Region 20 also
boasts large c values (c ≥ r), and in the portion of that region where large values of p are
allowed, it displays similar adoption patterns as region 1 to which it is adjacent. However,
when p is allowed to be large, the negative effect of c never gets a chance to manifest
itself. The large p prevents enough sedentary users from adopting, and the service never
garners enough coverage to become attractive to frequently-roaming users. In this case,
adoption converges to a low value in [0, γ/r). As p decreases, the region of attraction of the
equilibrium shrinks, and non-converging adoption patterns emerge.
The behavior in region 30 is similar, albeit for an equilibrium in [γ/r, 1]. Specifically,
region 30 combines small positive p values and very large c values. The small value of p
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γ2
2(γ−p)

f1

c = 2r −

f2

c=

2r2 (γ−p)
2rγ−γ 2

f3

c=

2r2 (γ−p)
γ2

f4

c=γ+r−p−

f5

c=r

p
p2 + 2p(r − γ)

Table A.1: Boundaries for regions of solution in fixed price policy
means that many users want to adopt. The very large c value, however, implies that only
frequently roaming adopters derive enough benefits from the large coverage to compensate
for the penalty of roaming traffic. As a result, the most sedentary users disadopt. When
p is sufficiently small, this disadoption is small enough to not affect coverage to the point
where frequently-roaming users start leaving as well. However, as p increases, coverage
may decrease enough to trigger an exodus of frequently-roaming user, and create cyclical
patterns of adoption and disadoption as in region 1.

Behavior ii)
Regions 2 and 4 of Fig. A.5 have a stable equilibrium in [0, γ/r) to which adoption converges.
The regions correspond to relatively high p values and relatively high values of c. The high
p value is such that few sedentary users adopt and coverage never gets high enough to make
the service attractive to frequently-roaming users. Hence, adoption saturates at a low level
of penetration. Seeding will not help, as the rather high c value is too much of an impact
even for frequently roaming users.
Conversely, in regions 3 and 5 of Fig. A.5 adoption converges to a single stable equilibrium in [γ/r, 1]. The regions correspond to relatively low values of p and comparatively
low c values. The low p value initially attracts sedentary users that are not deterred by the
limited coverage, and once enough of them have adopted frequent roamers start joining.
Because the impact of increasing roaming traffic is relatively low, few sedentary users leave
and adoption stabilizes at a high level.
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Behavior iii)
Regions 6, 7 and 8 of Fig. A.5 exhibit a stable equilibrium in both [0, γ/r) and [γ/r, 1]. In
these cases, adoption converges to either equilibrium as a function of the initial adoption
level (seeding). The three regions share relatively high p values and similarly small c values.
When initial adoption (coverage) is low, frequently-roaming users are not interested in
the service and the high p value limits the number of sedentary users who adopt. Hence,
adoption saturates at a low level. In contrast, if seeding has produced enough initial coverage
to attract frequent roamers, they will start adopting in spite of the high p value. As their
number grows and coverage continues improving, some sedentary users will also adopt
because of the relatively low impact that they incur from roaming traffic through their
home base. As a result, overall adoption eventually stabilizes at a high level.

Figure A.6: Adoption Outcomes as a Function of p and c, when γ = 1 and r = 2
The behaviors identified in this section are illustrated in Fig. A.6 that plots the “final”
adoption levels for different (p, c) pairs starting from an initial adoption level of x0 = 0. In
scenarios where adoption does not converge, i.e., Behavior i), the adoption level reported in
the figure was sampled at a particular iteration. The figure clearly identifies the regions of
the (p, c) plane that correspond to chaotic or at least non-converging adoption (regions 1, 20 ,
and 30 ), low adoption (regions 2 and 4, as well as regions 6, 7, and 8 since x0 = 0 was used),
and regions of high adoption (regions 3 and 5).
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A.4.6

Optimal Pricing for Provider’s Profit

In a flat-price policy, all users pay the same price p. Therefore, the provider’s profit (or
welfare) Π(p) that was introduced in section 3.3.1 as WP (Θ) becomes

Π(p) = (p − e) x.

(A.24)

The UPC provider’s goal is to select p so as to maximize its profit at equilibrium5 , i.e.,
once adoption has stabilized6 . In other words, the provider seeks to identify p∗ such that
Π(p∗ ) = max {Π(p)} .
p

Note that in Eq. (A.24) the service adoption level x is itself a function of p and the
exogenous parameters of Eq. (A.12). Π(p) can, therefore, be expressed as a function with
p as its only variable. More precisely, because adoption equilibria have different functional
expressions depending on whether adoption is low or high, we also have two distinct expressions for Π(p). The first is associated with an equilibrium in the low-adoption region,
while the second corresponds to an equilibrium in the high-adoption region.
For the sake of analytical tractability, we keep Π as a function of x (rather than p).
(1)

(1)

This yields two expressions, ΠL (x) and ΠH (x), for the provider’s profit corresponding to
equilibria in [0, 1/2) (low adoption), and [1/2, 1] (high adoption). Derivations are mechanical
in nature, and the resulting expressions are given in Eqs. (A.25) and (A.26) for completeness.
(1)

ΠL (x) =
(1)

ΠH (x) =

4−c 3
x − x2 + (γ − e) x
2
c−4 3
x + (3 − c) x2
2

(A.25)
(A.26)

+(γ − e − 1) x

Both equations are cubic polynomials in x. Differentiating them yields expressions for the
5
6

This forces a price selection that ensures the existence of an equilibrium.
Note that this implicitly assumes a recurring pricing model, as is common with most service offerings.
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x values that maximize them, i.e., x
bL and x
bH .
(1)

(1)

The next step calls for determining which of ΠL (b
xL ) and ΠH (b
xH ) is higher, and
consequently decide how to best price the service. The answer can change based on the
combination of exogenous parameters, e.g., the service’s intrinsic value, γ, the impact of
roaming traffic, c, and the value of the service cost e. For instance, it can be shown that
the γ value at which high-adoption becomes more profitable than low-adoption increases
with c. This is intuitive since a larger c means that sedentary users are more sensitive to
roaming traffic. Hence, the service needs to be intrinsically more valuable to allow enough
of them to join and stay as roaming traffic grows with adoption.

A.5

Derivations of Equilibria under the Fixed Price Policy

The intersections of Hh (x) and x correspond to interior equilibria in adoption levels, i.e.,
equilibria in (0, 1), and the relative positions of Hh (x) and x at x = 0 and x = 1 determine
whether or not either are boundary equilibria. We consider equilibria in the intervals [0, γ/r)
and [γ/r, 1] separately. During the analysis we may use k , γ − p for notational conciseness.

A.5.1

Equilibria in [0, γ/r)

From Eq. (A.19), H1h (0) = k/γ > 0, given the earlier assumption that k > 0. Therefore,
the condition H1h (0) ≤ 0 is never met and x = 0 is not an equilibrium. Next, we consider
interior points, i.e., points in (0, γ/r).
From Eq. (A.19), H1h (x) = x yields

 c
− + r x2 − γ x + k = 0 .
2

(A.27)

We assume −c/2 + r > 0 or 2r > c, which is a reasonable and hardly restrictive assumption
in our model; This means that at full adoption, the most frequently roaming user (with
θ = 1) will derive more utility from the ability to roam than be impacted by the external
roaming traffic. Under the assumption that 2r > c, Eq. (A.27) has (at most) two roots
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given by

√
γ ± ∆1
x=
2r − c

where ∆1 = γ 2 + 2kc − 4kr. The inequality H1h (x) < x holds (only) between the two roots.
We distinguish three cases:
i) ∆1 < 0 or c < 2r −

γ2
2k .

In this case, Eq. (A.27) does not have any roots and H1h (x) > x holds ∀x ∈ [0, γ/r). In
other words, there are no equilibria in [0, γ/r). A sample illustration can be seen in Fig. A.5
where we have chosen γ = 1 and r = 2. This criterion corresponds to the points in the (p, c)
plane where c < f1 . The functional expressions of the different curves are given in Table A.1.
ii) ∆1 = 0 or c = 2r −

γ2
2k

In this case Eq. (A.27) holds at x =
k<

γ2

2r .

γ
2r−c

= 2k/γ, so H1h (x) and x touch once in [0, γ/r) if

In this case, there is only one equilibrium x1 ∈ [0, γ/r) which is easily seen to be

stable from the left and unstable from the right. This is because Hh (x) > x when x < x1
(adoption levels increase towards x1 in each iteration), and Hh (x) > x when x > x1 as well
(adoption levels continue increasing once x1 is exceeded).
iii) ∆1 > 0 or c > 2r −

γ2
2k

In this case Eq. (A.27) has two real roots, so that H1h (x) and x intersect twice. These two
intersections may or may not indeed be in [0, γ/r). Next, we determine conditions for either
of these intersections to lie in [0, γ/r) and characterize the equilibria they give rise to.

Intersection x1s
Intersection x1s is the smaller of the two roots of Eq. (A.27) and is given by:

x1s =

γ−

p

γ 2 + 2kc − 4kr
.
2r − c
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(A.28)

For x1s to be an equilibrium, it must be in the interval [0, γ/r). The earlier assumptions
k > 0 and 2r > c ensure that x1s > 0. For x1s < γ/r we need:
−γ(r − c) p 2
< γ + 2kc − 4kr
r
This is trivially true if r − c > 0. If on the other hand r − c < 0, we need

γ 2 c2 − (2r γ 2 + 2r2 k)c + 4k r3 < 0 .

(A.29)

The left side is a quadratic equation in c and the inequality holds between the two (possible)
roots, which are given by:
p
(rγ 2 + r2 k) ∓ (rγ 2 − r2 k)2
c=
γ2
2
2
(rγ + r k) ∓ |rγ 2 − r2 k|
=
.
γ2
Based on the sign of rγ 2 − r2 k the interval between the two roots of Eq. (A.29) can be
specified. We have
c∈



2


 2rγ 2k , 2r
if γ 2 ≥ rk



 2r,

2r2 k
γ2



if γ 2 < rk.

But because of our previous assumption that 2r > c, the second case above cannot happen.
This shows that when ∆1 > 0, the intersection x1s will be an equilibrium in [0, γ/r) if
 2

either c < r or c ∈ 2rγ 2k , 2r and k ∈ [0, γ 2 /r]. These criteria correspond to (p, c) being in
Regions 20 , 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of Fig. A.5, again with the functional expressions of the different
curves given in Table A.1.
When (p, c) is in any of the Regions 2, 4, 6, 7 or 8, then x1s can be shown to be a
stable equilibrium. This is because x1s > Hh (x) > x (adoption increases towards x1s
in the next iteration), and x1s < Hh (x) < x (adoption decreases towards x1s in the next
iteration). On the other hand if (p, c) is in the Region 20 , then x1s is an “orbital” equilibrium.
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An orbital equilibrium may have a non-empty region of attraction7 , but exhibit cyclical
adoption patterns (periodic or chaotic) outside of that neighborhood. Orbital behaviors
arise when Hh (x) > x1s > x (adoption increases beyond x1s in the next iteration), and
Hh (x) < x1s < x (adoption drops below x1s in the next iteration). This gives rise to cyclical
trajectories, which may or may not converge to x1s depending on the slope of H1h (x) at
x = x1s and the initial distance between x and x1s . Note also that if H1h (x) > γ/r for some
x < x1s , the next adoption level will be determined using H2a (x) instead of H1h (x), since
we have left the interval [0, γ/r).

Intersection x1u
Intersection x1u is the larger of the two roots of Eq. (A.27) and is given by

x1u =

γ+

p
γ 2 + 2kc − 4kr
.
2r − c

Again, for x1u to be an equilibrium, it must be in [0, γ/r). Since 2r − c > 0, we have
x1u > x1s > 0, and therefore we only need to verify when the condition x1u < γ/r holds.
For this we need:
p
γ(r − c)
.
γ 2 + 2kc − 4kr <
r
This never holds if r − c < 0. When r − c > 0, the condition becomes

γ 2 c2 − (2r γ 2 + 2r2 k)c + 4k r3 > 0 .

which is the symmetric of Eq. (A.29), and thus it holds for values of c outside the roots of
the corresponding quadratic equation.
We also note that equilibrium x1u is unstable. This is because Hh (x) < x when x < x1u
(adoption levels keep decreasing once they have dropped below x1u ), and Hh (x) > x when
x > x1u (adoption levels keep increasing once they have exceeded x1u ).
To summarize, in Case iii), i.e., in the case of c > 2r −
7

γ2
2k

there can possibly be two

A neighborhood of x1s so that for values of x in that neighborhood, trajectories converge to x1s .
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equilibria in [0, γ/r). When c > r, the root x1s is the only equilibrium in [0, γ/r) if the
2

condition c ∈ [ 2rγ 2k , 2r] is also satisfied (Region 20 in Fig. A.5); Otherwise, no equilibrium
is present in this interval (The portion of Region 1 in Fig. A.5 for which c > f1 ). When
c < r, both x1s and x1u can be equilibria if c <

2r2 k
γ2

(Regions 4, 8 and 6 in Fig. A.5), and

otherwise x1s is the only equilibrium in [0, γ/r) (Regions 2 and 7 in Fig. A.5). Again the
functional expressions of the different curves are given in Table A.1.

A.5.2

Equilibria in [γ/r, 1]

For the boundary point x = 1 we use Eq. (A.22) and see that:

H2h (1) =

− 2c + k + r − γ
−c + k
= 2
+ 1.
r−γ
r−γ

Therefore the full adoption level, x = 1, will be an equilibrium if and only if −c/2 + k ≥ 0.
We will now consider the interior points, i.e., the points in [γ/r, 1).
From the equation H2h (x) = x we get:

c 2
x + (γ + r − c)x − p = 0.
− r−
2

(A.30)

Assuming r − c/2 > 0 as before, Eq. (A.30) exhibits (at most) the two roots given by
−(γ + r − c) ±
x=
−(2r − c)

√

∆2

where

∆2 = (γ + r − c)2 − 2p(2r − c)
= c2 − 2(γ − p + r)c + (γ + r)2 − 4pr.

The inequality H2h (x) > x holds8 only between these two (possible) roots. We again
distinguish three cases:
8

Note that since x ∈ [γ/r, 1], the denominator of H2h (x) is positive.
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i) ∆2 < 0
This is equivalent to

p
p 
c ∈ −p + γ + r − Q , −p + γ + r + Q

where
Q = p2 + 2p(r − γ).
In this case, Eq. (A.30) does not have any roots and H2h (x) < x holds ∀x ∈ (γ/r, 1]. In
other words, there are no equilibria in (γ/r, 1].
ii) ∆2 = 0
This is equivalent to
c = −p + γ + r ∓
and in this case Eq. (A.30) holds at x =

γ+r−c
2r−c .

p

p2 + 2p(r − γ)

Therefore the two curves H2h (x) and x touch

once in (γ/r, 1] if c < r. In this case, there is only one equilibrium x2 ∈ (γ/r, 1] which is
easily seen to be stable from the right and unstable from the left. This is because Hh (x) < x
when x > x2 (adoption levels decreases towards x1 in each iteration), but Hh (x) < x when
x < x2 as well (adoption levels keep decreasing if x goes below x1 ).
iii) ∆2 > 0
This is equivalent to
h
p i
p
c 6∈ −p + γ + r − Q , −p + γ + r + Q

where as before
Q = p2 + 2p(r − γ).
In this case Eq. (A.30) has two real roots, and as a result it is possible for H2h (x) and x
to intersect twice in [0, γ/r]. Next, we characterize the equilibria that these two possible
intersections, x2u and x2s , can give rise to.
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Intersection x2u
Intersection x2u is the smaller of the two roots of Eq. (A.30) and is given by:

x2u =

γ+r−c−

p
(γ + r − c)2 − 2p(2r − c)
.
2r − c

In order for x2u to be an equilibrium, it must be in the interval (γ/r, 1]. It can be easily
verified (under the assumptions already made for parameters c, γ and r) that x2u ≤ 1
always holds if the root exists. For x2u to be greater than γ/r we need:
p
r−c
(γ + r − c)2 − 2p(2r − c) < (r − γ)
r
For this equation to hold, it is necessary that r − c > 0. If this is the case we then need

(2rγ − γ 2 )c2 + (−6γr2 + 2γ 2 r + 2pr2 )c + 4r3 (γ − p) < 0

(A.31)

which holds between the roots of the corresponding quadratic equation, which are given by:

(3γr2 − γ 2 r − pr2 ) ∓ (γr2 − γ 2 r + pr2 )
.
2rγ − γ 2
2r2 (p − γ)
= 2r and
2rγ − γ 2

c=

(A.32)

2

(γ−p)
This implies that x2u is an equilibrium in (γ/r, 1] if both 2r2rγ−γ
2 < c < r and c < −p +
p
γ + r − p2 + 2p(r − γ), where we have taken into consideration the fact that when c < r
p
the inequality c > −p + γ + r + p2 + 2p(r − γ) cannot hold. These criteria correspond to

Regions 5, 8 and 7 in Fig. A.5 with the functional expressions of the different curves given
in Table A.1.
When these conditions are satisfied, x2u can be shown to be an unstable equilibrium.
This is because Hh (x) < x when x < x2u (adoption levels keep decreasing once they have
dropped below x2u ), and Hh (x) > x when x > x2u (adoption levels keep increasing once
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they have exceeded x2u ).
Intersection x2s
Intersection x2s is the larger of the two roots of Eq. (A.30) and is given by

x2s =

γ+r−c+

p
(γ + r − c)2 − 2p(2r − c)
.
2r − c

(A.33)

Again, for x2s to be an equilibrium, it must be greater than γ/r. Note that x2s < 1 is not
necessary, since a x2s value that is larger than 1 will be projected down to the boundary
point x = 1. For x2s > γ/r we need:

−(r − γ)

r−c p
< (γ + r − c)2 − 2p(2r − c) .
r

This always holds if r − c > 0. When c > r, the condition becomes

(2rγ − γ 2 )c2 + (−6γr2 + 2γ 2 r + 2pr2 )c + 4r3 (γ − p) > 0

which is the symmetric of the inequality in Eq. (A.31), and thus it holds for values of
c outside the roots of the corresponding quadratic equation. This condition reduces to
c<

2r2 (γ−p)
2rγ−γ 2

(Region 30 in Fig. A.5).

Thus x2s results in an equilibrium if (p, c) is in any of the Regions 3, 30 , 5, 6, 7 and 8 of
Fig. A.5.
When (p, c) is in any of the Regions 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, then x2s can be shown to be
a stable equilibrium. This is because x2s > Hh (x) > x (adoption increases towards x2s
in the next iteration), and x2s < Hh (x) < x (adoption decreases towards x2s in the next
iteration). On the other hand if (p, c) is in the Region 30 , then x2s is an “orbital” equilibrium.
An orbital equilibrium may have a non-empty region of attraction9 , but exhibit cyclical
adoption patterns (periodic or chaotic) outside of that neighborhood. Orbital behaviors
arise when Hh (x) > x2s > x (adoption increases beyond x2s in the next iteration), and
9

A neighborhood of x2s so that for values of x in that neighborhood, trajectories converge to x2s .
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Hh (x) < x2s < x (adoption drops below x2s in the next iteration). This gives rise to
cyclical trajectories, which may or may not converge to x2s depending on the slope of
H2h (x) at x = x2s and the initial distance between x and x2s .
To summarize, as for the equilibria in [γ/r, 1], when c <

2r2 (γ−p)
,
2rγ−γ 2

the root x2s is the
2

(γ−p)
only equilibrium in (γ/r, 1] (Regions 30 , 3 and 6 in Fig. A.5). When c > 2r2rγ−γ
2 , both x2s
p
and x2u equilibria will exist if the condition c < min(r, −p + γ + r − p2 + 2p(r − γ)) is also

satisfied (Regions 5, 7 and 8 in Fig. A.5). Otherwise, no equilibrium is present in (γ/r, 1]
(Regions 1, 20 , 2 and 4 in Fig. A.5)

A.6

Model perturbations for robustness testing

Our original models make specific assumptions with regards to the magnitude and range
of various parameters, functional expressions of the user utilities, and the extent to which
information is considered to be known to the service provider. In order to gauge how
much these assumptions affect the models’ results and more importantly findings, as well
as determine how robust the findings are to variations in those assumptions, we consider a
series of perturbations to the original models that relax/modify one or more of those specific
assumptions.
In this section, we describe perturbations that directly affect the parameters and functional expressions of the models. All scenarios are investigated by means of numerical
simulations, and the results are presented in Appendix A.7 (See Appendix A.9 for one example of analytical generalization). Appendix A.7 also evaluates the impact of another
type of perturbations, namely, that of errors in estimates of the model’s parameters on the
part of the service provider. Overall, the results demonstrate that our main findings are
relatively robust to a wide range of perturbations.
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A.6.1

User propensity to roam θ

Our original models assume that users’ propensity to roam, θ, follows a uniform distribution,
i.e., it is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]:

0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.

f (θ) = 1,

We introduce a perturbation to that assumption by considering different probability distributions for the roaming variable θ. There are obviously many possible distributions to
choose from; we consider two representative examples, one with a higher density of sedentary users, and the other with a higher density of roaming users. These two choices cover
the effect of both overestimating and underestimating roaming patterns. We present next
the details of these two distributions.
The distributions are truncated and modified versions of an exponential distribution,
and their density functions are plotted in Fig. A.7. The low-mode distribution with a mode
at x = 0 has a density function

fLow-Mode (x; λ) =

λ
e−λx ,
1 − e−λ

0 ≤ x ≤ 1, λ > 0,

where the parameter λ is taken to be λ = 1.5. Conversely the high-mode distribution with
a mode at x = 1 has a density function

fHigh-Mode (x; λ) =

eλ

λ
eλx ,
−1

0 ≤ x ≤ 1, λ > 0,

where the parameter λ is again taken to be 1.5.
As mentioned earlier, Appendix A.7 presents the results on how these perturbations
affect the findings of Chapter 3.
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(a) Low-mode: Truncated exponential distribution with parameter λ = 1.5. (high
concentration of sedentary users.)

(b) High-mode: Inverted truncated exponential distribution with parameter λ = 1.5.
(high concentration of roaming users.)

Figure A.7: Density functions and sample realizations for for non-uniform θ distributions.

A.6.2

Modified user utility functions

The original model assumes a specific functional expression for users’ utility that grows
linearly with coverage κ (as measured10 by x) and decreases linearly with the volume of
roaming traffic m.
We first relax the linear dependency assumption, and then consider two different utility
functions inspired by the Web Browsing Model and the File Transfer Model of [70]. As
before, Appendix A.7 presents the results of this investigation.
The original utility function is stated in Eq. (3.5), which we restate below for convenience.
U (Θ, θ) = γ − c m + θ (r x − γ) − p(Θ, θ)
10

As mentioned before, in Section A.6.4 we do numerically consider scenarios where coverage κ is not
equal to x and instead saturates as x grows).
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Non-linear utility function
In order to relax the linear dependency assumption, we consider the following “perturbed”
utility function:
U (Θ, θ) = γ − c m1.2 + θ (r x0.8 − γ) − p(Θ, θ) .
The non-linear terms m1.2 and x0.8 are arguably only one of many possible types of nonlinearities, but they offer a reasonable evaluation of the effect of non-linearities.
Next we introduce two different utility functions inspired by the models of [70].

Upper-bounded roaming
The Web Browsing Model from [70] considers a utility that increases with the connection
duration, as long as the connection duration is not longer than an upper-bound τ (which is
the duration that a user intends to browse the web).
In the context of [70] the connection duration is the main contributor to a user’s utility,
while in our model the roaming frequency θ determines the rate at which a user accesses
the higher-valued roaming connectivity. Therefore the connection duration of [70] readily
maps to roaming frequency in our model.
Hence, in order to emulate the Web Browsing Model from [70], we modify our original
utility function to upper-bound the roaming frequency of the users. In a manner similar
to Eq. (1) of [70] which includes a term min(T, τ ), we replace the roaming factor θ with
min(θ, τ ).
The new utility function is then given by
U (Θ, θ) =
(A.34)
γ − c m + min(θ, τ ) · (r x − γ) − p[Θ, min(θ, τ )],
where 0 < τ < 1. In the numerical tests of Section A.7 we take τ = 0.8.
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Minimum useful coverage
The File Transfer Model from [70] considers a utility function with a threshold behavior, i.e.,
it yields zero value when the connection duration is too short to download a file. Therefore
the connection duration has to be longer than a certain threshold to yield a positive utility.
As mentioned before, in our context, users’ utility is directly related to the ability to
connect while roaming. Therefore, to emulate the File Transfer Model from [70], we modify our utility function to implement a threshold behavior based on roaming connectivity.
Namely, a user experiences zero roaming utility, unless the odds of roaming connectivity
are above a certain threshold, or equivalently, the system’s coverage κ is above a threshold
κth .
The new utility function is then

U (Θ, θ) = γ − c m + θ (r κ
b − γ) − p(Θ, θ)

(A.35)

where κ
b is the perceived level of coverage and is given by

κ
b=




0

if x < κth ,



x

if x ≥ κth .

The threshold κth satisfies 0 < κth < 1. In the numerical tests of Section A.7 we use
κth = 0.2.

A.6.3

Heterogeneous population

In the original models, users are assumed to all have the same utility function, and share
a common profile in how much traffic they generate, including while roaming. We relax
those assumptions by considering a scenario where users belong to two types with different
“profiles.” The type of a user, T1 or T2 , affects that user’s utility and the volume of roaming
traffic she generates as a function of her roaming parameter θ.
Users are randomly assigned a given type, so that the user population is divided into
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two groups of identical size. The utility functions of users of type T1 and type T2 are then
given by:
U (Θ, θ) =



γ − c m + θ (r x − γ) − p(Θ, θ)

for T1 users



1.1 γ − c m + θ (0.9 r x − 1.1 γ) − p(Θ, θ)

for T2 users.

In other words, users of type T2 exhibit a difference of 10% with type T1 users in how much
more (less) they value home (roaming) connectivity (they have a larger γ and smaller r).
Moreover, a user’s type also affects the volume of traffic she generates while roaming, as
follows
Contribution to roaming traffic =




θ

for T1 users



θ0.7

for T2 users,

In other words, given two users of types T1 and T2 with the same roaming parameter θ, the
user of type T2 generates more roaming traffic while roaming (since θ0.7 > θ for θ ∈ [0, 1]).
As mentioned earlier, this can account for differences induced by the type of equipment
each type of users uses (e.g., tablet vs. smartphone). The overall roaming traffic m is then
given by
Z
m=

Z
θf (θ) dθ +

T1

θ0.7 f (θ) dθ .

T2

Results are again presented in Appendix A.7.

A.6.4

Coverage saturation

The original models assume that coverage κ increases linearly with the level x of service
adoption. In particular, we assume that κ = x. In this section, we relax this assumption and
consider a saturation effect for coverage. This means that while coverage initially expands
in proportion to the adoption level x, its growth slows down (“levels off”) as x grows large.
In order to capture this effect, we assume a relation between coverage and adoption of the
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form κ = sin( π2 x) (see Fig. A.8). Results illustrating how this difference in the evolution of
coverage affects the conclusions of Chapter 3 are again in Appendix A.7.

Figure A.8: Coverage saturates as adoption x grows large.

A.7

Numerical simulations

Appendix A.6 introduced a series of perturbations to our original models. In this Appendix,
we report on the results of numerical simulations used to investigate the impact of those
perturbations. The results demonstrate that the findings of Chapter 3 are robust with
regards to those perturbations and errors in the modelling assumptions.
Recall that the main findings of Chapter 3 belong to two broad categories. The first
is concerned with the system’s ability to create value, i.e., the total system welfare. They
establish that when the system is capable of creating positive value, the maximum of that
value is often realized at full adoption. The second category of findings is concerned with
realizing that potential: how to use pricing schemes to realize the optimal adoption level
and the corresponding total welfare, as well as distribute the total welfare between the users
and the provider.
In testing the robustness of that second group of findings, i.e., those regarding pricing
schemes, it is important to specify how much knowledge the provider has about potential
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discrepancies between the model it is using to determine (optimal) prices, and the actual
model and its parameters. This is because that knowledge will affect the provider’s ability
to set prices that realize its goals. Therefore, throughout this section, when presenting
results related to pricing policies, we also specify the extent to which the provider is aware
of the perturbations.
For purposes of clarity, we consider each one of the perturbations of Appendix A.6 in
isolation, i.e., we perturb one aspect of the model while keeping others intact, and report
on its impact on the findings of Chapter 3. We discuss first how different perturbations
affect our main conclusions regarding total system welfare.

A.7.1

Optimal total welfare

The main finding of Chapter 3 when it comes to total system welfare was that total welfare
(value) is usually maximized when the adoption level is either x = 1 or x = 0. In other
words, whenever the system is capable of generating positive value, this positive value is
realized at full adoption x = 1.
The result was obtained under the simplifying assumptions of the system’s model, but
in this section we demonstrate that even under more general conditions, i.e., when various
aspects of the original model are perturbed,11 this finding remains valid.
A.7.1.(a) Original model
A plot of the optimal adoption level x for maximizing system value was given in Chapter 3
for the original model, and is repeated for convenience in Fig. A.9a. The figure indeed shows
that for most values of parameters γ and e, the optimal adoption level is either x = 1 or
x = 0. An optimal adoption level of x = 0 means that the system cannot create positive
value.
A.7.1.(b, c) Modified roaming distribution
We changed the distribution of the roaming parameter θ as per the description of Sec11
Note that because total welfare is only concerned with the system’s overall value and not how to realize
it, the extent to which the service provider is aware of any discrepancies between the model and the actual
system has no impact.
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(a) Original model

(b) Low-mode θ distribution with parameter λ =
1.5.

(c) High-mode θ distribution with parameter λ =
1.5.

(d) Non-linear utility function

(e) Upper-bounded roaming
(τ = 0.8)

(f) Minimum useful coverage (κth = 0.2)

(g) Heterogeneous population

(h) Coverage
with adoption

saturation

Figure A.9: Values of optimal adoption x for maximum total welfare under different perturbations. Parameters are r = 1.6 and c = 0.6 (and therefore r − c = 1).
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tion A.6.1. Under this perturbation, Figs. A.9b and A.9c demonstrate that the maximum
total welfare is again mostly achieved at either x = 1 or x = 0.
Other remarks
Figs. A.9b and A.9c identify the region in the γ − e plane where a positive total welfare
is possible. The regions in the two figures are slightly different: For large values of home
connectivity utility γ, the system with more sedentary users (Fig. A.9b) can tolerate a larger
deployment cost e while still yielding a positive value. For instance when γ = 2, the system
with more sedentary users (Fig. A.9b) allows e / 1.6, whereas the system with a large
roaming population (Fig. A.9c) allows only e / 1.4. This is intuitive as a higher population
of sedentary users means more people will enjoy the high home connectivity utility.
On the other hand, for small values of γ the roles are reversed. The system with more
roaming users (Fig. A.9c) can tolerate a larger deployment cost e while still yielding a positive value. For instance when γ = 0, the system with more sedentary users (Fig. A.9b)
allows e / 0.4; however, the system with a large roaming population (Fig. A.9c) is understandably less affected by the small home connectivity utility γ, and allows e / 0.6.
A.7.1.(d) Non-linear utility functions
We now consider the effect of non-linearities in users’ utility functions using the utility
function introduced in Section A.6.2. The resulting optimal adoption level for maximizing
total welfare is given in Fig. A.9d. It shows that the maximum total welfare continues to
be achieved mostly at either x = 1 or x = 0.
A.7.1.(e) Utility function with upper-bounded roaming
We used the new utility function given in Section A.6.2 with an upper-bound value of
τ = 0.8. Under this new utility function, Fig. A.9e displays the optimal adoption level x.
Although the figure exhibits small differences with Fig. A.9a, it shows that the maximum
total welfare continues to be achieved mostly at either x = 1 or x = 0.
A.7.1.(c) Utility function with minimum useful coverage
We use the new utility function of Section A.6.2 with a threshold value of κth = 0.2. Under
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this new utility function, Fig. A.9f demonstrates that the maximum total welfare is again
mostly achieved at either x = 1 or x = 0, in a manner very similar to Fig. A.9a.
Fig. A.9f is almost identical to Fig. A.9a, because the values of optimal adoption x in
Fig. A.9a mostly correspond to a coverage level that is already above the coverage threshold
κth , and therefore are not affected by imposing the criterion of minimum useful coverage
in Fig. A.9f. Therefore the regions of Fig. A.9a where the optimal adoption is at x = 0 or
x > κth are exactly replicated in Fig. A.9f. This constitutes most of the points in the figure.
(g) Heterogeneous population
In this section, we consider the effect of a heterogeneous user population, as per the two-type
user population of Section A.6.3. Recall that a user’s type affects both her utility function
and the roaming traffic she generates. Fig. A.9g reports the adoption levels associated with
maximum welfare for such a configuration. It again shows that the maximum total welfare
is usually achieved at either x = 1 or x = 0.
A.7.1.(h) Coverage saturation with adoption
The last perturbation we consider involves a scenario where coverage saturates as the system
approaches full adoption x = 1 (as described in section A.6.4). The results are shown in
Fig. A.9h.
Fig. A.9h highlights some minor differences with our original findings of Fig. A.9a.
Specifically, while maximum total welfare is still often achieved at either x = 1 or x = 0, an
intermediate region has emerged for which the optimal adoption level, while still high and
close to 1, is nevertheless slightly lower. The difference is small and quite intuitive, as we
explain next.
Recall the two effects of increasing adoption. On one hand, an increase in adoption improves total welfare, both because it improves coverage, which favorably affects the utility of
all users, and because the new users themselves contribute to the total welfare. On the other
hand, more users means more roaming traffic, which adversely affects all users’ utility and,
therefore, welfare. The combined contributions of these opposing effects determines whether
higher adoption increases or decreases total welfare. When coverage saturates earlier, new
136

(a) Original model

(b) Low-mode θ distribution with parameter λ = 1.5.

(c) High-mode θ distribution with parameter λ = 1.5.

(d) Non-linear utility function

(e) Upper-bounded roaming (τ = 0.8)

(f) Minimum useful coverage (κth = 0.2)

(g) Heterogeneous population

(h) Coverage saturation with adoption

Figure A.10: Usage-based pricing policy: values of usage allowance a for which full adoption
x = 1 is the (unique) equilibrium of the system, under different perturbations. Parameters
are c = 0.8, γ = 1, r = 1.6.
users still contribute to the system welfare, but their impact on improving coverage is now
diminished while the negative contribution of their roaming traffic is unchanged. Hence, it
is to be expected that under a model where coverage saturates before full adoption, maximum welfare may be realized slightly below full adoption as seen in the “blue” region of
Fig. A.9h.
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A.7.2

Usage-based pricing

Under the original model, we concluded that for the usage-based pricing policy, full adoption
x = 1 is the unique equilibrium of the system if and only if the usage allowance a is larger
than a threshold value.
In this section we demonstrate that even under more general conditions, i.e., when
various aspects of the original model are perturbed12 , this finding remains valid.
Throughout the simulations of this section, we fix the parameters c = 0.8, γ = 1, r = 1.6
and find the final adoption level that the system converges to, as the value a of usage
allowance varies. By observing the final adoption level we can determine whether x = 1 is
the unique equilibrium of the system. The details of the simulations are as follows: At each
value of a, we start the system from zero adoption. After each iteration in the simulation,
users evaluate their utility and those with a positive utility adopt. The simulation stops
once consecutive iterations yield the same set of adopters. At this point the final adoption
level is recorded.
A.7.2.(a) Original model
Under the original model of Chapter 3, full adoption x = 1 is the unique equilibrium if and
only if the value of usage allowance satisfies a > c/2 (Proposition 2). This is illustrated
in Fig. A.10a which shows the values of a for which full adoption x = 1 is the unique
equilibrium (recall that c/2 = 0.4). The figure shows that there exists a threshold value a0
such that for a > a0 , full adoption x = 1 is the unique equilibrium of the system, and for
a < a0 , full adoption is not an equilibrium.
A.7.2.(b, c) Modified roaming distribution
12
Unlike section A.7.1 that only dealt with maximizing the system value, this section and all subsequent
ones are concerned with pricing the service. Prices are set by the provider, and as a result the information
available to the provider about the system’s characteristics is important. In the remainder, we therefore
mention not only perturbations to the original model, but also the provider’s knowledge of those perturbations.
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Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about the modified θ distribution and assumes
the θ distribution is still uniform.
The roaming distribution is modified as per the description of Section A.6.1. We see
from Figs. A.10b and A.10c that under the two new roaming distributions of Section A.6.1
(low and high mode), the outcome is similar to that of the original model, i.e., there exists
a threshold value such that for values of a above it x = 1 is the unique equilibrium, and for
values of a below it, x = 1 is not an equilibrium.
A.7.2.(d) Non-linear utility function
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about the non-linearity of the utility function
and assumes the original function is valid.
We now consider the effect of non-linearities in the utility function, as discussed in
Section A.6.2.

The outcome is shown, again as a function of the usage allowance a,

in Fig. A.10d, which exhibits a similar pattern as Fig. A.10a, i.e., there exists a threshold
value such that for values of a above it x = 1 is the unique equilibrium of the system and
for values of a below it, x = 1 is not an equilibrium.
A.7.2.(e) Utility function with upper-bounded roaming
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about the modified utility function and assumes the original function is valid.
We use the new utility function of Section A.6.2 with an upper-bound value of τ = 0.8.
We see from Fig. A.10e that under this new utility function, the outcome is similar to that
of the original model, i.e., there exists a threshold value, albeit a different one, such that
for values of a above it x = 1 is the unique equilibrium, and for values of a below it, x = 1
is not an equilibrium.

139

Figure A.11: Results for more drastic changes in the minimum useful coverage (κth = 0.6).
Values of usage allowance a in the usage-based pricing policy for which full adoption x = 1
is the (unique) equilibrium of the system. Parameters are c = 0.8, γ = 1, r = 1.6.
A.7.2.(f) Utility function with minimum useful coverage
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about the modified utility function and assumes the original function is valid.
As before, we use the new utility function of Section A.6.2 with a coverage threshold of
κth = 0.2. We see from Fig. A.10f that under this new utility function, the outcome is very
similar to that of the original model, i.e., there exists a threshold in the values of usage
allowance a, such that for values of a above it x = 1 is the unique equilibrium, and for
values of a below it, x = 1 is not an equilibrium.
In fact, the allowance threshold value in Fig. A.10f is identical to that of the original model in Fig. A.10a. This is because, as shown in Appendix A.8, the outcome of the
usage-based pricing is very robust to this change in the utility function. Nevertheless, differences in the outcome would naturally arise under more drastic changes, i.e., by considering
significantly larger values for the coverage threshold.
For instance, as the value for the coverage threshold κth is changed to κth = 0.6 (roaming
users do not consider the system valuable until coverage exceeds 60%), differences appear
in the adoption outcomes. This is shown in Fig. A.11. Nevertheless, the figure also shows
that even under this more drastic change, the overall behavior remains consistent with that
of the original model.
A.7.2.(g) Heterogeneous population
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Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about users of type 2 and assumes that
everyone is a type 1 user.
This scenario assumes that the users’ population is heterogeneous and split into two subpopulations of different type, as described in Section A.6.3. Fig. A.10g reports the results,
which are again consistent with those of the original model, i.e., there exists a threshold
value such that for values of a above it x = 1 is the unique equilibrium of the system and
for values of a below it, x = 1 is not an equilibrium.
A.7.2.(h) Coverage saturation with adoption
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider is not assumed to have any knowledge of the coverage saturation (of course,
in practice the provider may be able to estimate coverage, but the simulations do not
assume such knowledge).
As with the case of optimal welfare, the last perturbation we consider involves a scenario
where coverage saturates as the system approaches full adoption x = 1 (as described in
section A.6.4). The results are shown in Fig. A.10h, and again yield a similar outcome as
in the original model, i.e., there exists a threshold value such that for values of a above it
x = 1 is the unique equilibrium of the system and for values of a below it, x = 1 is not an
equilibrium.
We also note that unlike what happened with optimal welfare where optimal adoption
could end-up slightly lower than full adoption, the threshold value is unchanged when
compared to that of the original model. This is because the usage based pricing (by its
nature) does not require knowledge of the actual service coverage by the provider, and is,
therefore, insensitive to errors in the coverage level.
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A.7.3

Hybrid pricing tests with partial provider’s knowledge

Under the original model, we concluded that for the hybrid pricing policy, there are values
of home connectivity utility γ for which the system has an equilibrium at x < 1, which
would prevent the system from reaching full adoption, hence resulting in a sub-optimal total
welfare. The hybrid pricing policy, however, offers a way to eliminate the lower equilibria
and allow the system to reach full adoption. This is possible by adjusting the value of the
discount parameters δh or δr (for simplicity, we focus on adjusting δh ).
In this section, we demonstrate that even under more general conditions, i.e., when
various aspects of the original model are perturbed, the system also exhibits regimes where
a sub-optimal equilibrium (x < 1) can arise, thereby preventing the system from reaching
full adoption. In addition, overcoming this issue can again be accomplished by adjusting
the value of δh , albeit typically with a different discount value.
Throughout the simulations of this section, we fix the parameters c = 0.8, δr = 0 and
find the final adoption level, denoted by x(∞), as we vary γ and δh values. The details
of the simulations are as follows: At each point (γ, δh ), we start the system from zero
adoption. After each iteration in the simulation, users evaluate their utility and those with
a positive utility adopt. The simulation stops once consecutive iterations yield the same set
of adopters. At this point the final adoption level is recorded.
Moreover, throughout the simulations, the price parameters of the hybrid policy are
computed as:
ph = γ − c α − δh ,

and

pr = r − γ − δ r ,
where α is the estimate for overall intensity of roaming traffic m at full adoption (for the
original model we had α = 1/2, which gives ph = γ − c/2 − δh ). The simulations of
this section assume that the provider can accurately estimate the value of α. (We will
further eliminate this assumption in section A.7.4 where we assume that the provider has
no knowledge of α.)
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(a) Original model.

(b) Low-mode θ distribution with
parameter λ = 1.5.

(c) High-mode θ distribution with
parameter λ = 1.5.

(d) Non-linear utility function

(e) Upper-bounded roaming (τ =
0.8)

(f) Minimum useful coverage (κth =
0.2)

(g) Heterogeneous population

(h) Coverage saturation with adoption

Figure A.12: Final adoption level for the hybrid pricing policy under different perturbations.
Parameters are c = 0.8, δr = 0, with γ and δh values varying.
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A.7.3.(a) Original model
Fig. A.12a shows the final adoption level for the hybrid pricing policy under the original
model. The figure illustrates the presence of a region of (γ, δh ) values where the system
does not go to full adoption, and shows that by increasing the discount factor δh we can
avoid that region, hence realizing full adoption.
A.7.3.(b, c) Modified roaming distribution
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The simulations assume that the provider can accurately estimate α (the intensity of
roaming traffic m at full adoption). We relax this in section A.7.4. Other than that, the
provider does not have any knowledge about the modified θ distribution.
The roaming distribution is modified as per the description of Section A.6.1. We see
from Figs. A.12b and A.12c that adoption outcomes are similar to those of the original
model, i.e., the system exhibits regimes where the final adoption is at a sub-optimal level
x < 1, and that full adoption can be realized by adjusting the value of δh .
As expected, the level of discount δh required to realize full adoption is different in
Fig. A.12b and Fig. A.12c, as the exact amount depends on the exact specifications of the
system. However, the overall behavior is similar.
A.7.3.(d) Non-linear utility function
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about the non-linearity of the utility function
and assumes the original function is valid.
We now consider the effect of non-linearities in the utility function as introduced in
section A.6.2. The final adoption level is given in Fig. A.12d, which again yields a similar
outcome, i.e., the system exhibits regimes where the final adoption is at a sub-optimal level
x < 1, but full adoption can be realized by adjusting the value of the discount δh .
A.7.3.(e) Utility function with upper-bounded roaming
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Figure A.13: Result for more drastic changes in the utility function with upper-bounded
roaming (τ = 0.15). Compare to Fig. A.12e.

Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The simulations assume that the provider can accurately estimate α (the intensity of
roaming traffic m at full adoption). We relax this in section A.7.4. Other than that, the
provider does not have any knowledge about the new utility function.
We use the new utility function of Section A.6.2 with an upper-bound value of τ = 0.8.
We see from Fig. A.12e that adoption outcomes under this new utility function are very
similar to those of the original model, i.e., the system exhibits regimes where the final
adoption is at a sub-optimal level x < 1, and that full adoption can be realized by adjusting
the value of δh .
Note that, as mentioned above, the exact values of discount δh required to realize full
adoption in Fig. A.12e, are very close to that of the original model (Fig. A.12a). However,
greater differences would obviously arise under more drastic changes, i.e., by considering a
significantly smaller upper-bound value τ .
For instance, as the value for the upper-bound τ of Section A.6.2 is changed to τ = 0.15
(no user roams more than 15% of the time), greater differences arise. This is shown in
Fig. A.13. Nevertheless, the figure also shows that even under this more drastic change, the
overall behavior remains consistent with that of the original model.
A.7.3.(f) Utility function with minimum useful coverage
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Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about the new utility function.
We use the new utility function of Section A.6.2 with a threshold value of κth = 0.2. We
see from Fig. A.12f that adoption outcomes under this new utility function are very similar
to those of the original model, i.e., the system exhibits regimes where the final adoption is
at a sub-optimal level x < 1, and that full adoption can be realized by adjusting the value
of δh .
Note that, as mentioned above, the exact values of discount δh required to realize full
adoption in Fig. A.12f, are very close to that of the original model (Fig. A.12a). However,
as seen earlier, greater differences would obviously arise under more drastic changes, i.e.,
by considering a significantly larger threshold value κth .
For instance, as the value for the threshold κth of Section A.6.2 is changed to κth = 0.4
(roaming users do not consider the system valuable until coverage exceeds 40%), greater
differences arise. This is shown in Fig. A.14. Nevertheless, the figure also shows that even
under this more drastic change, the overall behavior remains consistent13 with that of the
original model.

Figure A.14: Result for more drastic changes in the utility function with minimum useful
coverage κth = 0.4. Compare to Fig. A.12f.
13
The yellow stripes in Fig. A.14 correspond to points where the system does not converge to an equilibrium. However, we still have the previous behavior, i.e., as δh increases, full adoption becomes the unique
equilibrium of the system.
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A.7.3.(g) Heterogeneous population
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about the users of type T2 and assumes
that everyone is a user of type T1 . But the simulations assume that the provider can
accurately estimate α (the intensity of roaming traffic m at full adoption). We relax this
in section A.7.4.
In this section, we consider the effect of a heterogeneous user population, as per the
two-type user population of Section A.6.3. The results are shown in Fig. A.12g. We see
that again the system exhibits regimes where the final adoption is at a sub-optimal level
x < 1, but that we can still realize full adoption by adjusting the value of the discount δh .
There are, however, unavoidable differences between Fig. A.12g and Fig. A.12a. Notably,
we now need a positive discount (δh ' 0.18) to reach full adoption at all γ values. This
is because the provider is totally unaware of the existence of the type T 2 users, which
introduces relatively big errors in the pricing policy. As a result and because we need to
compensate for those large errors, reaching full adoption now requires a bigger discount
factor δh than before. In general, the larger the errors in the assumptions used to set
prices, the bigger the discount “margin” required to compensate for them. Nevertheless,
the structure of the system remains unchanged.
A.7.3.(h) Coverage saturation with adoption
Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider is not assumed to have any knowledge of the coverage saturation (of course,
in practice they can measure the coverage if they want to, but our simulations do not
assume that knowledge).
As before, we consider a scenario where coverage saturates as the system approaches full
adoption x = 1 (see Section A.6.4). The results for this scenario are shown in Fig. A.12h
that displays a somewhat different structure from the other figures, namely, the system
appears to always reach full adoption even with a discount of δh = 0. This is, however, not
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surprising given that at any adoption level the coverage is higher than in the original model
(the saturating coverage function has a concave shape). As a result of this higher coverage,
more users find the service useful, and hence adopt, eventually resulting in full adoption.
Nonetheless, the analysis of Chapter 3 can help us understand this result as well. For
instance, consider the case of zero discounts, i.e., δh = δr = 0. The utility function for each
user becomes
U (Θ, θ) = c (α − m) + θ γ(κ − 1).
As before, α is the estimate for the roaming traffic m at full adoption, so that α − m is
non-negative. Similarly, because coverage κ is less than or equal to 1, it follows that (κ − 1)
is negative (or 0). Because coverage saturates earlier, the term θ γ(κ − 1) is greater than
in the original model, hence enticing more roaming users to adopt, therefore facilitating
reaching full adoption14 .

A.7.4

Hybrid pricing tests with zero provider’s knowledge

Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about any of the perturbations in this section.

This section presents simulations similar to those of the previous section, with the
difference that we assume that the provider has no knowledge of the system’s parameters.
Specifically, we relax the assumption that the provider can accurately estimate the actual
level of roaming traffic m generated at full adoption. The results are given in Fig. A.15 that
parallels Fig. A.12.
Note that Figures. A.15d, A.15f and A.15h are identical to their counterparts in Fig. A.12.
The reason is that the perturbations associated with the scenarios of those three figures do
not alter the value of m at full adoption. Hence, the provider still estimates the correct
value for m. The same does not hold for the other scenarios and Figures (b), (c), (e) and
14
Obviously, a scenario where coverage proceeds more slowly as adoption increases, i.e., a convex rather
than concave coverage function, would have the opposite effect.
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(g) differ from their counterparts in Fig. A.12. However, in spite of those differences, they
exhibit similar overall behaviors, i.e., they display regimes where a sub-optimal equilibrium
x < 1 arises, but full adoption can still be realized by adjusting the value of the discount
δh .
The differences between Fig. A.15 and Fig. A.12 are not surprising, as the perturbations
now result in more severe errors in the pricing policy, due to the complete lack of insight
by the provider about the system. These larger errors work in favor of full adoption in (b)
and (e), and against it in (c) and (g). As expected, differences in errors result in different
necessary discount values, even if the overall pattern and structure are preserved.

A.7.5

Fixed price policy

Provider’s knowledge of the perturbations:
The provider does not have any knowledge about any of the perturbations in this section.

Under the original model and the fixed price policy, a profit maximizing strategy would
often differ from a welfare maximizing one. In Chapter 3 we quantified this gap by comparing
the overall profit under both types of strategies. The gap was small when the parameter c
was small, but grew large as c increased.
In this section, we demonstrate that even under more general conditions, i.e., when
various aspects of the original model are perturbed, this finding remains valid.
Throughout the simulations of this section, we fix the parameters γ = 1, r = 2 and
e = 0.3 and consider a range of c values. The details of the simulations are as follows:
At each point, we iterate over different values of p to find the price p∗ that maximizes the
provider’s profit with no constraint, as well as the price pb that maximizes provider’s profit
with the constraint that the total welfare is also maximized. We denote the corresponding
cP , respectively. We then compute the relative profit
values of maximum profit by WP∗ and W
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drop from profit maximization to welfare maximization as

Profit difference =

cP
WP∗ − W
× 100%.
∗
WP

Fig. A.16 compares the resulting profit drops for both the original model and the seven
different perturbations introduced in Appendix A.6. The figure illustrates that the overall
behavior is similar across all scenarios, i.e., there is no profit difference for small values of
c, but the gap increases rapidly as c increases beyond some moderate threshold value.
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Same as Fig. A.12a

(a) Original model

(b) Low-mode θ distribution with
parameter λ = 1.5.

Same as Fig. A.12d

(c) High-mode θ distribution
with parameter λ = 1.5.

(d) Non-linear utility function

Same as Fig. A.12f

(f) Minimum
(κth = 0.2)

(e) Upper-bounded roaming (τ =
0.8)

useful

coverage

Same as Fig. A.12h

(h) Coverage
adoption

(g) Heterogeneous population

saturation

with

Figure A.15: Final adoption level for the hybrid pricing policy (the provider does not know
m at full adoption) under different perturbations. Parameters are c = 0.8, δr = 0, with γ
and δh values varying.
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(a) Original model

(b) Low-mode θ distribution with parameter λ =
1.5.

(c) High-mode θ distribution with parameter λ =
1.5.

(d) Non-linear utility function

(e) Upper-bounded roaming
(τ = 0.8)

(f) Minimum useful coverage (κth = 0.2)

(g) Heterogeneous population

(h) Coverage
with adoption

saturation

Figure A.16: Relative profit drop from profit maximization to welfare maximization (fixedprice policy γ = 1, r = 2 and e = 0.3).
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A.8

Usage-based pricing and utility functions with
minimum useful coverage

In this section we analyze user adoption under the usage-based pricing policy and the utility
function with minimum useful coverage rule.
Putting the usage-based price function of Eq. (3.16) into the utility function of Eq. (A.35),
the utility for user θ is found as

U (Θ, θ) =




a − cm − rθx

if x < κth ,



a − cm

if x ≥ κth .

(A.36)

In order to analyze the adoption dynamics in this case, we assume that at each “decision time”, only the most ”eager” of the users adopts (or disadopts) the service. Such
a “diffusion-like” adoption mechanism prevents artifacts such as sudden oscillation in the
adoption level for the current case.
We first note that by Eq. (A.36), at any adoption level x, the users with smaller roaming
frequency θ have higher utility. Therefore, the adoption interval is always of the form [0, x],
and consequently m = x2 /2. Therefore the utility function of Eq. (A.36) becomes

U (Θ, θ) =


2


a − c x2 − rθx

if x < κth ,



a − c x2
2

if x ≥ κth .

(A.37)

We want to find the conditions under which full adoption x = 1 is the unique equilibrium
and the adoption levels eventually reach this equilibrium. Now assume that adoption levels
are initially at x = 0. Because of the low adoption level, user utilities are given by the first
expression in Eq. (A.37). As adoption levels increase, we want to consistently have the user
with θ = x+ see a positive utility, hence adopt the service. The worst case happens for the
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user with θ = κ−
th , who at the time of her decision sees a utility of
U (x ≈ κth , θ = κth ) = a − (c/2)κth − rκth
= a − κth (c/2 + r).
Therefore we obtain the extra condition a > κth (c/2 + r) for x = 1 to be a unique
equilibrium. Consequently, we get a modified form of proposition 1.
Proposition 12. Under the usage-based pricing policy of Eq. (3.16), and a utility function
with minimum useful coverage rule given in Eq. (A.35), full adoption, x = 1, is the unique
equilibrium if a > max{c/2, κth (c/2 + r)}, and is not an equilibrium if a ≤ c/2.
Note that if the threshold κth is such that c/2 ≥ κth (c/2+r), then the system’s adoption
behavior is the same as the original model. On the other hand, If c/2 < κth (c/2 + r), then
for c/2 < a < κth (c/2 + r), full adoption x = 1 is an equilibrium but not unique.

A.9

Contiguity of the optimal adoption set

In this section we provide analytical proof for a more general form of Lemma 1. Namely, in
a setting where the users’ propensity to roam, θ, has a general arbitrary distribution f (θ)
in [0, 1].
Under a general distribution, the adoption level x, the roaming traffic m and the total
welfare V (Θ) should be computed based on their general expressions, as follows.
Z
x(Θ) =

f (θ) dθ,

(A.38)

θ f (θ) dθ ,

(A.39)

v(Θ, θ) f (θ) dθ.

(A.40)

θ∈Θ

Z
m(Θ) =
θ∈Θ

Z
V (Θ) =
θ∈Θ

The next Lemma then gives the generalization of Lemma 1.
Generalization of Lemma 1. Under an arbitrary roaming distribution with density f (θ)
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and for any adoption level x, maximum welfare is always obtained with a set of adopters
Θ∗ (x) that exhibit contiguous roaming characteristics. Specifically, Θ∗ (x) is of the form

Θ∗ (x) =




Θ∗1 (x) = [0, x)


Θ∗ (x) = [1 − x, 1]
2

if x <

γ
r−c ,

if x ≥

γ
r−c .

(A.41)

Proof. For any given adoption level x, consider an arbitrary realization Θold of adopters
such that |Θold | = x. Now take any two intervals N1 and N2 from [0, 1] such that
N1 = [θ1 , θ1 + 1 ),

N1 ∩ Θold = ∅,

N2 = [θ2 , θ2 + 2 ),

N2 ⊂ Θold

where θ2 > θ1 , 1 > 0 and 2 is selected such that

x(N1 ) = x(N2 ) , ,

(A.42)

x(·) being the coverage generated by a particular set as defined by Eq. (A.38). The above
conditions mean that everyone in N1 is a non-adopter and everyone in N2 is an adopter,
and the population of these two sets is the same, taken to be . Construct a new set of
adopters by having everyone in N1 adopt and everyone in N2 disadopt,
Θnew = (Θold ∪ N1 )\N2 ,

where \ indicates the set difference operation. We investigate next the change ∆ in welfare
when the adopers’ set changes from Θold to Θnew , i.e.,

∆ , V (Θnew ) − V (Θold ).
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(A.43)

Using Eq. (A.40) and splitting the bounds of the integral, we can write
V (Θold ) =

Z

v(Θold , θ) f (θ) dθ

Θold

Z

old

v(Θ

=

(A.44)

Z

old

v(Θ

, θ) f (θ) dθ +

Θold \N2

, θ) f (θ) dθ,

N2

and similarly
V (Θnew ) =

Z

v(Θnew , θ) f (θ) dθ

Θnew

Z
v(Θ

=

new

(A.45)

Z
v(Θ

, θ) f (θ) dθ +

Θnew \N1

new

, θ) f (θ) dθ,

N1

Note that
Θold \N2 = Θnew \N1 = Θold ∩ Θnew ,
and therefore we can use Eq. (A.44) and Eq. (A.45) in Eq. (A.43) to get
∆ = ∆1 + ∆2 , where
Z


v(Θnew , θ) − v(Θold , θ) f (θ) dθ,
∆1 ,
new
old
ZΘ ∩Θ
Z
new
∆2 ,
v(Θ , θ) f (θ) dθ −
v(Θold , θ) f (θ) dθ.
N1

and

N2

Moreover, from Eq. (3.9) we have

v(Θold , θ) = γ + θ (rxold − γ) − cmold − e,
where xold and mold are the adoption level and the volume of roaming traffic corresponding
to Θold . Similarly,

v(Θnew , θ) = γ + θ (rxnew − γ) − cmnew − e,
with xnew and mnew defined respective to Θnew . Note that as a result of the condition in
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Eq. (A.42), we have xold = xnew = x. Therefore
Z



c mnew − mold f (θ) dθ
Θnew ∩Θold

Z
new
old
f (θ) dθ
= −c m
−m

∆1 = −

Θnew ∩Θold

= −c (m(N1 ) − m(N2 )) (x − )
and
∆2 = (γ − cm

new

Z

Z

− e)

f (θ) dθ + (rx − γ)
N1

− (γ − cmold − e)

θ f (θ) dθ
N1

Z

Z
f (θ) dθ − (rx − γ)

N2

θ f (θ) dθ
N2

= (γ − cmnew − e) + (rx − γ) m(N1 ) − (γ − cmold − e) − (rx − γ) m(N2 )
= −c (m(N1 ) − m(N2 )) + (rx − γ) (m(N1 ) − m(N2 )) ,
Where m(·) is as given by Eq. (A.39). Thus, we compute ∆ as
∆ = −cx (m(N1 ) − m(N2 )) + (rx − γ)(m(N1 ) − m(N2 ))
(A.46)
= (m(N2 ) − m(N1 ))(cx − rx + γ).
We also have
Z

θ2 +2

m(N2 ) =

θ f (θ) dθ
θ2

Z

θ2 +2

> θ2

Z

θ1 +1

f (θ) dθ = θ2
θ2

f (θ) dθ
θ1

Z

θ1 +1

> (θ1 + 1 )

f (θ) dθ
θ1

Z

θ1 +1

>

θ f (θ) dθ = m(N1 ),
θ1

where θ2 > θ1 + 1 holds since by construction N1 and N2 are mutually exclusive.
Consequently m(N2 ) − m(N1 ) > 0, and Eq. (A.46) indicates that ∆ > 0 if and only
if x <

γ
r−c .

But a ∆ > 0 (positivity independent of the specific choices of N1 and N2 )
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means that welfare always increases if an interval of high-θ users leave and a same-size
interval of low-θ users join. Repeating this for multiple intervals of suitable sizes will
create a contiguous set of adopters in [0, x) that generates more welfare than any other set.
Similarly, the case of ∆ ≤ 0 creates15 a contiguous set of adopters in the other end of [0, 1]
interval, i.e., [1 − x, 1].
The generalization of Lemma 1 characterizes the structure of optimal adoption set for
any given x and establishes that is a contiguous set of adopters.

15

When ∆ = 0, this optimal contiguous Θ is not the only optimum.
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Appendix B

Extras for Ising models
B.1

Modified edge-weights in Random Influence Model

Theorems 1 and 2 were stated based on zero self-weight wii = 0 for the nodes and a uniform
p value for all edge-weights. Similar results hold even if wii = Wi > 0, and every edgeweight wij arises from a different Bernoulli process, each with a probability pij of being +1.
Denote Wmin = mini {Wi }, and pmin = mini,j {pij }. A modified version of Theorem 1 can
then be obtained as follows.
Theorem 7. Fix any 0 < δ < 1 and suppose

pmin

Wmin
1
+
≥ −
2 2(n − 1)

s

log(n/δ)
.
2(n − 1)

Then Pn+ ≥ 1 − δ. In particular, if pmin > 1/2 is bounded away from 1/2, then Pn+ → 1 as
n → ∞.
Proof. Similar to the steps in the proof of Theorem 1 we have

+
P(x+
i Si ≤ 0)


X
X
= P Wi +
(wij − (2pij − 1)) ≤ −
(2pij − 1)
j6=i

j6=i
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2 
(2p
−
1)
ij
j6=i


2(n − 1)

Wi +

P

 Wi +
≤ exp −

P


≤ exp −
 

2 
j6=i (2pi,min − 1)


2(n − 1)

!
Wi
(n − 1)2 ( n−1
+ 2pi,min − 1)2
≤ exp −
2(n − 1)
 !

Wi
1 2
,
= exp −2(n − 1)
+ pi,min −
2(n − 1)
2
where pi,min = minj {pij }. Continuing in the steps of the proof of Theorem 1, we get

P

n
[

!
+
x+
i Si


≤0

i=1

≤

n
X

+
P x+
i Si ≤ 0



i=1
n
X

 !
1 2
Wi
+ pi,min −
≤
exp −2(n − 1)
2(n − 1)
2
i=1

 !
n
X
Wmin
1 2
≤
exp −2(n − 1)
+ pmin −
2(n − 1)
2
i=1

 !
Wmin
1 2
= n · exp −2(n − 1)
+ pmin −
2(n − 1)
2


where pmin = mini {pi,min } = mini,j {pij } and Wmin = mini {Wi }. This means that

P

n
[

!
+
x+
i Si ≤ 0



i=1

for the given selection of pmin .
Next we derive a modified version of Lemma 4.
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≤ δ,

Lemma 13. Fix any m < n/2 and suppose x ∈ Bm . Then
P

n
\

!
(Si (x) > 0)

i=1



[(n − 1 − 2m) (2pmin − 1) − Wmax − 2m∆max ]2
≥ 1 − n · exp −
.
2(n − 1)

In these expressions,
pi,min = min{pij },
j

pmin = min{pij },
i,j

Wmax = max{Wi },
i

and

∆max = max{∆i }.
i

where ∆i = pi,max, − pi,min . Furthermore, and in order to get a simpler expression, W >
pi,min − 1/2 is assumed.
Proof. Following the same steps as in the proof of lemma 4, for i ∈ M (x) we get


(t1 )2
for i ∈ M (x),
P (Si (x) ≤ 0) ≤ exp −
2(n − 1)
where
t1 , −

X

(2pij − 1) +

j∈M (x),
j6=i

X

(2pij − 1) − Wi > 0.

j ∈M
/ (x)

We note that
t1 ≥ −

X

(2pi,max − 1) +

X

(2pi,min − 1) − Wi

j ∈M
/ (x)

j∈M (x),
j6=i

= (n + 1 − 2m)(2pi,min − 1) − Wi − 2(m − 1)∆i
≥ (n − 2m)(2pi,min − 1) − Wi − 2m∆i
≥ (n − 1 − 2m)(2pi,min − 1) − Wi − 2m∆i .
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Similarly, for i ∈
/ M (x) we get


(t2 )2
for i ∈
/ M (x),
P (Si (x) ≤ 0) ≤ exp −
2(n − 1)
where
t2 , −

X

(2pij − 1) +

j∈M (x)

X

(2pij − 1) − Wi > 0.

j ∈M
/ (x),
j6=i

We note that
t2 ≥ −

X

(2pmax,i − 1) +

X

(2pmin,i − 1) − Wi

j ∈M
/ (x),
j6=i

j∈M (x)

= (n − 1 − 2m)(2pi,min − 1) + Wi − 2m∆i
≥ (n − 1 − 2m)(2pi,min − 1) − Wi − 2m∆i .
Hence we have
t1 , t2 ≥ (n − 1 − 2m)(2pi,min − 1) − Wi − 2m∆i ,
and as a result
∀i, P (Si (x) ≤ 0)
2

[(n − 1 − 2m) (2pi,min − 1) − Wi − 2m∆i ]
≤ exp −
2(n − 1)

!

[(n − 1 − 2m) (2pmin − 1) − Wmax − 2m∆max ]
≤ exp −
2(n − 1)

2

!
,

Where pmin = mini {pi,min } = mini,j {pij }, and ∆max = maxi {∆i }. An application of union
bound and conjugation, as done in the proof of lemma 4, will conclude the proof.
We conclude with the modified version of Theorem 2, which is identical to it except for
the value of α0 (p).
Theorem 8. Select any tiny, positive . Fix any 1/2 < p < 1 and any value 0 < α < α0 (p).
If x is any state with d(x, x+ ) ≤ αn, then P(A+
x ) > 1 −  whenever n is sufficiently large.
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The value α0 (p) is the solution to
f (α, p) = 0,
where

2
Wmax
f (α, p) = 2 (1 − 2α − 1/n) (pmin − 1/2) −
− α∆max
2n
+ α log(α) + (1 − α) log(1 − α).

Proof. Using the result of lemma 13 and following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 2, we see that
P (Rxc )

2 !
max
pmin − 12 − W2n
− α∆max
≤ n · exp −
2(n − 1)


2 !

1
Wmax
1
−
− α∆max
.
≤ n · exp −2n (1 − 2α − ) pmin −
n
2
2n

4n2 (1 − 2α −

1
)
n

The rest of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 2.

B.2

Independents in the Random Influence Model

This section analyzes the Random Influence model in the presence of a group of independents Ga in addition to the two parties G1 and G2 that were described in section 4.2.2.
The independents have non-biased affinities towards every node in the network, i.e., the
a , i ∈ G } between a node i ∈ G and any node j in the network
interaction weights {wij
a
a
a = 1} = 1/2.
form a system of signed Bernoulli trials with success parameter P{wij

In this case the arguments of section 4.2.3 can still be used to merge the two parties into
one party Gb . However, the model may not be further simplified and we are left with one
b , i, j ∈ G , i ≤ j}
party Gb and the independents. As before, the interaction weights {wij
b

between two nodes1 i, j ∈ Gb form a system of signed Bernoulli trials with success parameter
b = 1} > 1/2.
p = P{wij

Let the size of the party be |Gb | = nb and the size of the independent group be |Ga | =
1

For conciseness of representation, we assume that self-weights wii are of the same nature as cross-weights.
Generalizations to this can be easily obtained.
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Figure B.1: The fraction of time that the system converges to a meta-partisan fixed point,
when 1/2 of the total 1000 nodes are independents, and the fraction of the times that the
system converges to a partisan fixed point, when there are 500 party members without any
independents. In both cases, the number of party members is 500. Also in both cases we
pick random, non-biased starting points.
na = n − nb . Define a meta-partisan state xµ+ (with positive polarity) as any state2 for
which xµ+
= +1, ∀i ∈ Gb and define Si (xµ+ ) = Siµ+ . A meta-partisan state xµ+ is similar
i
to the partisan state x+ of section 4.3 with regards to the party nodes i ∈ Gb , but allows
for any opinion at the independent nodes i ∈ Ga . Therefore there are a total of 2na different
meta-partisan states (with positive polarity) which we index by 1 ≤ µ ≤ 2na . In the
remainder of this section we show that starting from any of the meta-partisan states xµ+ ,
c+ that the system remains within the set of the meta-partisan
there is a high probability P
states indefinitely.
Let E µ+ be the exit event for the meta-partisan state xµ+ , which occurs if xµ+ updates
to a non-meta-partisan state, i.e., there exists at least one party member i ∈ Gb such that
2

Similar to the partisan states defined in section 4.3, a meta-partisan state may be defined with positive
or negative polarity. Here we concentrate on the states xµ+ with positive polarity. The negative-polarity
states are symmetrical to the positive-polarity ones and can be similarly discussed.
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Figure B.2: The fraction of time that the system converges to a meta-partisan fixed point,
when a fraction 0.90 of the total 4000 nodes are independents At each p value, 5 different
initializations of edge-weights are considered and for each of those, 5 initialization of random
opinions.
µ+
xµ+
≤ 0. Specifically
i Si

E µ+ =

[

µ+
xµ+
≤ 0.
i Si

(B.1)

i∈Gb

The next Theorem determines the probability of the exit event.
Theorem 9. Assume p is large enough so that

nb (2p − 1) − na ≥ 0.

(B.2)

Then at any meta-partisan state xµ+ , the probability of the exit event defined by Eq. (B.1)
satisfies the following inequality.

P E


µ+

[nb (2p − 1) − na ]2
≤ nb · exp −
2nb

!
.

Proof. If the system is in the meta-state xµ+ then the partial sums for any node i ∈ Gb are
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given by
µ+
xµ+
= Siµ+ =
i Si

X

b µ+
wij
xj +

j∈Gb

X

=
≥

a µ+
wij
xj

j∈Ga
b
wij
+

X

a µ+
wij
xj

j∈Ga

j∈Gb

X

X

b
wij
− na .

j∈Gb

The sum on the right represents a random walk with a positive drift, and −na is a lowerb
bound (worst case) for the effect from the independents. The signed Bernoulli variables wij

have expectation 2p − 1. From the above it results that

µ+
P(xµ+
≤ 0) ≤ P 
i Si


X

b
wij
− na ≤ 0

j∈Gb


= P

X



b
wij
− (2p − 1) ≤ na − nb (2p − 1) .

j∈Gb

From Eq. (B.2) we have
[na − nb (2p − 1)] ≤ 0,
and the Hoeffding’s inequality can therefore be used as before. We obtain
µ+
P(xµ+
i Si

[nb (2p − 1) − na ]2
≤ 0) ≤ exp −
2nb

!
.

By Boole’s inequality, it follows that

P

[ 
i∈Gb

µ+
xµ+
i Si




X  µ+ µ+
≤0 ≤
P xi Si ≤ 0
i∈Gb

[nb (2p − 1) − na ]2
≤ nb · exp −
2nb
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!
.

Corollary. Separate deterministic calculations easily show that if p = 1 and na < nb then
P (E µ+ ) = 0.
We note that if none of the meta-partisan states yields to the exit event, then the system
does remain within the set of the meta-partisan states indefinitely (but the inverse is not
true). Therefore the probability of the latter is at least as high as the probability of the
former, i.e.,

c+ ≥ 1 − P 
P



na
2[

E µ+  .

(B.3)

µ=1

c+ can
Now assume na = n (and nb = (1 − )n). Then the following theorem shows how P
be made arbitrarily large.
Theorem 10. Fix any 0 < δ < 1 and suppose
s
1

p≥ +
+
2 2(1 − )

 log 2 + log((1−)n/δ)
n
.
2(1 − )

(B.4)

c+ ≥ 1 − δ. In particular, if p > 1/2 is bounded away from (and more than)
Then P

1
+
p = +
2 2(1 − )

s

 log 2
,
2(1 − )

(B.5)

c+ → 1 as n → ∞.
then P
Proof. From Eq. (B.3) we use Boole’s inequality to obtain
n

c+ ≥ 1 −
P

2 a
X


P E µ+ .

µ=1

Since Theorem 9 holds for all values of µ, and since the condition in Eq. (B.4) subsumes
the condition in Eq. (B.2), we can apply Theorem 9 to the above equation to get
2
c+ ≥ 1 − 2na n · exp − [nb (2p − 1) − na ]
P
b
2nb
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!
.

c+
Figure B.3: Lower bound of p required for P
n→∞ → 1 as given by Eq. (B.5). Note that
according to the corollary to Theorem 10, even where Eq. (B.5) gives a p > 1, a value of
c+ = 1 ≥ 1 − δ provided that  < 1/2.
p = 1 guarantees that P
Replacing na = n and nb = (1 − )n in the above gives
2

c+ ≥ 1 − 2n (1 − )n · exp − n (2p − 2p − 1)
P
2(1 − )

!

≥ 1 − δ,
where the last inequality holds for the given selection of p from Eq. (B.4).
Corollary. Following the corollary to Theorem 9, it is again straight forward to show that
c+ = 1.
if p = 1 and  < 1/2, then P
Fig. B.3 plots p from Eq. (B.5) as a function of .

B.3

Isolation of centric clusters

When κ is an even number, there are centric clusters that have exactly κ/2 entries of +1
in their profiles. The next proposition shows that these centric clusters are not affected by
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the dominance effect of Theorem 6.
Proposition 13. There exists p∗ < 1 such that ∀p, p∗ ≤ p < 1, the overall ifnfluence of
the outer world on the clusters of type C (κ/2) is zero.
Proof. We will separately consider the effect of clusters C (λ) with different values of λ 6= κ/2
over clusters of type C (κ/2) . Without loss of generality, consider a C (κ/2) cluster with a
profile of the form [+1, +1, . . . , −1, −1], i.e., all the +1 entries are in the beginning of the
profile. Now for any C (λ) , let λ1 be the number of +1 entries in the profile of C (λ) from
position 1 to κ/2. Furthermore, let λ2 be the number of +1 entries from position κ/2 + 1
to κ. Obviously, we have λ1 + λ2 = λ. We will denote such a cluster by C (λ1 , λ2 ) .
Without loss of generality, we assume that λ < κ/2. If that is not the case, one can
redefine λ as the number of −1 entries in the profile, and the following steps will still hold.
The edge-weight between C (λ1 , λ2 ) and C (κ/2) is

λ1 − (κ/2 − λ1 ) − λ2 + (κ/2 − λ2 ) = 2(2λ1 − λ).

Moreover, there are a total of

κ/2 κ/2
λ1
λ2

clusters of type C (λ) , and all of them have the

same opinion x(λ) by Theorem 6. Moreover, they all have the same expected size pλ q (κ−λ) .
Therefore the total influence of clusters C (λ) over a cluster C (κ/2) can be written as

(λ)

Γ

=

λ
X
λ1 =0




κ/2 κ/2 λ (κ−λ)
2(2λ1 − λ)
p q
λ1
λ2

λ (κ−λ)

= 2p q

λ
X




κ/2 κ/2
(2λ1 − λ)
.
λ1
λ2

λ1 =0

Now it suffices to show that






λ
λ
X
X
κ/2 κ/2
κ/2 κ/2
λ
=
2λ1
.
λ1
λ2
λ1
λ2

λ1 =0

λ1 =0
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(B.6)

We start from the right hand side of Eq. (B.6),
λ
X

RHS =

λ1 =0
λ
X

=

λ1 =0




κ/2 κ/2
2λ1
λ1
λ2



κ/2
κ/2
,
2λ1
λ1
λ − λ1

and apply the change of variable t = λ − λ1 to get
0
X





κ/2
κ/2
RHS =
2(λ − t)
λ−t
t
t=λ



λ
X
κ/2
κ/2
=
2(λ − t)
t
λ−t
t=0



λ
X
κ/2
κ/2
=
2(λ − λ1 )
.
λ1
λ − λ1
λ1 =0

Adding up the two equivalent expressions above, gives
λ
X

2 × RHS =

λ1 =0
λ
X

=

λ1 =0




κ/2
κ/2
2λ
λ1
λ − λ1



κ/2 κ/2
2λ
.
λ1
λ2

Therefore



λ
X
κ/2 κ/2
λ
= LHS.
RHS =
λ1
λ2
λ1 =0

This concludes the proof.

B.4

Proof for special cases of profile-based model

Profile of size 1
The following theorem says that for κ = 1, the system has only two fixed points. After that,
we consider a profile of length 2 and a profile that is very large. Note that when κ = 1, the
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profile vector πi is just a scalar and πi = πi1 .
Proposition 7. For any network size n, the profile-based model with profile size κ = 1
has exactly two fixed point that are stochastic, i.e., they are determined by the specific
realization of profile values, as given in Eq. (B.7).

xa : xai =

xb : xbi =




+1

if πi = +1
(B.7a)



−1 if πi = −1



−1 if πi = +1


+1

(B.7b)

if πi = −1

Proof. Profile vectors of size 1 are simply scalars πi = ±1. Consider a state x at a Hamming
distance m to xa . Note that such a state has n−m a-conforming nodes that are in accordance
with xa , and m b-conforming nodes that are in accordance with xb .
Now take i to be any of the m b-conforming nodes with xi = xbi = −πi . The update
sum for this node is
Si =

X

πi πj xj = πi

X

j6=i

π j xj

j6=i





 X

X


= πi 
π j xj +
πj xj 


a
b
j:xj =xj

j:xj =xj ,
j6=i





 X

X


= πi 
(+1) +
(−1)


a
b
j:xj =xj

j:xj =xj ,
j6=i

= πi ((n − m) − (m − 1))
= πi (n − 2m + 1).
If
m<

n+1
,
2
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(B.8)

then Sign (πi (n − 2m + 1)) = Sign (πi ) = πi and therefore node i will update its opinion xi
to match xai = πi and become a-conforming, i.e.,
xnew
= xai = πi .
i
So the number of b-conforming nodes is reduced to m − 1. Furthermore, If m >

n+1
2 ,

then

Sign (πi (n − 2m + 1)) = −Sign (πi ) = −πi and therefore node i will remain b-conforming,
i.e.,
xnew
= xi = xbi = −πi .
i
So the number of b-conforming nodes remains m.
On the other hand, if i is an a-conforming node with xi = xai = πi , then the update sum
for this node is
Si =

X

πi πj xj = πi

X

j6=i

π j xj

j6=i






 X
X


πj xj +
πj xj 
= πi 


a
b
j:xj =xj ,
j6=i

j:xj =xj






 X
X


(−1)
= πi 
(+1) +


a
b
j:xj =xj ,
j6=i

j:xj =xj

= πi ((n − m − 1) − (m))
= πi (n − 2m − 1).
If
m<

n−1
,
2

(B.9)

then Sign (πi (n − 2m − 1)) = Sign (πi ) = πi and therefore node i will remain a-conforming,
i.e.,
xnew
= xi = xai = πi .
i
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So the number of b-conforming nodes stays at m. Furthermore, If m >

n−1
2 ,

then

Sign (πi (n − 2m + 1)) = −Sign (πi ) = −πi

and therefore node i will become b-conforming, i.e.,

xnew
= xbi = −πi .
i

So the number of b-conforming nodes in increased to m + 1.
Combining the above results, we see that if the system starts from a state with m <

n−1
min n+1
= n−1
2 , 2
2 b-conforming nodes, under an arbitrary sequence of node updates
that ensures every node is visited in finite time, all of the b-conforming nodes will eventually
be met and transformed into an a-conforming node. At each such incident the number of
b-conforming nodes decreases by 1 unit, until it becomes zero and the system converges to
xa .
On the other hand, if the system starts from a node with m > max

 n+1
2

,

n−1
2

=

n+1
2

b-conforming nodes, under an arbitrary sequence of node updates that ensures every node is
visited in finite time, all of the a-conforming nodes will eventually be met and transformed
into a b-conforming node. At each such incident the number of b-conforming nodes increases
by 1 unit, until it becomes n and the system converges to xb .

x will converge to




xa


xb

If m is any integer

n−1
2

≤ m ≤

n+1
2 ,

if m <

n−1
2 ,

if m >

n+1
2 .

(B.10)

the convergence outcome depends on the first

node to update, and the value assumed for Sign(0). For example, if n is even, then the


n+1
only integer in n−1
is n/2. With m = n/2 b-conforming nodes, if the first node to
2 , 2
update is a b-conforming one, then m <

n+1
2

is satisfied and it will become a-conforming,

changing m to n/2 − 1. The system will hence converge to xa by Eq. (B.10). If, on the
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other hand, the first node to update is an a-conforming one, then m >

n−1
2

is satisfied and

it will become b-conforming, changing m to n/2 + 1. The system will hence converge to xb
by Eq. (B.10).
Proposition 7 showed that with profiles being of the extreme size κ = 1, the outcome
of the system is either of the two fixed points that are determined wholly by the particular
realization of profile values. Next we study another extreme profile size, κ = ∞.
Profile of size ∞

Proposition 8. or any network size n, and with arbitrarily large probability, the profilebased model with profile size κ sufficiently larger than

2n2
(log(n) + log(n + 1)),
(4p2 −4p+1)2

has

exactly two fixed points that are determined by the party affiliation of the nodes, as given
in Eq. (B.11).

xa : xai =

xb : xbi =




+1

if i ∈ G1
(B.11a)



−1 if i ∈ G2



−1 if i ∈ G1


+1

(B.11b)

if i ∈ G2

Proof. We first show that the relative sizes of G1 and G2 do not affect the result, and in
particular, we can assume that all nodes belong to G1 without loss of generality, i.e., n1 = n
and n2 = 0. In order to show this, we will use the result of Section 4.2.3 iteratively. In what
follows, we show that the discussion of Section 4.2.3 is indeed applicable.
Consider any two nodes i and j both from party G1 . The k th entry of their profiles, πik
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and πjk , each have a probability p of being positive. Therefore
P (πik πjk = 1) = p2 + (1 − p)2
= 2p2 − 2p + 1
, pe,
and
P (πik πjk = −1) = 2p(1 − p)
= −2p2 + 2p
= 1 − pe.
Now consider a node j 0 from party G2 . Since πj 0 k has a probability (1 − p) of being positive,
we have

P πik πj 0 k = 1 = 2p(1 − p)
= 1 − pe,
and

P πik πj 0 k = −1 = p2 + (1 − p)2
= pe.
Consequently, (−πik πj 0 k ) has the same probability distribution as (πik πjk ). As a result,
κ

−w
bij 0 = −
=

1
κ

1X
πik πj 0 k
κ
k=1
κ
X

−πik πj 0 k

k=1
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has also the same probability distribution as
κ

w̌ij =

1X
πik πjk .
κ
k=1

Therefore the result of Section 4.2.3 is applicable, and by iteratively applying it, we can
assume that all the nodes belong to party G1 .
Since profile entries with different k indices are independent of each other, the product
πik πjk , ∀k, makes a set of k independent Bernoulli random variables that take values +1
and −1 with probabilities pe and 1− pe. Therefore we can use Hoeffding’s inequality to bound
P
the probability that κk=1 πik πjk deviates from its mean. Before we proceed, we find its
expected value, E(·), as

E

κ
X

!
πik πjk

k=1
κ
X

=

=
=

k=1
κ
X

E (πik πjk )
(P (πik πjk = 1) − P (πik πjk = −1))

k=1
κ
X

4p2 − 4p + 1



k=1

= κ 4p2 − 4p + 1



, κ µ,
Where µ , 4p2 − 4p + 1 is the expected value of πik πjk , and µ > 0 for p > 1/2. For any
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 > 0 we have by Hoeffding’s inequality,
κ
X

P

!
πik πjk ≥ (µ + )κ

k=1
κ
X

=P

k=1
κ
X

=P

!
πik πjk ≤ (µ − )κ
!
(πik πjk − µ) ≤ −κ

k=1

 2 2
 κ
≤ exp −
2κ
 2 
 κ
= exp −
,
2
which bounds the value of wij =

Pκ

1
κ

k=1 πik πjk

to the interval (µ − , µ + ) with high

probability. More accurately, let Dij () be the event that wij deviates from this interval.
We have
∀i, j, P (Dij ()) , P ((wij ≤ µ − ) ∪ (wij ≥ µ + ))
≤ P (wij ≤ µ − ) + P (wij ≥ µ + )
 2 
 κ
≤ 2 exp −
.
2
The above relation is for a specific i and j. Now the probability that of all the different
{i, j} pairs, at least one of the edge-weights wij deviates from the interval (µ − , µ + ), is

P


[

Dij () ≤

i>j

X

P (Dij ())

i>j

 2 
 κ
.
≤ n(n + 1) exp −
2

(B.12)

For κ large enough, this probability goes to 0 and therefore with a high probability, all of
wij values are inside (µ − , µ + ), i.e., the probability

P


\

i>j

c

[Dij ()]

 2 
 κ
≥ 1 − n(n + 1) exp −
2
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will go to 1. Note that this is the measure of the set of different profile realizations for
which, all wij values are bounded in (µ − , µ + ). Now assume that one of these profile
realizations has indeed happened, and consider any state x with a Hamming distance m
from xa . Under this state, the update sum of a node i with xi = xai can be written as
Si =

X

X

wij xj +

j:xj =xa
j,
j6=i

=

X

wij xj

j:xj 6=xa
j

X

wij −

j:xj =xa
j,

wij

j:xj 6=xa
j

j6=i

≥ (n − m − 1)(µ − ) − (m)(µ + )
= µ(n − 2m − 1 − n/µ + /µ),
which is positive for
m<

n − 1 − /µ(n − 1)
.
2

(B.13)

On the other hand, for a node i with xi 6= xai , the update sum is
Si =

X
j:xj =xa
j

=

X
j:xj =xa
j

X

wij xj +

wij xj

j:xj 6=xa
j,
j6=i

wij −

X

wij

j:xj 6=xa
j,
j6=i

≥ (n − m)(µ − ) − (m − 1)(µ + )
= µ(n − 2m + 1 − n/µ + /µ).
which is positive for
m<

n + 1 − /µ(n − 1)
.
2

(B.14)

If /µ(n − 1) < 1, then Eq. (B.13) and Eq. (B.14) are equivalent to Eq. (B.9) and
Eq. (B.8). Moreover, since all the wij values are bounded, the computations that lead
to Eq. (B.13) and Eq. (B.14) stay valid as the system evolves. Therefore by the same
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arguments as in the proof of Proposition 7, convergence to the proposed fixed points is
obtained.
It only remains to show that even for such small  values, the expression in Eq. (B.12)
still goes to 0 as κ increases. In particular,  = µ/n satisfies /µ(n − 1) < 1. For this  we
have
2 κ
n(n + 1) exp −
2


We can take κ 

2n2
(log(n)
µ2





κµ2
= n(n + 1) exp − 2 .
2n

+ log(n + 1)) sufficiently large to make the above expression

arbitrarily small. This concludes the proof.
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B.2 The fraction of time that the system converges to a meta-partisan fixed point,
when a fraction 0.90 of the total 4000 nodes are independents At each p value,
5 different initializations of edge-weights are considered and for each of those,
5 initialization of random opinions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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c+
B.3 Lower bound of p required for P
n→∞ → 1 as given by Eq. (B.5). Note
that according to the corollary to Theorem 10, even where Eq. (B.5) gives a
c+ = 1 ≥ 1 − δ provided that  < 1/2.168
p > 1, a value of p = 1 guarantees that P
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[4] M. H. Afrasiabi and R. Guérin. Choice-based pricing for user-provided connectivity.
In Proceedings of the 10th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation, NetEcon 2015, Portland, OR, June 2015, 2015. To appear.
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